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How do migrants from Mexico to the U.S., including those who return 
permanently to Mexico and those who engage in cross-border 
communication from the U.S., contribute to changes in the political attitudes 
and behavior of Mexicans living in Mexico? 
Individuals who return to Mexico after experiencing U.S. democracy 
directly are less likely to influence change among their non-migrant co-
nationals than are migrants who remain in the U.S. This holds even though 
the former can share their experiences face-to-face, while the latter must 
transmit them from a distance and across the border.  
Non-migrants’ propensity to learn foreign political practices and beliefs 
from migrants is conditioned by their ambivalent attitudes towards the U.S. 
These attitudes condition both migrants’ willingness to share the forms of 
civic engagement they learned up north and non-migrants’ receptivity. Non-
migrants are more receptive to migrants who remain in the U.S. than to 
returnees because they have a higher esteem for them and because the 
long-distance ties that bind non-migrants to migrants abroad, as opposed to 
those back home, are stronger. Both types of migrants have an interest in 
sharing their new beliefs and behaviors with non-migrants; but while 
 x
returnees struggle to accept adaptations of American-style practices to the 
Mexican context, this produces little inconvenience for migrants abroad. The 
anti-American attitudes returnees find in Mexico also dampen their efforts to 
introduce change. 
I employ statistical regressions, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and 
process tracing to evaluate two data sources: (1) a large-n database that 
draws from an original survey administered on a nationwide sample of 
Mexican citizens living in Mexico; and, (2) scores of interviews with migrants 
and the people in Mexico with whom they communicate. The statistical 
results indicate the outcomes that migrant-led international diffusion 
produces. The qualitative analysis explains the mechanisms that drive or 
constrain diffusion. 
The project applies theories of international diffusion to change 
occurring among individuals at the level of mass publics. It highlights the 
importance of intersubjective beliefs about the sources of foreign 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Question 
Research shows that international migrants contribute in numerous ways 
to changes in their sending localities. Much of this influence results because 
emigrants continue to engage in social transactions with their home country after 
departing. For example, they may send money home; communicate with loved 
ones via phone, letters, and the Internet; receive visitors from the homeland in 
their new country of residence; and return to their homeland as tourists. Such 
transactions have been shown to transfer information and material resources 
capable of modifying both the cultures (Levitt, 1998) and strategic options 
(Merino, 2005) of those who receive them. There is also evidence that trans-state 
engagement between migrants and people who stay behind can alter the political 
organization (Fitzgerald, 2000; Goldring, 2002; Rivera Salgado, 1999; Smith, 
M.P., 2003; Smith, R., 1995), rules and outcomes (Burgess, 2005; Martínez 
Saldaña, 2002; Martínez Saldaña & Ross Pineda, 2002), and economies of 
sending communities (Nyberg–Sørensen, Van Hear, & Engberg–Pedersen, 
2002; Orozco, 2006; Taylor, 1999).  
Migrants may also import change into their countries of origin when they 
return there permanently1 after having experienced the values, attitudes, and 
practices of another country firsthand. Returnees have transformed the face of 
their sending communities as a result of the significant portion of savings they 
direct to housing and local infrastructure improvements. Many utilize the 
resources obtained abroad to compete for, and win, local political offices (Bakker 
& Smith, M.P., 2003; Smith, M.P. & Bakker, 2007; Smith, R., 2006).  
Do these distinct cross-border movements of people, resources, 
knowledge, and ideas contribute to the diffusion of political behavior and beliefs 
                                            
1 I use the term permanently to refer to migrants who return with the intention of re-establishing 
their residence in Mexico for the foreseeable future. Although their intentions at the time of return 
are to settle in Mexico, many migrants emigrate again.  
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from migrants’ host countries to the country of origin? What factors either 
encourage or prevent migrants from transferring innovative political attitudes and 
practices across borders? How and what do people who remain rooted in their 
country of origin learn from their co-nationals with significant experience living in 
another nation-state as migrants? How and under what conditions do the beliefs 
and behaviors of migrants themselves change as they travel from the political 
context of one country to another? Finally, does the diffusion of political behavior 
and beliefs help to strengthen civic engagement in migrants’ countries of origin? 
International diffusion is a “process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system” (Rogers, 1995, p. 5). The core proposition driving this project is 
that international migration produces a unique set of channels through which 
innovations pertaining to civic engagement may travel among members of a 
trans-state social system.  
This project first determines whether diffusion via migrants occurs and 
examines its effects on political behavior and attitudes of non-migrant Mexicans. 
Are the presence of migrants who have become politically socialized in the U.S., 
the existence of two distinct pathways for the interpersonal transmission of ideas 
from one country to another, and demand in Mexico for a better quality of 
democracy sufficient conditions for the diffusion of U.S. forms of civic 
engagement to Mexico? 
I subsequently compare the different processes by which return migrants 
and stayers2 contribute to the diffusion of U.S. political beliefs and behaviors. The 
objective is to explain what facilitates or constrains the diffusion of political 
innovations via each pathway. Is long-distance cross-border communication a 
viable path for transmission of both foreign political attitudes and practices to 
                                            
2 I employ the term “stayers” to refer to migrants who remain in their host country. In this project it 
refers to migrants who remain in the U.S. 
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non-migrant friends and kin? How does crossing the border back into Mexico 
influence migrants’ propensities to supply information and the content of the 
information they convey to others? In what ways does a migrant’s distance or 
presence in the U.S. condition the diffusion process? What and under what 
conditions do non-migrants learn from their co-nationals with significant 
experience living as migrants in another nation-state? In addressing these 
questions, I take seriously that the channels of diffusion in question—social 
transactions between migrants and non-migrants—are embedded in an 
international context involving a politically charged border.  
For the dependent variable, I utilize a conception of civic engagement that 
includes both behavioral and attitudinal dimensions. Behaviorally, civically 
engaged citizens ought to support “an ‘activist’ role of the self in the polity” 
(Almond & Verba, 1989). This signifies that in addition to voting, democratic 
citizens should have information, knowledge, opinions about and an interest in 
political issues (Almond & Verba, 1989); they should consider themselves 
politically efficacious. Furthermore, participant citizens should support the right to 
join organized civic groups and protest (Dahl, 1971). Attitudinally, civically 
engaged citizens should be tolerant and broadly supportive of democracy. That 
is, they should support the right of minority dissent, including approving of the 
civil liberties of unpopular groups or regime critics (Dahl, 1971). We might also 
refer to this combination of attitudes and behaviors as democratic citizenship.  
1.2 Findings and Theoretical Argument 
I find that migrants contribute to the international diffusion of political 
beliefs and behaviors, but the findings are more nuanced and mixed than one 
would expect. The availability of information from people with whom non-
migrants have affective ties about how democracy can function better, coupled 
with a strong demand for knowledge about how to improve the quality of 
democracy among non-migrants, would seem to represent the optimal conditions 
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for diffusion. However, I do not uncover uniformly positive differences between 
the attitudes and behaviors of Mexicans who are touched by international 
migration versus those who are not.  
Instead, long-distance cross-border social transactions contribute strongly 
to the diffusion of more democratic political behaviors, while communication 
between return migrants and Mexicans who have not migrated does not 
contribute to diffusion at all. In other words, individuals who return to Mexico after 
experiencing democracy directly in the U.S. are less likely to contribute to the 
international diffusion of political behaviors and attitudes than are migrants who 
continue living in the host country. This is true even though returnees can share 
their experiences face-to face with their non-migrant co-nationals when they 
resettle in their country of origin, while people who remain abroad must 
communicate information from a distance.  
Another key finding is that attitudes do not diffuse in lockstep with 
behavioral dispositions. Although long-distance communication between stayers 
in the U.S. and non-migrants living in Mexico contributes to the diffusion of both 
aspects of civic participation, it principally leads to the transfer of behavioral 
dispositions. In contrast, return migrants, who overall diffuse very little, mainly 
import new attitudes.  
What explains the inconsistent and counterintuitive patterns by which 
international migration contributes to modifications in attitudinal and behavioral 
dispositions among Mexicans living in their country of origin? More specifically, 
why are long-distance social transactions between migrants and non-migrants 
more effective channels for the diffusion of democratic citizenship? And, why do 
patterns of diffusion among behaviors and attitudes differ? 
The central argument is that the migration-driven diffusion of political 
beliefs and behaviors is conditioned by a unique set of attitudes that are shared 
by members of localities, such as Mexico, where significant portions of the 
population have either emigrated, returned home after emigrating, or are thinking 
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about emigrating in the future. In such cases, sentiments toward migrants and 
emigration tend to mirror a broader sense of ambivalence towards the country to 
which emigrants move, and concerning bilateral relations between migrants’ 
home and host country. 
Deeply rooted anti-Americanism continues to characterize popular 
sentiments about Mexico’s relationship with the U.S., even as North American 
interdependence has intensified. Unwelcome U.S. involvement in Mexico’s 
domestic affairs has been a thorny issue for Mexicans since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Popular resentment of American military, political and economic 
involvement in Mexico, including the U.S. annexation of rich Mexican territories 
and its intermittent, but notable, ownership of key Mexican assets, underpins 
many of Mexico’s post-revolutionary ideals. Although NAFTA has attenuated 
anti-American sentiments by facilitating unprecedented levels of economic and 
cultural integration between the two countries during the last two decades, the 
core elements of popular nationalism enshrined in the 1917 Constitution persist, 
including widespread—if not growing—opposition to allowing U.S. investment in 
the Mexican energy sector (González & Minushkin, 2006), and strong objections 
to the presence of U.S. law enforcement officers within Mexico to help fight crime 
(CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).  
A central feature of anti-Americanism in Mexico as well as the rest of Latin 
America has been “ambivalence—the relatively clear-headed espousal of 
contradictory feelings or beliefs” (McPherson, 2003, p. 7). For instance, 73 
percent of Mexicans believe Americans are either racist or very racist, and 63 
percent consider the U.S. wealthy because it exploits others. Yet, 45 percent 
claim that their lives would improve if they migrated illegally to the U.S. (CIDAC-
Zogby, 2006). And, one-third of Mexicans say they would be willing to move to 
the U.S. if they could, even though 57 percent feel disdain or indifference 
towards the country and 53 percent feel distrust (González & Minushkin, 2006). 
Even more strikingly, asked if they would support a U.S. plan, similar to the 
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Marshall Plan, to help Mexico’s development in exchange for stronger controls 
on illegal migration, only 29 percent of Mexicans agreed (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). 
Correspondingly, the majority (65%) of Mexicans indicated their refusal to 
exchange greater U.S. access to investment in petroleum and gas for more 
flexible migration policies (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).  
Mexicans’ attitudes toward migration are a specific aspect of a broader set 
of incongruous attitudes toward the U.S. On one hand, Mexicans perceive entry 
into the U.S. as a promising means of improving their lives; on the other hand 
they are fiercely nationalist and protective of their sovereignty—especially with 
respect to the U.S. Moisés Naím aptly characterizes this paradoxical form of anti-
Americanism as “fueled by jealousy, resentment, ambivalence, and crushed 
expectations. The seductive allure of American capitalism, freedoms, products, 
and culture often coexists with ambivalence about them as economically or 
politically unattainable” (2002, p. 103).  
My argument draws on a constructivist perspective. According to 
Finnemore and Sikkink, “constructivism is an approach to social analysis that 
asserts the following: (a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational 
factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are 
widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs…and (c) these shared beliefs construct 
the interests and identities of purposive actors” (2001, pp. 392-393; see also 
Wendt, 1999). Migrant-led diffusion from the U.S. entails people and information 
traveling across an international border that is highly symbolic and politically 
charged from the perspective of most Mexicans. The intersubjective beliefs that 
Mexicans hold both about U.S.-Mexico relations and the place of Mexican 
migration within those relations influence the innovations that migrants share and 
those to which non-migrants are receptive.  
This dissertation argues that anti-Americanism is akin to a social norm in 
Mexico. Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as a “standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity… what is appropriate by reference to the 
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judgments of a community or a society” (1999, p. 891-892). Dozens of scholars 
have argued that anti-Americanism is a core element of Mexican identity (see 
e.g., Castañeda, 1993; Morris, 1999, 2000, 2005; Paz, 1979; Ramos, 1962; 
Reyes Heroles, 1995). Scholars also argue that anti-Americanism is a norm that 
contributes to shaping the range of acceptable public policies—a norm that 
strongly influences Mexican public attitudes toward the U.S. and determines the 
type of bilateral relationship they are willing to accept with their northern neighbor 
(Krauze, 2005; Pastor & Castañeda, 1989; Weintraub, 1990). Mexican attitudes 
toward the U.S. fundamentally define the scope of U.S.-Mexico relations and the 
possibilities for closer regional integration (Inglehart, Nevitte, & Basáñez, 1996). 
Andrew Selee recently remarked that “In the case of Mexico-U.S. relations, the 
role of public perceptions is even greater than in most bilateral relationships, 
however—and perhaps more important than in any other relationship that either 
country has with another” (2005, p.1).  
These shared beliefs reify the border and infuse it with meaning beyond 
that of a line marking the limits of the state (Bustamante, Jasso, Taylor, & 
Trigueros Legarreta, 1998). Political attitudes and behavioral dispositions 
traveling from the U.S. to Mexico via migrants must therefore bridge both a 
politically charged state boundary and two distinct normative contexts. The 
bridging process is complex because migration itself contributes to Mexicans’ 
anti-American norms. Migrants have to navigate a set of normative beliefs that 
their own cross-border movements (inadvertently) help constitute.  
This anti-American social norm guides the distinctions that non-migrants 
make between migrants at home and abroad, and underlies the paradoxical 
strength of long-distance communication as a path for diffusion. It explains why 
long-distance ties between migrants abroad and their friends and kin in Mexico 
are stronger than ties between returnees and their co-nationals who never leave.  
Widely held anti-American beliefs underlie non-migrant Mexicans’ beliefs 
regarding the risks involved in crossing the border into the U.S. and the 
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challenges of maintaining oneself in that “distant” country. These beliefs in turn 
cause non-migrants who stay behind to worry about their friends and family in the 
U.S.; to take personal pride in the migrants’ ability to integrate into the U.S. 
economy and political system; and to carefully attend to them whenever they 
communicate. Any material benefits, such as receiving cash remittances, that 
accrue to non-migrants as a result of having a friend or family member in the 
U.S. further strengthens their orientations towards migrants. Non-migrants’ 
positive orientations, in turn, encourage migrants to express themselves openly 
and freely.  
In contrast, migrants who resettle in Mexico must face perception of them 
as “Americanized”, possessing aggrandized perceptions of themselves and their 
capabilities, and as lazy. These understandings of return migrants make them 
targets of non-migrants’ anti-American sentiments. That return migrants are 
generally less capable of providing material benefits once they have returned to 
Mexico only worsens non-migrants perceptions of them. Non-migrants are not 
attentive and receptive to return migrants. As a result returnees do not express 
themselves openly and freely after they return.  
Migrants who remain abroad communicate long-distance and across an 
international border from a supportive normative context, while migrants who 
have returned home communicate face-to-face the new ideas they learned 
abroad under social constraints. This dynamic explains the paradoxical strength 
of long-distance cross-border ties. Highly ambivalent anti-American social norms 
cause non-migrants’ perceptions of migrants to vary, depending on whether they 
are located at home or abroad.  
This dynamic also makes it relatively easier for foreign innovations 
transmitted from abroad to find a fit in Mexico, as compared with those imported 
personally by migrants when they resettle there. Many returnees come home 
with the expectation that they may improve life in their country or locality of origin 
if they can successfully implement what they learned abroad. Their efforts often 
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fail because they are unable to adapt the innovation in question into their home 
country context. Returnees become easily frustrated and disappointed by the 
incongruity they observe between their idealized recollection of how the practice 
functioned in the U.S. and the process or outcome it produces in Mexico. Their 
emphasis on how the practice in question functions in the U.S. hinders diffusion 
precisely because it activates anti-American sentiment among non-migrants, who 
snub energized and optimistic co-nationals who they perceive as lauding U.S. 
political practices—or worse as traitors against Mexican traditions.  
 Quite the opposite, non-migrants can implement foreign innovations of 
which they learn from migrants residing abroad more easily because they have 
never witnessed or experienced the innovation firsthand in its native context; they 
do not have an idealized model against which to compare their interpretation and 
reconstruction of the innovation; the absence of specific expectations makes 
them less likely to abandon efforts to import change. Moreover, the migrant who 
conveys the information is not present to supervise and criticize the manner in 
which the innovation has been implemented. For all these reasons, non-migrants 
who change their attitudes or behavior in response to information transmitted by 
migrants abroad are less likely to be seen as traitors who simply emulate 
Americans. 
This dissertation also finds that political attitudes diffuse less than 
behaviors. We can explain differences in how attitudes and behaviors diffuse 
using the same theoretical framework I advanced above. Specifically, differences 
in the nature of attitudes as opposed to behaviors have important implications for 
how each interacts with the Mexican domestic social environment. The political 
behaviors I explore inherently involve observable public actions. Migrants who 
return to Mexico and engage in the new political behaviors that they learned 
abroad must publicly stand up to Mexicans’ shared anti-American attitudes. 
However, they can keep their new individual attitudes private, since attitudes are 
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not publicly observable. Migrants can thus retain their new values and think 
globally—so to speak, but act locally to conform publicly to social constraints.  
A different logic underpins the finding that long-distance social 
transactions do not contribute significantly to the diffusion of political beliefs. 
Migrants tend to share with co-nationals back home their observations about the 
political actions and practices of Americans; and these reflect U.S. political 
values. For example, migrants may share that they freely participated in a 
political march, even though their presence in the U.S. is undocumented. This 
message could convey to non-migrants’ ideas about the extent of political 
tolerance that exists in the U.S., but long-distance communication does not 
appear to contain explicit discussions about political values as such. The 
infrequency and brevity of long-distance communication appears to privilege the 
discussions about the daily lives and concerns of both migrants and non-
migrants. 
To reprise, migrant-driven international diffusion is conditioned by the 
intersubjective beliefs that Mexicans hold regarding Mexico-U.S. relations and 
the place of migration within those relations. These beliefs can best be 
characterized as anti-American, yet they are highly ambivalent. Shared beliefs 
among Mexicans living in Mexico cause the attitudes toward migrants to differ 
depending on their location either in the U.S. or Mexico. They explain the 
strength of long-distance trans-state social transactions between migrants and 
non-migrants as a channel of diffusion while diminishing the value of face-to-face 
transactions between returnees and their co-nationals. The social context to 
which migrants return inhibits diffusion on the part of returnees by making it more 
difficult for them to adapt U.S. practices to the Mexican context and by 
encouraging returnees to keep their new ideas to themselves. In contrast, 
experience with a U.S. ideal does not limit non-migrants who learn of political 
innovations from their U.S.-based friends and kin; non-migrants can thus 
implement innovations as they like in the absence of the migrant. In sum, due to 
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the prevailing anti-Americanism in Mexico, an American political innovation 
conveyed from abroad is more meaningful to potential adopters than one that is 
conveyed face-to-face. There is greater demand and acceptance for new political 
ideas from migrants abroad; this, in turn, encourages their transfer, rather than 
stifle it.  
1.3 Theoretical Significance of the Project 
The study of international diffusion has recently come into vogue to 
account for the wave-like spread of similar public policies, regime transitions, and 
changes in national-level social norms. Early scholars argued that the adoption of 
certain political institutions and habits in one country effectively influence the 
probability that another country will also adopt them (Strang, 1991). Studies of 
international democratic diffusion studied macro-level regime change—that is, 
entire countries' transitions from authoritarianism to democracy—principally to 
confirm empirically that the hypothesis that these spatio-temporal clusters 
existed. For example, Starr (1991) determines that regime transitions to 
democracy occur closer together in time than mere chance would predict. 
Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) find that democracies 
surrounded by other democracies are more likely to survive. Brinks and 
Coppedge (2006) show that the level of democracy of a country’s neighbor 
contributes to determining the level of democracy in the country itself.   
A more recent and closely related body of scholarship has strengthened 
this broader research area by accounting for the role of agents in the diffusion 
process. This literature concerns not only democratic diffusion, but also that of 
norms and public policies. The first wave of this literature stressed the role of 
transnational or foreign agents as advocates of change within countries, without 
much concern for how leaders of those countries incorporated external ideas. A 
second wave has enhanced our understanding of diffusion by taking seriously 
the role of domestic agents as active adopters of the innovations being diffused. 
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Both waves of scholarship focus on state and non-state agents of diffusion, 
including national leaders (e.g., Acharya, 2004; Weyland, 2007), grass-roots 
activists (e.g., Brooks & Fox, 2002; Tarrow, 2005); non-governmental 
organizations (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998); members of organized transnational 
epistemic communities (e.g., Kapur & McHale, 2005); and members of organized 
diasporas (e.g., Scheffer, 2003).  
Although scholars who study diffusion claim to address the broader 
question of how foreign influences contribute to modifying domestic political 
outcomes, little work in this field has explored the question with respect to 
outcomes observable among ordinary individual citizens. This is surprising since 
the literature on democracy widely concurs that civic engagement, including both 
its attitudinal and behavioral aspects, is an essential component of a healthy, 
consolidated democracy (Barber, 1984; Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1999; Lijphart, 
1997; Linz, 1990; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Moreover, in today’s globally integrated 
world, we have reason to believe that external—or international—factors might 
also contribute to explaining changes in this critical aspect of democracy.  
Identifying factors that contribute to civic engagement has been a central 
concern of scholars of comparative politics for decades precisely because of its 
importance to the democratic process. However, theories of civic participation 
have privileged domestic explanations and ignored the rich literature that 
developed in parallel regarding the effects of international forces on domestic 
political phenomena. The most salient explanations of civic participation 
emphasize local and historically rooted levels of social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti,1993); socialization (Beck & 
Jennings, 1982; Sears & Funk, 1999; Sears & Valentino, 1997) and social 
communication (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995; Beck, Dalton, Greene, 
& Huckfeldt, 2002; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, Levine, & Morgan, 1998); 
modernization (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1981); or the 
role of institutions (Holzner, 2007; Lijphart, 1997; Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969). 
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Few scholars have seriously integrated international forces into their 
explanations, even though some have clear testable implications at the global 
level.  
At the domestic level, scholars argued for decades that political 
discussions contribute to spreading information about politics (Downs, 1957), and 
that they are a widespread activity with influential consequences (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & 
Gaudet, 1944). Contemporary social communication theories have grown 
increasingly sophisticated; however, the thrust of their arguments continues to be 
that social interactions strongly influence political behavior—more so than the 
media, political parties, and other organizations (Beck, Dalton, Greene, & 
Huckfeldt, 2002). Although this scholarship has examined how a multitude of 
variations in the social contexts and social transactions of citizens influence 
behavior, it has ignored cross-national social transactions. Again, this is 
surprising given the unprecedented level of global social integration and 
communications that exists today. 
This project makes two major contributions to the broader theoretical and 
empirical endeavors of contemporary comparative political scientists. First, it 
applies theories of international democratic diffusion to questions observable at 
the level of mass publics. In so doing, it shifts the level of analysis from the 
national to the individual level. Additionally, it focuses on a distinct type of agent; 
rather than study purposive actors such as elite political leaders or organized 
activists, I focus on the prosaic trans-state transactions of ordinary people. 
Second, I examine the possibility that international forces, in addition to domestic 
forces, contribute to changes in patterns of civic engagement. Specifically, I 
strengthen theories of social communication by considering them in the case of 
trans-state social transactions. 
I also add novel evidence and ideas to the ongoing debates within the 
diffusion literature regarding the nature of the process itself. The transfer of 
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political beliefs and behaviors across borders via migrants represents a new type 
of diffusion that we can explore to better understand the causal forces that 
underpin international diffusion more broadly. Is the process rational, boundedly 
rational or constructivist in nature? I find that diffusion is a complex process 
shaped by the attitudes and beliefs that non-migrants hold concerning the 
country to which their co-nationals emigrate—the country in which their migrant 
friends and family learn new political practices and beliefs. This process is similar 
to that advanced by constructivist scholars. Constructivists argue that the beliefs 
that potential adopters share about the appropriateness or normative desirability 
of an object of international diffusion fundamentally determine if that object will be 
accepted or rejected. In this case, shared beliefs about the state in which 
migrants learn the political beliefs and behaviors that they then transmit to 
Mexico condition the likelihood of adoption. 
1.4 Significance of the Project for Mexico 
My research has several implications for Mexico specifically. First, 
although Mexico’s transition to an electoral democracy is widely viewed as 
successful, elections alone have not sufficed to effectively channel citizen 
demands and hold political leaders accountable. By most accounts, the 
institutional hardware required of an enduring democracy is in place, but the 
necessary participative behaviors and attitudes are weak. There is a need within 
Mexico for greater civic engagement.  
My research has mixed implications about the impact of migration on the 
democratization of political beliefs and behaviors. The positive impact is most 
significant with respect to the type of trans-state social transaction that is most 
widespread: long-distance communication between migrants and non-migrants. 
However, it is difficult to pass judgment on the value of a domestic democratic 
deepening process that is being driven by the departure of hundreds of 
thousands from their own country to another nation in which most are not 
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citizens. Though communication between returnees and non-migrants comprise 
a smaller portion of trans-state social transactions, they are substantial and 
promise to remain so in the future. Mexicans’ habitual rejection of innovations 
imported by returnees is striking. Such intolerance of new political ideas and 
practices is antithetical to democracy and raises serious questions about the 
proposition that migration contributes to enhancing the latter. 
With 1 in 9 Mexican-born nationals living outside the country (about 90 
percent of these live in the U.S.), cross-border social interactions represent a 
significant source of regional integration. Scholars have argued that regional 
integration and cultural convergence (including the convergence of political 
beliefs and behaviors) go hand-in-hand. Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basáñez have 
made the claim that “the medium- and short- term projections indicate that in the 
next few decades there will be a very significant cultural confluence between the 
new inhabitants of Mexico and the citizens of the U.S” (1996, p. 164). Similarly, 
Seligson and Booth argue that “both Mexico's proximity to the United States and 
the tradition of heavy migration of Mexicans to their northern neighbor have 
widely exposed Mexicans to liberal democratic norms and practices…[and] may 
well account for the emergence of democratic values among urban Mexicans in 
spite of their authoritarian polity” (1993, p. 131).  
My research focuses explicitly on migrants as vectors of change. The time 
frame for my study comes nearly fifteen years after the implementation of NAFTA 
and corresponds with a 50 percent increase in the rate of emigration from Mexico 
between 2000 and 2008. Nonetheless, my findings contradict the convergence 
thesis and reveal the strength of domestic factors. The extent and means through 
which the intersubjective anti-American beliefs of Mexicans limit diffusion is 
surprising in light of the dominant academic thinking to date. The findings show 
that borders constrain actors because they are legal boundaries marking the 
limits of nation states. Other than representing a state’s sovereign territory, which 
civilian and military officials may enforce coercively, borders have symbolic 
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meanings rooted in power, history and culture. Citizens of nation-states reify 
these socially constructed interpretations of borders enough for them to influence 
the fate of innovations that cross them. 
Most of the research concerning migration´s effects on democracy in 
Mexico has focused on communities that are newsworthy precisely because of 
the political involvement of migrants. This research helps us understand 
migrants’ transnational activities, including how these have contributed to 
expanding the degree to which migrants can participate in home country politics 
and with what effect. However, their focus on exceptional cases probably leads 
them to overstate the effect of migration on the political behavior and beliefs of 
Mexicans overall. My research thus presents a more balanced national 
assessment of how migration affects civic engagement in the country. 
1.5 Research Design 
This study examines how two aspects of migration serve as channels of 
ideational and behavioral diffusion: migrant returns and long-distance cross-
border social transactions. The concept of migrant returns encompasses 
individuals who have worked, studied or resided for at least one year in the U.S. 
and subsequently re-settled in Mexico. Long-distance cross-border social 
transactions comprise any type of communication—including phone calls, letters, 
electronic mail or other Internet communication, brief personal visits, videos, and 
so forth—that occurs between migrants who at the time of my research were 
studying, working or living for at least one year in the U.S. and Mexican citizens 
living in Mexico.3 I explore how these two migration-driven paths of diffusion 
                                            
3 Note, residents of Mexico may have previously migrated and engagement in trans-state 
exchanges from their country of origin following their return. My research considers migrants all 
migrants who are abroad versus all migrants who return. Many migrants abroad will claim that 
they intend to return, but will not do so for decades. The difficulty of distinguishing between 
sojourner (migrants who stay for only a short time) and true settlers led me to lump them together 
as a group and compare them to bona fide returnees. 
  
33 
affect political attitudes and behavior. Attitudes involve judgments, meaning 
opinions of approval and disapproval, and values, meaning the ethical criteria 
that guide individuals’ thoughts and actions. I consider four attitudes: (1) 
tolerance of political differences (value); (2) the belief that individuals can bring 
about political change (value); (3) satisfaction with democracy (judgment); (4) 
and evaluations of government respect for rights (judgments). Behavior 
encompasses individual and collective political participation that attempts to 
influence public decision-making. I examine four behaviors: voting, individual 
non-electoral political activity, participation in civic organizations, and organized 
protest. 
I use three methods of comparative inquiry. First, I use large-N data to 
conduct multi-level linear and logistic regressions to estimate the influence of 
migration on political attitudes and behaviors. This analysis draws on the data 
gathered through an original survey conducted in Mexico called Desencanto 
Ciudadano en México (Citizen Disenchantment in Mexico). The survey was 
originally designed to evaluate how Mexicans view their democracy. Its principal 
author, David Crow, generously agreed to incorporate a battery of questions 
about the international migration experiences of Mexican citizens living in 
Mexico. Berumen y Asociados, a well-established Mexican firm dedicated to 
market and public opinion research since 1991, conducted the survey face-to-
face between June 16 and June 28 of 2006. Respondents comprised 650 voting-
age Mexican citizens selected at random nationally. The statistical analysis also 
employs publicly available data collected in 2000 by Mexico’s National Institute of 
Geography, Statistics and Information (INEGI) and the country’s National 
Population Council (Conapo).  
Second, I conduct fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyze 
data obtained from over 120 semi-structured field interviews of return migrants, 
non-migrants who know return migrants, and leaders of communities that 
produce large numbers of emigrants. I employ the method to identify both the 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for migrants to have learned and introduced 
into Mexico U.S. political beliefs and behaviors. Fuzzy sets can be utilized to 
evaluate the same relationships that traditional “crisp” sets assess, such as 
membership, intersection, and union. However, fuzzy sets allow various levels of 
membership within a set. Rather than limit membership to strict binary variables, 
in which a case is either “in” or “out” of a set, fuzzy sets allow membership scores 
to range anywhere between zero and one. Fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA) involves organizing the fuzzy set data into a “truth table”, which 
represents every possible configuration of causal conditions and outcomes, 
comparing all possible causal configurations, and simplifying them via Boolean 
minimization procedures. The technique serves to identify all of the combinations 
of conditions that are sufficient for an outcome to arise; it also helps us identify 
the conditions that are necessary to observe an outcome.  
Finally, I employ the process tracing method to clarify the theoretical 
nature of the diffusion process that migration sets in motion. Like fsQCA, process 
tracing differs from methods that rest on a correlational logic; however, unlike 
both of the former methods, process tracing does not even involve comparison 
across cases. Instead, the research method is theory-driven. It requires 
researchers to trace the process leading to an outcome to determine whether 
each step along the way conforms to the expectations generated by theory A or 
theory B (George & Bennett, 2005). I use process tracing to compare the causal 
forces that drive four distinct components of the migrant-led international 
process. The objective is to evaluate each of these components’ conformity with 
the expectations generated either by rational choice theory or constructivism. 
First, I assess whether return migrants’ failure to diffuse the beliefs and behaviors 
they learn in the U.S. is because they believe they have no utility in Mexico 
(rational choice), or if the prevailing norms in Mexico discourage their practice 
and proliferation (constructivism). I compare these findings to three others: 
returnees’ propensity and reasons for keeping to themselves the new beliefs they 
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import; the decision to share beliefs and behaviors by migrants abroad; and non-
migrants’ decisions to embrace or reject the innovations that each type of migrant 
shares with them.  
This mixed research method is ideal, because the quantitative analysis 
allows me to identify national tendencies with respect to what attitudes and 
beliefs are affected by migrant returns and long-distance cross-border social 
transactions, while the qualitative analysis permits me to explore in-depth the 
processes that underlie these outcomes.  
Understanding whether and under what condition migrants might 
transform their countries of origin is fascinating in and of itself. In some countries, 
as much as 39 percent of the native-born populations live in another country as 
migrants (in this case, Jamaica). The percentage of Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, 
and Mexicans living outside of their country are 16, 13, and 11 percent, 
respectively. With at least one in ten citizens moving principally to well-
established democracies and hundreds of thousands returning home after 
significant stays, migration represents an important link between sending and 
receiving countries such as these.  Exploring the implications of these 
connections is important.  
This dissertation’s focus on migrants is also valuable because migrants 
who return to their home country or engage in long-distance cross-border social 
transactions with people who do not migrate represent a “most likely” vector for 
the diffusion of foreign political beliefs and behaviors at the level of mass publics.  
Those who return to their home country or have close friends and family 
with whom they remain in touch have a more personal stake in that country’s 
future than do other potential transmitters of foreign political beliefs and 
behaviors, such as the governments of other nation-states, the media, and non-
governmental organizations that promote democracy. Migrants should be 
especially steadfast in their commitment to the political beliefs and behaviors 
they believe will benefit their country of origin. 
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Migrants are both insiders and outsiders in their communities of origin. 
They can introduce within their own community the foreign ideas and practices 
that they experienced first-hand outside their country. Migrants tend to belong to 
the same reference group as the friends and family they left behind. As a result, 
they ought to be able to explain foreign political attitudes and behaviors to non-
migrants using familiar language and concepts. This is important because people 
tend to be suspicious of agents who actively proselytize their behavioral 
dispositions and beliefs in countries to which they do not belong.  
Finally, unlike other potential transmitters such as the media, migrants can 
engage in deliberations and discussions with non-migrants. They can clarify the 
doubts of potential adopters and provide additional supporting arguments for 
their new views and behavioral dispositions as necessary.  
My research concentrates on the “critical case” of migration from Mexico 
to the U.S. Implicitly, if my argument holds in the case of this migration corridor, it 
probably also holds for others. The case combines huge migratory flows, on the 
one hand, with significant differences in levels of democratic civic engagement, 
on the other. Mexico produces the largest, most consistent and enduring flow of 
international migrants in the world. Nearly half a million Mexican-born nationals 
emigrate to the U.S. annually, and about one in ten Mexican-born individuals 
currently reside in the U.S.  
Furthermore, although Mexico’s democracy has developed significantly 
over the past decade, there remains a sufficiently large gap between levels of 
democracy in the U.S. and Mexico to set diffusion in motion from north to south. 
The U.S. consistently ranks higher than Mexico on indices that assess the level 
of democracy (including Freedom House and Polity IV), and Americans are more 
likely engage in democratic citizenship, including both its attitudinal and 
behavioral dimensions.  
The U.S.-Mexico migration corridor is also unique in that it involves two 
countries that share a continuous 2,000 mile land border. For various reasons, 
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including natural geography, rising levels of economic interdependence, and the 
growth of regional transportation and communications infrastructure, people, 
money, ideas, and goods can cross this border with relative ease. Return 
migration and long-distance cross-border social transactions are therefore 
particularly prevalent in this case. 
Focusing on a single migrant source country is also methodologically 
advantageous. It allows me to hold constant (relative to cross-national studies) 
several aggregate level variables within the migrants’ country of origin that also 
influence individual political beliefs and behavior, such as political institutions; 
national history, religion, and culture; and economic development. The fact that 
nearly all Mexicans migrate to the U.S. or Canada permits me to control for 
diversity among the political systems and practices of migrant host countries.  
1.6 Organization of the Project  
The dissertation is organized into six chapters as follows. Chapter two 
explains the new theory of migrant-driven international diffusion that I develop 
based on the critical case of Mexico-U.S. migration. I argue that migrant-driven 
international diffusion is conditioned by the intersubjective beliefs that Mexicans 
hold regarding Mexico-U.S. relations and the place of migration within those 
relations. These beliefs can best be characterized as anti-American, yet they are 
highly ambivalent. Shared beliefs among Mexicans living in Mexico cause the 
social status of migrants to differ depending on their location either in the U.S. or 
Mexico. They cause the value of communication between migrants and non-
migrants to vary depending on whether the former have returned home or remain 
abroad. And, the social context to which migrants return inhibits diffusion on the 
part of returnees by making localization more difficult and by encouraging 
returnees to keep their new ideas to themselves.  
Chapter two also explains that neither rational choice nor boundedly 
rational approaches to the study of diffusion or social learning help to explain the 
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patterns by which international migrants contribute to the diffusion of political 
beliefs and behaviors. The two approaches fail to account for the incongruent 
spread of attitudes and behaviors. Additionally, they do not adequately account 
for the fact that return migrants face a constraint on behavioral changes inspired 
by the U.S. model, while non-migrants with friends and family in that country do 
not. The chapter concludes that a constructivist explanation provides the most 
compelling account of why migrant-led international diffusion produces the 
counterintuitive outcomes we observe. 
Chapter three employs statistical techniques to evaluate two hypotheses: 
1. Migrating to the U.S. causes return migrants to hold political beliefs 
and behaviors different from those of non-migrant Mexicans.  
2. Non-migrants who engage in long-distance cross-border social 
transactions with migrant Mexicans who reside in U.S. are relatively 
more participative and possess more democratic attitudes.  
The analysis uses data drawn from the Desencanto Ciudadano en México 
survey. It reveals that non-migrants with links to Mexicans abroad differ 
somewhat in their political beliefs and notably in their behaviors from non-
migrants without such ties. In contrast, it finds that while having migrated leads 
returnees to change their beliefs, this experience does not give rise to behavioral 
modifications among this group. The results suggest that long-distance trans-
border social transactions between migrants abroad and non-migrants represent 
more effective channels of diffusion than do face-to-face interactions between the 
latter and return migrants. Additionally, they suggest that attitudes and behaviors 
do not diffuse in lockstep. These surprising—if not puzzling—findings are the 
foundation for the subsequent two chapters. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the processes by which migrant returns, as 
compared with long-distance cross-border social transactions, contribute to the 
diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. The chapters draw on a set of in-depth 
field interviews I conducted with Mexicans living in both Mexico and the U.S., 
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including migrants abroad, return migrants, friends and family of both types of 
migrants, and Mexican leaders. 
 Chapter 4 examines how migrants who return contribute to the diffusion 
of political beliefs and behaviors. Based on three different research techniques, I 
find that return migrants learn both beliefs and behaviors abroad; however, they 
fail to diffuse these in Mexico because the shared attitudes of the non-migrants to 
whom migrants return are hostile towards them. The source of these hostilities 
appears to be that return migrants benefitted from emigrating to the U.S.; 
returnees are the target of Mexicans’ widespread resentment towards the U.S. 
Consequently, as returnees, they receive little of the respect and attention they 
did while they were abroad. Returning to this social context discourages 
migrants, who arrive with a great interest in implementing what they witnessed 
abroad, from following through with their efforts. Furthermore, because returnees 
have personally witnessed how democracy functions in the U.S., they struggle to 
adapt what they observed there to the Mexican context. They come to believe 
that some political beliefs and behaviors are uniquely possible in the U.S., and 
infeasible in Mexico; there is nothing in-between. 
Chapter 5 compares diffusion via long-distance cross-border 
communication to diffusion via returns. The chapter both confirms and 
strengthens the theoretical observations I make in Chapter 4 concerning return 
migrants. Specifically, it finds that migrants abroad do not feel constrained by 
Mexicans’ (in Mexico) attitudes toward them. Friends and family who 
communicate with migrants abroad do not report a similar disdain for migrants 
abroad as they do for migrants who return. Instead, they perceive those abroad 
as brave, successful risk-takers. Migrants in the U.S. represent for entire families, 
household, or businesses—a connection to better opportunities. For these 
reasons and because migrants are far away in another country, attitudes towards 
migrants abroad are supportive and attentive rather than demeaning and 
unaccommodating. Overall, non-migrants are receptive to migrants abroad and 
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endeavor to implement the suggestions they share. They implement the 
behaviors of which they learn as they imagine them; since they have not travelled 
to the U.S., they do not have an “ideal” reference point with which to evaluate 
their efforts. 
Chapter 6 draws theoretical conclusions from the extensive empirical 
investigation I report in the dissertation. The first part restates the new variant of 
constructivism I propose and explores its wider value for diffusion research. This 
new form of constructivism argues that a populations’ shared views toward the 
vector of foreign ideas or toward the entity from which a given object of diffusion 
originates is important. The core implication, in this case, is that even if potential 
adopters normatively support the more democratic beliefs and behaviors being 
diffused, their attitudes toward the U.S. and migration’s unique role within U.S.-
Mexico relations precludes their adoption as expected.  
The second part of Chapter 6 shows that my argument is applicable to a 
wide range of cases in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. It shows that 
the new theory I advance in the dissertation has general validity beyond the U.S.-
Mexico case. I conclude by indicating a number of research avenues that will 







CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF MIGRANT-DRIVEN      
INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION 
 
“The range of the inward as of the outward vision is capable of being increased in 
every individual; and while he gauges the extent of his geographical space by his 
freedom of movement and his right to enjoy it, he shapes accordingly his ideas 
and habits: and so as a whole does a people.” Friedrich Ratzel, 1898, p. 463. 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues that shared understandings among Mexicans about 
their country’s relationship with the U.S. fundamentally shape both non-migrants’ 
willingness to embrace information about U.S. political practices and beliefs and 
migrants’ own propensity to share them. Octavio Paz, in an allusion to “Snow 
White”, famously referred to the U.S. as an indiscreet mirror that conveys to 
Mexico that the U.S. is the true beauty of the region. Mexico’s long-standing 
tradition of defining itself in comparison to the U.S. has given rise to contradictory 
collective sentiments toward the U.S. Similar to attitudes towards the U.S. around 
the world, these are “fueled by jealousy, resentment, ambivalence, and crushed 
expectations. The seductive allure of American capitalism, freedoms, products, 
and culture often coexists with ambivalence about them as economically or 
politically unattainable” (Naím, 2002, p.103). In the case of Mexico, geographic 
proximity further strengthens the allure of the U.S., while strong popular 
perceptions of the U.S. as a latent threat sustain negative views. These strong 
paradoxical attitudes lead Mexicans to reify the border and infuse it with meaning 
beyond that of a line marking the limits of the state. 
As a result of these shared understandings, non-migrants consider 
migrants who are currently located in the U.S. to be self-sacrificing, courageous, 
and successful. Non-migrants are therefore very attentive to U.S.-based migrants 
and consider them worth emulating. In contrast, they pay little attention to 
returnees. Non-migrants disparage returnees because they perceive them as 
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regrettably having lost their Mexican identity; having forgotten how things are 
done in their native country; as individuals who return with inflated egos; and, as 
lazy.  
Non-migrants’ interest and willingness to embrace the foreign political 
innovations that migrants (including both returnees and stayers) convey is 
therefore socially structured; it is not influenced by a migrant’s personal merits, 
the success and strength of the U.S., or the inherent value of the idea being 
transmitted. Because non-migrants are of two minds in their attitudes towards 
migrants, the latter are more likely to share information about U.S. practices and 
values while they are abroad, when non-migrants are highly receptive to them, 
whereas they constrain their impulse to share once they have returned to 
Mexico, because non-migrants shut them out. 
Non-migrants are also better able to adapt foreign ideas to the local 
context in the absence of migrants. Returnees who import innovations personally 
give up relatively quickly on seeking ways to implement U.S. practices and 
beliefs in Mexico due to the social constraints that non-migrants’ attitudes 
towards them represent; they also overestimate the difficulty of carrying out 
change in Mexico as compared to in the U.S., and because they idealize the U.S. 
once they return home. 
My argument advances a new theoretical perspective that is consistent 
with constructivism insofar as it stresses the importance of irreducible 
intersubjective beliefs in shaping outcomes; however, I reject most diffusion 
scholars’ assumption that democratic change flows hierarchically and 
automatically from more to less democratic countries. Democratic behaviors, and 
to a much lesser extent, beliefs, do flow from the U.S. to Mexico via migrants, but 
not uniformly. The new form of constructivism that I put forth highlights the power 
of collective sentiments towards the country from which innovations emanate. It 
shows that feelings of resentment toward strong and successful countries can 
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stop changes that might otherwise be embraced as normatively superior, while 
simultaneously held feelings of admiration can contribute to their adoption.  
2.2 Democratic Diffusion and Political Learning via  Social Interactions: 
Shifting Levels of Analysis and Exploring New Types  of Relationships 
Theories of international diffusion offer compelling explanations for how 
international forces influence domestic politics. Broadly speaking, they argue that 
political changes outside of a country’s borders influence the probability that a 
similar change will occur within that country as well (Strang, 1991). Studies of 
democratic diffusion have evaluated the hypothesis that democracies exist in 
geographic clusters, or that they spread in a wavelike fashion from one country to 
another (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; O’Loughlin, Ward, Lofdahl, Cohen, Brown, 
Reilly, Gleditsch, & Shin, 1998; Starr, 1991; Starr & Lindborg, 2003). Scholars 
have strengthened support for these claims by using increasingly sophisticated 
approaches and research techniques, and by evaluating alternative indicators of 
democracy (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Hannan & Carrol, 1981; Most & Starr, 
1990; Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2002; Starr, 1991). However, 
nearly all studies of democratic diffusion employ minimal conceptions of the 
dependent variable (democracy), such as regime transitions; and they use 
aggregate level indicators (e.g., national Freedom House or Polity scores) to 
operationalize democracy.  
A significant research agenda opens up if we consider the implications of 
international diffusion on other aspects of democracy and assess diffusion’s 
effects at alternate levels of analysis. As we saw in the first chapter, my specific 
objective is to determine whether and under what conditions migrants contribute 
to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors from migrants’ host countries to 
their countries of origin. The broader goal of this research project is to direct the 
study of international diffusion to democratic processes caused by, and 
outcomes observable among, individuals at the level of mass publics.  
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This task requires us to carefully consider the micro-level processes that 
underlie diffusion. The existing literature depicts a democratization process that 
is set in motion by exogenous change; it posits that change leads to change 
(Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Most & Starr, 1991). The literature on model and 
principle diffusion significantly enhances our understanding of how the process 
functions on the ground. The first seeks to explain why leaders emulate policy 
models developed outside of their country. The second explores how changes in 
intersubjectively held understandings of what is appropriate in social life, which 
originate outside of a country, contribute to modifying the interests, beliefs, 
and/or choices of that country’s leaders. The main debate in the literature centers 
on the logic that drives decisions to adopt a foreign model or principle—that is, 
whether adopters behave rationally or otherwise. Another concerns whether 
international forces impose change on domestic actors, or if the latter play an 
active role in the diffusion process.  
Although research on model and principle diffusion focuses on processes 
that occur at the level of elite decision makers or involve organized activists, it 
offers useful perspectives for the study of mass level diffusion. In particular, 
unlike other scholarship that explores the spread of ideas, the international 
diffusion scholarship focuses on processes that are embedded in an international 
system comprised of sovereign nation-states and transnational or international 
organizations (TOs and IOs, respectively). The research contributes significantly 
to our understanding of the conditions under which actors anchored to one nation 
state decide to adopt models and principles developed either internationally or in 
another nation-state. It also sheds light on how foreign actors serve as agents of 
international diffusion.  
A separate research tradition explores how social communications 
influence political behavior among mass publics. This work complements the 
diffusion literature in helping us think about how beliefs and practices spread 
among actors other than elites and organized activists. It broadly concurs that 
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political information conveyed through interpersonal social mechanisms, such as 
discussions on the job or on the street, campaign buttons on a friend’s shirt, or 
even casual remarks have a powerful influence on individuals—even more 
powerful than do political information conveyed through speeches and media 
reports (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987, p. 1197). The most salient theoretical 
debates that frame this research revolve around similar issues as those that drive 
diffusion scholars. For instance, one debate regards whether individuals who 
learn from others do so rationally or not. There is also some disagreement 
regarding whether close personal ties contribute most to the spread of 
information, or whether other factors, such as local social structures have a 
stronger influence.  
Despite all of its contributions, however, the social communications 
scholarship has failed to consider whether and how informal social mechanisms 
that span the borders separating sovereign nation-states contribute to spreading 
political information. It typically focuses on face-to-face encounters, and operates 
under the assumption that this modality accounts for most interactions within 
primary groups. In principle, scholars recognize that an individual can access a 
distant social environment via close interpersonal relations with a second 
individual who is far removed from the day-to-day environment of the first. But, 
despite the explosion of globalization research, social communications 
researchers have not considered the possibility that the social spaces in which 
close interpersonal communications are situated may be international.4 Exploring 
this variant of interpersonal communication allows us to strengthen existing 
theories of social and political learning.  
The proportion of the population that has emigrated internationally from 
numerous countries is significant. In about one out of ten of the countries in the 
world over ten percent of the native-born population lives in another country 
                                            
4 There is a growing area of research concerning the effects of digital networks. These are quite 
distinct from the intimate cross-border links on which I focus this research project. 
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(Ratha & Xu, 2008). In some countries, such as Jamaica, the proportion of the 
native born population living in foreign lands is as high as 39 percent. The 
number of people living outside of their country of birth has doubled since 1975 
to about three percent of the world’s population. These data suggest that 
expanding the scope of pertinent social interactions to include cross-border ties 
does not simply satisfy a theoretical curiosity, but has substantive value in the 
real world as well.  
The data also imply that there are many countries of emigration in which 
critical masses of people who do not migrate have close friends or family residing 
outside of their country; many such people are exposed to foreign beliefs and 
behaviors as a result of their ongoing relations with those who have left. The 
relations I examine in this project therefore have much in common with those that 
social communication scholars study, except that they bridge international 
borders. 
My objective in the following paragraphs is to create a bridge between 
theories of international diffusion and social communication to develop competing 
sets of expectations regarding migrant-led international diffusion. I discuss the 
merits of each competing theory in turn. The chapter concludes by explaining 
more fully the new theory of migrant-driven international diffusion summarized in 
the first chapter. 
2.3 Theoretical Approaches to Learning: Elites vers us Mass Publics 
 Among those who study either international diffusion or political behavior 
among mass publics, there are significant numbers of scholars who focus on the 
issue of political learning. Multiple researchers in the area of diffusion examine 
how foreign information contributes to domestic political leaders’ existing 
knowledge, and what motivates domestic leaders to either embrace or reject 
foreign models or principles. Many scholars of political behavior evaluate how 
socially obtained information influences the political choices and beliefs of 
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individuals at the level of mass publics. Scholars in both fields disagree regarding 
the logic that underlies each process, with some claiming that actors involved are 
purely rational, others claiming they are boundedly rational, and a third group 
arguing that the process is socially constructed. 
2.3.1 Constructivist Approaches 
The constructivist approach to diffusion explores how the collectively held 
understandings or intersubjective ideas about social life in one country influence 
the identities, interests, behaviors, practices and decisions of actors rooted in 
another country (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986). Unlike 
rationalist accounts of diffusion, constructivism does not start from the premise 
that the interests of potential adopters are given. Additionally, although some 
level of domestic demand for policy solutions is required for the diffusion of 
models and principles, demand does not have to emerge from a country’s 
leaders. The demand for, or supply of, foreign models and beliefs among active, 
organized, and strategically placed domestic actors may be sufficient to create 
an environment in which domestic leaders also become interested. A leader’s 
interests may alternatively change as do the prevalent views in their surrounding 
environment (this may be the local, domestic, or international environment). 
Finally, leaders may become fundamentally convinced of the value of the 
principles and ideas in question. In sum, intersubjectively held beliefs about 
social life that flow into a country from an external source may constitute, 
regulate or enable leaders (Kratochwill & Ruggie, 1990), increasing the likelihood 
that they will embrace a democratic regime change, or policies that improve the 
quality of democracy. 
By and large, constructivist perspectives on the international diffusion of 
democracy argue that leaders will embrace democracy because they embrace its 
underlying values. In other words, actors will aspire to emulate or adopt a well-
functioning model of democracy because they consider it normatively superior. 
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We should consequently expect political beliefs and behaviors to flow from more 
to less advanced democracies. 
 There are various trajectories that foreign principles and models may 
follow as they come into contact with domestic actors, however. Domestic actors 
at various levels of analysis (based, in part, on their own intersubjective beliefs) 
may either embrace foreign models or principles, or call them into question 
(Cortell & Davis, 2000; Legro, 1997; Sikkink, 1991). Often, the interaction 
between international and domestic norms sets in motion a dynamic process in 
which domestically rooted actors and/or transnational activists work actively to 
make foreign models or principles more palatable or legitimate to local actors 
(Acharya, 2004, Checkel, 2001; Farrell, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999; 
Sikkink, 1991, Tarrow, 2005). For example, they may introduce the foreign 
concept strategically into the domestic environment by reframing (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1999), grafting (Risse-Kappen, 1995), and localizing (Acharya, 2004). 
Similarly, international actors may access influential, well-placed domestic actors 
who share their preference for the policy in question or share beliefs and utilize 
these actors to advance the model or principle of interest (Chayes & Chayes, 
1995; Checkel, 1999). Foreign practices can also become dominant domestic 
norms once a critical mass has embraced them (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999), or 
as elite actors legitimate them via official policies or laws.   
 The literature indicates that international forces are not unstoppable. 
Collective beliefs and ideas existing at the local, regional, national, sub-national, 
or organizational levels may be sufficiently rigid to prevent the introduction of new 
norms altogether (Acharya, 2004; Cortell & Davis, 2000). For instance, 
individuals may reject foreign models or principles if they seem inappropriate by 
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local standards, even if a cost-benefit analysis indicates that the foreign option 
represents the “best” strategy for achieving one’s objectives.5   
  The constructivist scholarship concerning international diffusion has not 
carefully explored and tested the above arguments with respect to mass publics. 
Nonetheless, scholars who study how individuals learn via social communication 
advance theories that similarly emphasize structure, norms and beliefs. For 
example, the structural equivalence model of social learning argues that the 
actions and choices of individual A—a total stranger with whom individual B may 
not even engage in political discussion—may nonetheless influence individual B 
if the former belongs to a social group whose principles appeal to the latter 
(Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1991). The logic behind the structural equivalence model 
is that people are likely to accept the practices they observe among individuals 
who belong to groups that share with them the same intersubjective beliefs about 
what is appropriate. Actors may even adopt behaviors and beliefs they know to 
be ineffective (irrational), so long as the transmitter of these goods belongs to the 
same “moral reference group” as the adopter or to a group for which the adopter 
has deep respect and admiration.6  
                                            
5 The perspective contrasts with ideal-typical rational choice approaches, which predict that a 
leader would be willing to defy local norms to implement the “best” policy prescription. Rational 
choice theories do not rest on a material ontology; actors’ constraints and utilities may be social 
and ideational or material (Blyth, 1997; Chong, 1991, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; 
Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998; Sugden 1989). However, the prevailing emphasis has 
been on the material. Rational choice institutionalists are an exception to this pattern. They part 
with the view that rational man is fully autonomous and unconnected to the social structure in 
which he is embedded and argue that socially constructed institutions are a structural constraint 
on actions akin to a material constraint. Nonetheless, as the following paragraph indicates, the 
differences between the rational choice and constructivist perspectives are deeper than whether 
constraints are material versus social or ideational. 
 
6 Note that structured social communication can help rational actors maximize their interests also. 
If the social relationships to which an individual belongs strongly represent her interests, then 
following this structural cue will be an efficient means of maximizing utilities. The difference 
between the rational choice and constructivist interpretation is that in the latter, adopters are 
persuaded of the normative value of the transmitters beliefs and behaviors. 
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 This dissertation has an interest in understanding whether migrants 
effectively transmit or import to Mexico the collective understandings in the U.S. 
(or migrants’ understandings of Americans’ collective understandings) about the 
behaviors and beliefs that constitute democratic citizenship. Constructivism 
argues that non-migrants and returnees living in Mexico ought to embrace the 
intersubjective beliefs that underlie American-style democracy. Concretely, 
migrants should be sufficiently committed to the democratic values they 
experienced and observed in the U.S. to transmit them to their non-migrant co-
nationals. Moreover, although local norms about political beliefs and behaviors 
could override external ones in theory, the political beliefs and behaviors of 
Americans should be sufficiently compelling, for normative reasons, to overcome 
the rational or ideational objections of potential non-migrant adopters. 
 
2.3.2 Rational Choice Approaches 
With respect to leaders, theories of rational learning assume that 
individual preferences are given. Leaders look to external models because their 
existing repertoire of policy solutions is insufficient to resolve the problems they 
face. The central argument of the rational choice approach involves how actors 
utilize external information. It claims that: 
actors (in our case politicians) have prior beliefs about which outcomes 
are expected from a particular policy…Politicians learn rationally only if 
they take all information into account about the outcomes of policies 
elsewhere (regardless of the characteristics of the sources of information) 
and use that information to revise their prior beliefs (Meseguer, 2005, p. 
75).  
Rational choice explanations of international diffusion imply that 
knowledge about policy models and norms that have been adopted elsewhere 
enhance the ability of leaders to effectively maximize their interests; such 




knowledge expands the range of policy alternatives from which leaders make 
selections based on a careful cost-benefit analysis.  
Rational learning in the case of mass publics may conform to either of two 
processes. First, if migrants introduce new behavioral and attitudinal alternatives 
that non-migrants find, through trial and error, to be more effective pathways for 
achieving their interests than those they knew of previously, then non-migrants 
should adopt these innovations if they are rational. More often, however, rational 
learning at the level of mass publics is less straightforward. Citizens, unlike 
leaders, may not be purposefully seeking solutions to problems in order to learn. 
They may have only a casual interest in politics, yet their interpersonal 
conversations about diverse topics may incidentally lead to political learning. 
Furthermore, rather than carefully assessing the merits of the various political 
behaviors and beliefs from which they may choose, rational citizens, at the level 
of the mass public, may utilize inferential shortcuts to make rational choices at a 
lower cost.  
Mass publics, unlike political leaders, utilize inferential shortcuts because 
they do not have the time, expertise, interest, or resources (or professional 
obligation for that matter) to make decisions about politics according to the strict 
postulates advanced by pure rational choice theorists. Unlike political leaders, 
whose job it is to make high impact policy decisions alone or in small numbers, 
the contribution that each individual citizen makes to political outcomes is nearly 
insignificant; however, mass publics may produce key outcomes as an 
aggregate. It is thus irrational for average citizens to obtain the information and 
expertise required to carefully assess the costs and benefits of each political 
decision they make (Downs, 1957). Such intense efforts are senseless in light of 
the constraints on citizens’ time and expertise, and in light of their infinitesimal 
contribution to political outcomes. 
Social interactions permit ordinary citizens to make rational choices more 
efficiently. Rather than carefully analyze all available options, citizens may follow 
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the cues of people they trust, whose knowledge of politics is superior, or with 
whom they share common interests, in order to navigate a complicated political 
world (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Downs, 1957; Huckfeldt, 2001; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991). For example, they may follow the lead of highly 
regarded and trusted peers or more specialized political actors such as political 
parties. Disagreement, debate, and persuasion contribute to expanding actors’ 
knowledge of the options available to them and expose them to arguments 
concerning which option represents the best path for reaching their objectives. 
This decision-making strategy produces interest-maximizing outcomes if 
individual decision makers engage in discussions with diverse interlocutors; if 
they are capable of identifying knowledgeable individuals who share their 
interests; and, if they are more likely to draw information from these discussants 
(Huckfeldt, 2001). 
There is evidence that many of the qualities possessed by the “opinion 
leaders” that rational choice theorists portray are overrepresented among 
migrants. Migrants are relatively more educated and skilled than those who stay 
behind (Macrcel & Cornelius, 2001). They tend to be the fittest member of their 
household, selected to migrate from the household (by non-migrants) precisely 
for this reason (Taylor, 1987). Significantly, migrants possess these qualities 
regardless of whether they return to Mexico or not. Some studies find that return 
migrants are self-selected for having fared relatively less well than they expected; 
they suggest that return migrants are negatively self-selected with respect to 
migrants who stay in the U.S. (Cuecuecha, 2006; Herzog & Schlottmann, 1983; 
Reyes, 1997). However, this should not be misunderstood to signify that 
returnees are systematically less skilled and capable of fulfilling their interests 
than non-migrants. To the contrary, studies show that returnees fare better 




Migrants’ international experiences should strengthen their position as 
relatively more fit than non-migrants. Regardless of their background in Mexico, 
migrants learn new political attitudes and behaviors in the U.S.7 For example 
they learn of more forms of participation by which they can hold leaders 
accountable or express their political preferences than their non-migrant co-
nationals learn in Mexico because living abroad exposes them to an even greater 
diversity of practices and strategies. In short, both migrants who return to Mexico, 
and those who stay in the U.S., are ideal candidates for rational non-migrants to 
learn from or simply emulate.8  
If migrants continue to engage their friends and family who remain back 
home, either when they return permanently or through cross-border 
communications; if the content of their communications includes accounts of 
social life in the U.S., including its politics; and, if Mexicans who stay in their 
country of origin have an interest in improving their democracy, then rational 
choice points to two possible outcomes. First, we should expect non-migrants to 
embrace the political beliefs and actions reported by migrants if these appear to 
be viable and effective in Mexico too. An alternate possibility is that non-migrants 
who communicate with Mexicans residing in the U.S. will embrace the political 
beliefs and behaviors that their migrant co-nationals claim are effective, without 
themselves carefully assessing their merits. With respect to return migrants, we 
would expect them to import into Mexico any of the beliefs and values they 
learned abroad that they know (based on empirical evidence) will help them meet 
their objectives and interests in Mexico.  
                                            
7 I explore this assertion in depth in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
8 Note that migrants’ leadership role is not contingent on their cross-border movement; however. 
It does not derive from the specific nation-states to which they migrate, the nature of relations 
between their home and host states, or citizens’ perceptions of these factors. Their leadership 




Note that it is perfectly rational to reject U.S.-based practices and beliefs if 
these are incompatible with Mexican political institutions—if they do not work in 
the context of the home country. However, the failure to adopt beliefs and 
behaviors proven to be highly effective in Mexico (i.e., more so than the existing 
ones) is inconsistent with rational choice theory. The adoption of beliefs, but not 
behaviors and vice versa is also inconsistent with the approach, which sees such 
dissonance as irrational; rational choice theory holds that behaviors follow from 
attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).  
Rational choice expectations are not consistent with the findings I present 
in this study. First, rational choice theory argues that beliefs and behaviors 
should be consistent, with beliefs contributing to the reasoning process in which 
rational actors engage to make decisions. But my research finds that beliefs and 
behaviors do not co-vary. Communication with friends and family abroad leads 
non-migrants to participate in politics significantly more, but such ties have a 
minimal impact on beliefs. In contrast, having migrated to the U.S. and returned 
to Mexico strengthens democratic attitudes, but returnees either participate less 
or at the same levels as their co-nationals without migration experiences. 
Furthermore, migrants do not consistently play the role of “opinion 
leaders” as I proposed earlier. Non-migrants perceive migrants who remain 
abroad, but not migrants who have returned, as people worth following. They 
snub returnees even though empirically they possess many of the qualities of 
individuals who influence others via social transactions. The difference between 
migrants and non-migrants is thus largely a matter of perceptions. Non-migrants 
perceive those who remain in the U.S. as more worthy of emulating, regardless 
of whether they are in fact more knowledgeable and capable of realizing their 
goals and interests. This contradictory perception leads non-migrants to respond 
differently to migrants and non-migrants, even when the political information 
being transmitted is almost identical. A migrant’s location either in Mexico or the 
U.S. is thus the primary factor that influences their status as so-called opinion 
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leaders. This process does not conform to rational theories of social learning at 
all. 
Return migrants’ failure to import new political behaviors could be rational 
if the foreign practices failed to produce results in Mexico. But there is little 
evidence for this argument. Returnees leave U.S. practices behind not because 
they find, through trial and error, that they do not work in their home country. 
Rather they respond to a Mexican context characterized by weak social support 
for the innovations that return migrants import. The lack of social support is 
rooted in non-migrants’ ambivalent sentiments towards the U.S.  
The diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors from the U.S. to Mexico via-
migrants therefore does not follow a rational choice logic. Return migrants’ failure 
to import behaviors is not due to their limited effectiveness in Mexico, but rather 
to social constraints grounded in anti-Americanism in Mexico. Non-migrants 
appear to consider migrants who remain abroad opinion leaders worth following 
because they are members of a country they both admire—a country to which 
they want to move. They do not consider returnees worth emulating although 
migrants who return to Mexico also possess knowledge, skills, and information 
worth following, non-migrants reject the foreign ideas that returnees introduce 
into their country because they originate in a country whose interference in 
Mexico they resent and whose treatment of Mexico and Mexicans they loathe. 
Non-migrants therefore differentiate “irrationally” between migrants at home and 
migrants abroad. 
2.3.3 Bounded Rationality Approaches 
Scholars who argue that actors are boundedly rational also embrace 
individual, micro-level, interest-based explanations for leaders’ adoption of 
foreign models; however, they claim that cognitive psychological propensities 
limit the extent to which leaders make decisions according to purely rational 
postulates (Weyland, 1996). Contrary to what rational choice theory predicts, 
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bounded rationality claims that politicians do not carefully analyze all incoming 
information because they are cognitive misers, or they do not have time to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of each available policy option. A common result 
of this type of decision-making is that leaders embrace high profile policies that 
were crafted in another country to address a foreign problem. Such policies may 
be sub-optimal for resolving the problems that domestic leaders face in their own 
country. 
Rather than conduct thorough and balanced evaluations of whether and 
how each policy available to them may contribute to resolving problems, leaders 
rely on economical cognitive heuristics (Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Kahnemann, Slovick, & Tversky, 1982; 
Weyland, 2007). For example, leaders may use the “availability” heuristic, which 
“refers to people’s tendency to place excessive importance on information that—
for logically accidental reasons—has special immediacy, strikingness, and 
impact, that grabs their attention,” (Weyland, 2007; p. 47). The prominence of a 
nation-state may make its models and principles highly available. (Elkins & 
Simmons, 2005). For example, Latin American countries may emulate the U.S. 
presidential model because that country has the most prominent (and thus 
available) presidential system in the region. Reference groups provide another 
cue to busy leaders. Elkins and Simmons (2005) note that “imitating similar 
individuals is one of the simplest and most effective cognitive heuristics in the 
calculation of utilities” (p. 45). This signifies that leaders are more likely to adopt 
policy models enacted in countries that are similar to theirs culturally, 
geographically, economically, historically or otherwise. Finally, the 
representativeness heuristic causes leaders to overestimate the extent to which 
patterns observed in a small sample are representative of the whole population,” 
(Weyland, 2007, p. 48). Put differently, leaders draw overly optimistic conclusions 
about how a policy that succeeded in other countries will effectively resolve their 
own country’s problems. 
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Cognitive shortcuts serve decision makers in various contexts, but a 
model’s availability and representativeness or whether it has been adopted by a 
member of a potential adopter’s reference group does not necessarily make it 
worth emulating. Relying on this type of shortcut can help actors to identify 
policies and models quickly, but not necessarily effectively.  
With respect to mass publics, bounded rationality argues that individuals 
at the level of mass publics make systematically biased choices as a result of 
their reliance on cognitive shortcuts—including social conversations with opinion 
leaders. Interpersonal relations may not help ordinary individuals optimize their 
interests as traditional rational choice theorists predict for numerous reasons. 
One problem is that citizens may unwittingly follow political leaders who do not 
make rational decisions. Though some scholars argue that leaders are the most 
likely case for rational action due to the potential consequences of their individual 
decisions (Fiorina, 1996), there is evidence to the contrary. To the extent that 
leaders fail to make rational choices, the choices of their followers will be biased, 
too.  
Another factor that limits the potential of social interactions to produce 
rational choices is that citizens may not effectively identify knowledgeable 
interlocutors among members of their social network (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 
1995). Individuals may misperceive interlocutors with whom they disagree as 
lacking expertise (Huckfeldt, 2001; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). If individuals are 
conflict-averse, they may fully avoid having political discussions with those who 
do not share their political views. This is problematic because it means social 
discussions will not produce a balanced flow of information from which 
individuals can make optimal choices. Similarly, there is evidence that potential 
adopters may overvalue information acquired from those with similar levels of 
education, status, religion, and so forth, because they interpret these personal 
attributes as indicators of common interests (Lodge, Taber, & Galonsky, 1999; 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Rogers, 1995). But similarities such as skin color, 
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gender or nationality may serve as poor indicators of common interests; and an 
interlocutor with common interests is not necessarily an “expert” worthy of 
following.  
The literature on social learning has not explored whether interlocutors’ 
nation-state origins9 influence the likelihood that potential adopters will take 
notice of them. Do qualities about the political entity from which informants and/or 
information hail influence the probability that mass publics will employ misleading 
cognitive heuristics as do policy leaders? For instance, does a transmitters’ origin 
in the U.S. make his political beliefs and ideas more representative? Although the 
research on social learning does not explicitly address these questions, we can 
draw on it to develop a reasonable set of expectations about what bounded 
rationality implies for migrant-led international diffusion. 
The U.S. is the most important country in the world from the Mexican 
perspective. It is the giant neighbor with whom Mexico shares a contentious 
northern border nearly two thousand miles long. Mexico’s economy is highly 
dependent on the U.S. More than 80 percent of Mexican exports flow to that 
country, and U.S. bound exports account for more than a quarter of Mexico’s 
GDP. Mexicans receive more U.S. news and media coverage than from any 
other country. This coverage leads them to admire (among other things) the 
judicial system of the U.S., its electoral processes, and its peaceful changes in 
leadership. The literature on bounded rationality suggests that due to human 
cognitive limitations, non-migrant Mexicans in search of novel civic engagement 
strategies would be more likely to look to the U.S. for examples than to other 
countries, even in the absence of migration.  
Migration makes American forms of civic engagement even more 
available to Mexican citizens by introducing them directly into their homes. The 
fact that over 10 million Mexican-born nationals live in the U.S. increases that 
                                            
9 When I say origins or national origins in this section, I mean the locations in which an individual 
developed the political beliefs and behaviors that they then share with others. 
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country’s availability to Mexicans who never migrate. Migration permits 
information about the U.S. to reach Mexicans via trusted individuals; people who 
stay behind have a link to the U.S. via individuals similar to themselves or from 
the same reference group (e.g., family, colleagues at work or school, people from 
the same small town). Indeed migrants probably share more attributes with their 
friends in Mexico than do other potential providers of foreign information, such as 
the media, consumer products, international non-governmental organizations, 
missionaries, etc. Few other vectors of foreign information fit the definition of a 
reference group as do migrants.  
The economic, military and democratic strength of the U.S. enhances its 
representativeness. The success of the U.S., alone is probably enough to 
convince migrants that the country is worth emulating; in addition, non-migrants 
may further idealize the U.S. economic and political system if they observe that 
their family and friends have achieved many of their objectives via migration to 
the north. We should therefore observe non-migrants overwhelmingly adopting 
U.S. models or principles—so to speak—without carefully considering their merit, 
and regardless of the personal attributes of the individuals from whom they 
learned of the new practices and beliefs.  
Bounded rationality also implies that returnees should be highly likely to 
import both U.S. political beliefs and behaviors in light of their direct experience 
with (and positive impression of) the social, economic, and political goods these 
produce for American citizens. Because migrants lived within the U.S. 
democracy, that country’s model should be most available and representative to 
them. We should expect returnees who are interested in improving Mexico’s 
democracy to draw on the American model with relatively little effort precisely 
because it is the well-functioning democracy with which they are most familiar.  
Surprisingly, however, I find that non-migrants do not welcome the new 
political beliefs and behaviors that returnees introduce into Mexico, precisely 
because they perceive these as a form of U.S. interference into Mexican affairs. 
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Mexican migrants’ re-entry into Mexico symbolizes the physical entry of U.S. 
interests in to Mexico to the extent that the beliefs and behaviors of returnees 
have changed to reflect dominant practices in the U.S. Again, while non-migrants 
admire the U.S., its economy and institutions, they reject that country’s 
involvement in Mexican domestic affairs because they mistrust U.S. intentions 
and believe the U.S. is not concerned about Mexico’s best interests. Non-
migrants direct this mistrust towards returnees, particularly those eager to 
change how “things are done” in Mexico, and those who return with U.S. dollars. 
The outcome contradicts the predictions of bounded rationality. Rather than 
embrace the political beliefs and behaviors of their immediate, more powerful and 
successful neighbor to the north, non-migrants reject the U.S.-based innovations 
that returnees import into Mexico. Their resentment of the dominant U.S. 
overrides that country’s representativeness and availability, particularly when it 
enters their home directly. 
Implicitly, their acceptance of the innovations that U.S.-based migrants 
transmit via long-distance cross-border communications is not due to the 
availability, prominence or representativeness of the U.S., otherwise, migrants 
would also embrace the innovations that returnees transmit.  Moreover, since 
both returnees and U.S. based migrants are the friends and kin of non-migrants, 
their acceptance is not because one group is more similar to non-migrants than 
another. Indeed, the similarity heuristic suggests that non-migrants would be 
particularly responsive to return migrants located in their own home as compared 
to migrants located in the distant U.S. Taken together, these findings are 
inconsistent with bounded rationality. 
2.4 A New Theory of Migrant-Led International Diffu sion 
Migrant-driven international diffusion is structured by the intersubjective 
beliefs that Mexicans hold regarding Mexico-U.S. relations migration’s place 
within those relations. These beliefs can best be characterized as anti-American, 
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yet they are highly ambivalent. It is this ambivalence that accounts for the 
strength of long-distance trans-state social transactions between migrants and 
non-migrants as a channel of diffusion as well as for the diminished power of 
face-to-face transactions between returnees and their co-nationals.  
Collectively held attitudes towards the U.S. among Mexicans living in 
Mexico cause the social status of migrants to differ “irrationally” depending on 
their location either in the U.S. or Mexico. Non-migrants hold migrants abroad in 
high regard; they evoke empathy, admiration, interest and pride among non-
migrants. Migrants abroad therefore communicate with non-migrants in a 
receptive social context; non-migrants’ attitudes towards them encourages them 
to share their U.S. experiences. In contrast, non-migrants see returnees with 
frustration and disappointment; relations between returnees and non-migrants 
give rise to feelings of alienation and resentment. Returning to a social context in 
which such attitudes are the norm inhibits returnees from sharing their new 
political beliefs and discourages them from persisting in adapting foreign 
practices to the local context.  In short, due to the prevailing anti-Americanism in 
Mexico, an American political innovation conveyed from abroad is more 
meaningful to potential adopters than one that is conveyed face-to-face. There is 
greater demand and acceptance for new political ideas from migrants abroad; 
and this in turn encourages their transmission.  
Where do collective understandings about U.S.-Mexico relations and 
migration’s role within it come from? Wendt’s (1999) concept of role identities 
suggests that some of the intersubjectively held ideas and beliefs that prevail in a 
given state are constituted by its relationship with other states. State-to-state 
relationships, membership in regional organizations, and other forms of 
international relations constitute role identities and shared perceptions of a 
foreign entity. This is true both at the level of mass publics and elites. Moreover, 
there is evidence to suggest that perceptions of states also affect beliefs about 
foreigners from that state.  
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Mexican attitudes toward the U.S. reflect a historically frustrated bilateral 
political and economic relationship. Unwelcome U.S. involvement in Mexico’s 
domestic affairs has been a thorny issue since the mid nineteenth century, when 
the U.S. took more than half of Mexico’s territory. Popular resentment of 
American military, political and economic involvement in Mexico, including the  
tacit U.S. support for the long-ruling Mexican dictator, Porfirio Díaz, and its 
intermittent, but notable, ownership of key Mexican assets, underpin many of 
Mexico’s post-revolutionary ideals. Over the past fifteen years NAFTA has 
attenuated anti-American sentiments by facilitating unprecedented levels of 
economic and cultural integration between the two countries. Nonetheless, only 
21 percent of Mexicans believe the trade agreement has helped (as opposed to 
hurt) them personally, and a plurality believes that the cultural impact of the U.S. 
on Mexico has been unfavorable (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). Moreover, some of the 
core elements of popular nationalism enshrined in the 1917 Constitution persist, 
including widespread—and growing—opposition to allowing U.S. investment in 
the Mexican energy sector (González & Minushkin, 2006), and strong objections 
to the presence of U.S. law enforcement officers within Mexico to help fight crime 
(CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).  
Mexicans’ attitudes about migration fully reflect this ambivalence. For 
instance, 73 percent of Mexicans believe Americans are either racist or very 
racist, and 63 percent consider the U.S. is wealthy because it exploits other 
countries. Yet 45 percent claim that their lives would improve if they migrated 
illegally to the U.S. (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). One-third of Mexicans say they would 
be willing to move to the U.S. if they could, even though 57 percent feel disdain 
or indifference towards the country and 53 percent feel distrust (González & 
Minushkin, 2006). Even more strikingly, asked if they would support a U.S. plan, 
similar to the Marshall Plan, to help Mexico’s development in exchange for 
stronger controls on illegal migration, only 29 percent of Mexicans agreed 
(CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). Correspondingly, the majority (65%) of Mexicans 
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indicated their refusal to exchange greater U.S. access to investment in 
petroleum and gas for more flexible migration policies (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). 
Mexico’s dependence on migration to the north thus contributes to a broader 
incongruous set of attitudes toward the U.S. On one hand, Mexicans perceive 
entry into the U.S. as a promising way to improve their lives; on the other, they 
are fiercely nationalist and protective of their sovereignty—especially with respect 
to the U.S. 
Though they have recently softened, attitudes towards migrants 
themselves have been even more critical for much of Mexico’s history. Between 
the late 19th century and the 1940s, when the Mexican government sought to 
attract home its citizens who remained in the territories it had to cede to the U.S., 
Mexican emigrants to the north were seen as traitors (Durand, 2004). From WWII 
until the 1980s, the Mexican government had no clear policy toward migration or 
its migrants, but undocumented migration swelled. During this time, the popular 
term “pocho” emerged to refer to Mexican migrants or their children who belong 
neither to the U.S. nor Mexico. “Pochos” typically speak poor Spanish and are 
derided by Mexicans for having weak connections to their roots even as they 
remain on the margins of American society.  
Both official policy and popular opinion appears to have changed since the 
1980s. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act allowed millions of 
undocumented immigrants to obtain U.S. citizenship. Additionally, the neoliberal 
economic reforms initiated by Miguel de la Madrid in the 1980s set in motion a 
process of regional economic integration; one of the unofficial, yet most 
significant consequences of this integration has been the growth of migrant 
remittances—cash that migrants send from their host country to their country of 
origin. Each of these contributed to a new era in which the Mexican government 
has actively sought to redefine their relationship with their nationals abroad 
(Durand, 2004; Smith, R, 2003). Particularly under the Fox administration, it 
appeared as if migrants had gone from traitors to heroes after 100 years 
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(Durand, 2004). The extent to which this new perception rests on migrants’ ability 
to send money and leverage Mexicans’ interests vis-à-vis the U.S. government 
suggests that the heroes are migrants who remain abroad. Indeed, an individual 
who has returned home permanently is no longer a migrant in the eyes of the 
Mexican state, but simply a Mexican citizen. 
There are no public opinion studies available to gauge the potentially 
different perceptions that non-migrants in Mexico hold of migrants in the United 
States versus migrants who have returned to Mexico. However this study finds 
evidence to support that perceptions of migrants differ depending on whether 
they are at home or abroad. Abroad they are heroes, while at home they are not. 
The perception rests in part on the money that migrants send home; these funds 
stop flowing as soon as migrants return. Additionally, having a migrant friend or 
family member in the U.S. represents a link to that country and the opportunities 
it offers; the friend is a symbolic link to a better possibility, even if it remains 
unfulfilled. This link is broken when migrants return; the utility of that individual, 
so to speak, therefore declines. Finally, migrants who stay abroad are seen as 
particularly fit. They can navigate U.S. culture and society and succeed in the 
world’s strongest economy. This perception holds regardless of the empirical 
facts concerning specific migrants.  
In contrast, a migrant’s return calls into question his or her level of fitness. 
Return migrants are overwhelmingly perceived as less successful, regardless of 
what they truly achieved abroad. Shared beliefs about migrants, which rest on 
wider ambivalent attitudes toward the U.S. and bilateral relations between the 
U.S. and Mexico, therefore impact evaluations of the information that migrants 
convey. Messages conveyed from migrants who remain abroad are considered 
to be from more knowledgeable individuals capable of successfully meeting their 
objectives, while messages from individuals who have returned are not. Migrants 
abroad are therefore perceived as better guides from whom to learn behavior. 
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 The distinction between migrants at home and abroad, underlies the 
paradoxical strength of long-distance communication as a path for diffusion in 
other ways too. We intuitively think of the interpersonal ties between migrants 
living abroad and non-migrants living in the home country as ‘weak’, compared 
with face-to-face ties. Granovetter’s assertion, in his influential article “The 
Strength of Weak Ties”, that, “the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize each tie” (1973, p. 
1361) would confirm this conjecture. However, long-distance ties between 
migrants abroad and their friends and kin in Mexico are stronger than ties 
between returnees and their co-nationals who never leave.  
Widely held beliefs regarding the risks involved in crossing the border into 
the U.S. and the challenges of maintaining oneself in that country cause those 
who stay behind to worry about migrants. The Mexican national press’s tendency 
to principally cover migrants’ negative experiences abroad such as deaths, 
arrests, exploitation and discrimination, exacerbate these concerns. Shared 
perceptions about migrants who cross the border thus strengthen the emotional 
intensity of long-distance, trans-state social transactions. When migrants return, 
they are no longer a subject of concern and are expected to meet their 
obligations, as does everyone else in the home country. 
Distance also increases the intimacy of ties between migrants and non-
migrants. For instance, because phone calls from migrants are occasional, as 
opposed to daily events, family and friends carefully attend to them; they value 
and often retell the information that migrants share. Furthermore, since migrants 
are physically removed from the anti-American norms of the home locality, they 
express themselves more openly and freely—or intimately—than they might back 
home. Their physical absence from such “local” norms, combined with their 
elevated status has the effect of freeing them and enhancing their will to express 
alternative ideas and practices. In contrast, migrants who physically cross the 
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border to resettle in Mexico must navigate the dominant beliefs they find back 
home, either defying or adapting to them; this weakens intimacy. 
Finally, the reciprocal services that characterize long-distance cross-
border ties are noteworthy. Research shows that migration is a collective survival 
strategy in which migrants fulfill certain functions and household members who 
stay behind perform others (Cohen, 2001; Conway & Cohen, 1998; Massey, 
Alarcón, Durand, & González, 1987; Warnes, 1992). Migrants’ stays abroad are 
thus a unique time during which household members on both sides of the border 
support each other mutually and are especially responsive to one another. Again, 
a migrant’s homecoming contributes to weakening these reciprocal obligations.  
In short, external migrant suppliers communicate across borders from a 
liberating normative context, while internal migrant suppliers (migrants who have 
returned home) communicate face-to-face, but under social constraints. At the 
same time, the risks and sacrifices that migrants undertake both alone and on 
behalf of the family make non-migrants particularly attentive to non-migrants. 
This dynamic explains the paradoxical strength of long-distance ties. 
Highly ambivalent beliefs about migrants lead non-migrants to evaluate 
them differently, depending on whether they are located at home or abroad. 
These beliefs make it relatively easier for foreign innovations transmitted from 
abroad to find a fit in Mexico, as compared with those imported personally by 
migrants when they resettle there.  
 Many returnees come home with the expectation that they may improve 
life in their country or locality of origin if they can successfully implement what 
they learned abroad. Their efforts often fail because they are unable to fit the 
innovation in question into their home country context; that is, they are unable to 
localize the innovation. The concept of localization sees international diffusion as 
a process involving both transnational agents as proponents of change, but also 
domestically rooted agents as active adopters (Acharya, 2004). This signifies that 
adopters “do more than simply reject or accept foreign innovations, rather, they 
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actively contribute to reinterpreting and re-representing foreign ideas in order to 
develop significant congruence between them and local beliefs and practices” 
(Acharya, 2004, p. 244-245).  
 Returnees are poor localizers because they become easily frustrated and 
disappointed by the incongruity they observe between their idealized recollection 
of how the practice functioned in the U.S. and the process or outcome it 
produces in Mexico (if the opportunity to implement the innovation arises). More 
importantly, returnees’ emphasis on how the practice in question functions in the 
U.S. hinders diffusion precisely because it activates Mexican nationalism. Non-
migrants snub the energized and optimistic co-nationals who they perceive as 
lauding U.S. political practices—or worse as traitors against Mexican traditions. 
Return migrants thus serve as optimal targets against which to direct anti-
American sentiments. Their failure to appreciate the importance of adapting 
foreign political practices and attitudes to local circumstances and the anti-
American social context to which they return leads them to believe that change is 
not possible at home. Rather than graft small changes onto existing practices 
and beliefs or reframe the innovation as other than American, returnees tend to 
abandon the diffusion effort altogether. 
 Quite the opposite, non-migrants can implement foreign innovations of 
which they learn from migrants residing abroad with greater ease than can 
returnees. The reason is that non-migrant adopters have never witnessed or 
experienced the innovation first hand in its native context. Moreover, the migrant 
herself is not present to supervise and criticize the manner in which the 
innovation has been implemented. The surprising result is that non-migrants 
receiving information from a distance can more effectively “localize” or find 
congruence between foreign and local ideas precisely because they do not have 
an idealized model against which to compare their interpretation and 
reconstruction of the innovation; the absence of specific expectations makes 
them less likely to abandon efforts to import change. For this reason, non-
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migrants who change their attitudes or behavior in response to information 
transmitted by migrants abroad are not seen as traitors who simply emulate 
foreigners. Additionally, changes among people with migrant kin abroad are 
perceived as part of a broader adaptation to the absence of a key household 
leader.  
The constructivist perspective also provides a viable account for my 
findings with respect to political attitudes. Concretely, return migrants retain their 
“foreign” attitudes, because these are not subject to social pressures as long as 
migrants keep them close. Attitudes can be held privately; therefore nobody has 
to know what an individual truly believes. In contrast, political behavior 
intrinsically involves public action, it cannot be kept private. Actors who want to 
hide their true behavioral intentions have no other choice than to avoid action 
altogether or act in ways that do not reflect their attitudes. Individuals can 
simultaneously hold inconsistent beliefs and behaviors.  Collectively held beliefs 
which hold that U.S. intervention in Mexico’s domestic affairs is undesirable 
underlie this outcome, consistent with constructivist broadest claim concerning 
the significance of intersubjectively held beliefs. Such beliefs do not apply to 
migrants located abroad, since such transmitters are not perceived as 
introducing the claims directly into Mexico. Nonetheless, migrants abroad do no 
appear to transmit beliefs in isolation, because the short duration and 
infrequency of their long-distance communication with non-migrants leads them 
to prioritize other topics of conversation. 
2.5  Conclusion 
This chapter puts forth a new theory of migrant driven international 
diffusion based on the critical case of Mexico-U.S. migration. It argues that a 
constructivist explanation provides the most compelling account for why migrant-
led international diffusion produces the counterintuitive outcomes we observe. 
Neither rational choice nor bounded rationality approaches to the study of 
  
69 
diffusion or social learning help to explain the patterns by which international 
migrants contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. We cannot 
reconcile either of these approaches with the fact that return migrants face a 
constraint on the diffusion of behaviors and beliefs that is absent in the case of 
diffusion via long-distance communication between U.S.-based migrants and 
their friends and family who continue living in Mexico. The two rational 
approaches are also inconsistent with the finding that foreign political behaviors 
diffuse across international borders among mass publics with greater ease than 
do attitudes.   
The proposed theory shows that international diffusion at the level of mass 
publics is unique, and follows a distinct logic. Although this chapter argues that a 
constructivist approach best explains migrant-led international diffusion, the 
theory I advance contains some important variations on conventional 
constructivist approaches to international diffusion. Most importantly, the study 
highlights that collectively held beliefs among potential adopters about the 
country in which an object of diffusion originates can critically influence 
international diffusion processes. Attitudes about foreign countries, and their 
place in international, regional or bilateral relations can range from highly positive 
to strongly negative, or they can be ambivalent. In the latter two cases, popular 
negative views of a foreign country may be sufficiently powerful to override the 
availability, similarity and representativeness heuristics. Such views could 
preclude the adoption of behaviors that could help individuals to improve the 
quality of Mexico’s democracy. Finally, intersubjective beliefs about a country 
may be sufficiently negative or ambivalent that they interfere with the flow of 
otherwise normatively desirable political behavioral and ideational changes from 
more to less democratic countries.   
Existing constructivist accounts of international diffusion do not consider 
the possibility that shared resentment of a foreign country could either condition 
or fully prevent the diffusion of foreign norms among mass publics. Yet this is 
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possible not only in the case of high migrant producing countries, but in the case 
of countries currently seeking to deepen their regional integration to include the 





CHAPTER 3: CHANGES IN POLITICAL BELIEFS AND BEHAVIO R, 
SOME OBSERVABLE OUTCOMES OF MIGRANT-LED DIFFUSION 
3.1 Introduction 
Does migration lead to the diffusion of democratic values and behavioral 
patterns? What outcomes does it produce? Do its outcomes conform to the 
causal logic that rational choice, rationally bounded, or constructivist scholars 
advance? This chapter draws on the results of Desencanto Ciudadano en 
México to provide a set of empirical observations that begin to address these 
questions.  
In theory, four basic conditions may be necessary for migrants to 
contribute to the diffusion of democratic citizenship: 1) migrants must travel to a 
more advanced democracy; 2) migrants must adapt politically and learn new 
political beliefs and behaviors as a result of living in that democracy; 3) there 
must exist one or more pathways through which migrants can transmit the new 
ideas, beliefs, and practices to their friends and kin who do not migrate; and 4) 
citizens in the country of origin must have some level of interest in the full range 
of political practices and beliefs that contribute to deepening democracy. Do 
these conditions exist in the case of Mexico-U.S. migration? Are they sufficient to 
produce diffusion?  
This chapter represents a first cut at assessing two paths through which 
migrants may diffuse political beliefs and behaviors from the United States to 
Mexico: migrant returns and long-distance cross-border social transactions. In 
the first case, migrants may diffuse the behaviors and beliefs they learned in the 
U.S. when they return to Mexico and share with their co-nationals their personal 
experiences abroad, including the political behaviors and beliefs they observed 
or embrace. In the second, migrants who remain abroad may channel new 
beliefs and behaviors to their co-nationals who remain in Mexico via cross-border 
communication, such as phone calls, letters, Internet communication, and 
temporary visits.  
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The statistical analysis presented in this chapter assesses just one step of 
return migrants’ potential role in the diffusion process: whether they introduce 
new beliefs and behaviors into their country of origin. The large-N data drawn 
from the Desencanto survey are not adequate to assess whether non-migrants 
“learn” from what return migrants import; nor do they allow me to assess whether 
returnees actively share with others the innovations they may have obtained 
abroad. Determining the extent to which returnees import these innovations 
following their stay in the U.S.—quite apart from assessing whether they share 
them—is valuable in and of itself because returnees themselves must hold new, 
more democratic beliefs and participate more politically in order to serve as 
vectors of international diffusion. The analysis thus gives us a sense of the 
maximum levels of diffusion returnees may generate. 
The analysis evaluates the effect of long-distance cross-border social 
transactions more precisely. The survey data allow me to assess whether the 
political beliefs and behaviors of Mexican who report communicating with 
migrants living in the U.S. differ from those of Mexicans without such ties. 
However, my assessment of the effect of long-distance cross-border social 
transactions is based only on non-migrants’ reports. The survey did not gather 
data from migrants based in the U.S., so this chapter does not study migrants’ 
own accounts of their role as agents of diffusion from abroad.  
The most salient empirical finding this chapter reports is that long-distance 
cross-border ties serve as a stronger channel for the diffusion of foreign political 
behaviors than do migrant returns to the homeland. Conversely, it appears that 
returns might contribute to the diffusion of beliefs while cross-border social 
transactions generally do not.10  
                                            
10 Note, I say that returnees might contribute to the diffusion of beliefs because the statistical 
analysis only provides evidence of migrants’ propensity to import beliefs, not the degree to which 
they share foreign beliefs with their co-nationals in Mexico. Furthermore, the present analysis 
does not measure whether non-migrants learn from return migrants. These questions are 
addressed in chapters four and five. 
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Individuals who have migrated and returned do not reveal any behavioral 
changes as a result of having lived in the U.S., yet the experience strengthens 
returnees’ tolerance of political and social differences, and increases their 
demand for observance of rights by Mexican government authorities. Non-
migrants probably do not learn new political behaviors from returnees, because 
the latter do not import them. We cannot conclude from the statistical analysis, 
alone, that return migrants’ retention of foreign political beliefs contributes to 
diffusion; I explore this question further based on qualitative evidence in 
subsequent chapters.  
On the other hand, non-migrants who communicate with migrant friends or 
family residing in the United States have significantly higher political participation 
rates, strongly suggesting that cross-border social transactions contribute to the 
diffusion of political behaviors. Although the analysis finds that cross-border 
social transactions make non-migrant Mexicans more critical of their own 
democracy, the impact of this diffusion pathway on political beliefs is otherwise 
insignificant.  
The optimal conditions for migrant-led international diffusion exist in the 
case of U.S.-Mexico migration. There are transmitters in one country with 
innovations of great interest to receivers in another; there are clear channels for 
these innovations to pass from the former to the latter. This chapter finds that 
these conditions do not give rise to diffusion in the ways that we might expect. 
The two types of trans-state social transactions (long-distance cross-border 
communication and returns) do not have uniform effects. Beliefs and behaviors 
do not co-vary; and long-distance cross-border communications do not simply 
produce the same effects with a lesser magnitude than do returns. 
The statistical analysis, alone, does not provide sufficient evidence to 
characterize the theoretical nature of migrant-led international diffusion. 
However, it intimates that rational choice and bounded rationality fail to provide 
compelling accounts and leaves open the validity of a constructivist approach.  
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3.2 Conditions for Diffusion in the Case of Mexico 
In theory, there exist the sufficient conditions for the diffusion of 
democratic attitudes and behavior via migrants to obtain in the case of U.S.-
Mexico migration. Migrants travel to a more advanced democracy where they 
adapt politically and learn new beliefs and behaviors. Mexican citizens who 
remain in Mexico have a strong interest in improving their democracy. Finally, 
migrants and non-migrants engage in trans-state social transactions that facilitate 
the transfer of beliefs and practices from the U.S. to Mexico. This section 
provides evidence for each of these claims. 
3.2.1 Migrants Travel to More Democratic Host Countries 
Migrants tend to emigrate from authoritarian countries or developing 
democracies such as those of Central America, Northern Africa, South Asia and 
Eastern Europe to more the more advanced democracies of Europe and North 
America for various reasons (including the association of democracy with 
economic development). Table 3.1 lists the principal destination countries of 
migrants from countries around the world that produce high volumes of migrants. 
Freedom House scores for political freedom and civil liberties are noted in 
parentheses are noted in parentheses next to each country. Well over 75 percent 
of the migrants from these typical emigrant source countries move from a less to 
a more democratic country. Mexican migrants are no exception. More than eighty 
percent of emigrants from that country move to the United States, while nearly all 
others migrate to Canada or Spain.  
This study focuses on Mexican migration to the U.S. Although Mexico’s 
democracy has grown significantly over the past decade, there remains a 
sufficiently large gap between that country’s level of democracy and its northern 
neighbor to help motivate diffusion from north to south. The U.S. consistently 
ranks higher than Mexico on indices that assess the level of democracy 
(including Freedom House and Polity IV) and Americans are more likely to 
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democratic forms of civic engagement, including both its attitudinal and 
behavioral dimensions.  
 
Table 3.1: Levels of Democracy in Migrants’ Home an d Host Countries 
Country of Origin & 
Freedom House 
Scores (2007) 
Top Destination Countries (2005) & Freedom House Scores (2007) 
Albania (3/3) 
Greece (1/2), Italy (1/1), Macedonia FYR (3/3), United States (1/1), 
Germany (1/1), Canada (1/1), France (1/1), United Kingdom (1/1). 
Macedonia, FYR (3/3) 
Germany (1/1), Switzerland (1/1), Australia (1/1), Italy (1/1), Turkey 




Germany (1/1), Austria (1/1), Switzerland (1/1), United States (1/1), 
Turkey (3/3), Croatia (2/2), Sweden (1/1), Italy (1/1), Canada (1/1), 
Australia (1/1). 
Morocco (5/4) 
France (1/1), Spain (1/1), Italy (1/1), Israel (1/2), Netherlands (1/1), 
Germany (1/1), Belgium (1/1), United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Saudi 
Arabia (7/6). 
Turkey (3/3) 
Germany (1/1), France (1/1), Netherlands (1/1), Austria (1/1), United 
States (1/1), Bulgaria (1/2), Greece (1/2), Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
Jamaica (2/3) United States (1/1), United Kingdom (1/1), Canada (1/1), Germany (1/1) 
El Salvador (2/3) 
United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Guatemala (3/4), Costa Rica (1/1), 
Australia (1/1), Belize (1/2), Mexico (2/3), Spain (1/1), Panama (1/2). 
Nicaragua (3/3) 
Costa Rica (1/1), United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Panama (1/2), 
Guatemala (3/4), Spain (1/1), Mexico (2/3), El Salvador (2/3) 
Mexico (2/3) United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Spain (1/1) 
† 2005 Freedom House Scores for Serbia and Montenegro. 
Sources: D. Ratha and D. Xu (2008). Migration and Remittance Factbook 2008. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1199807908806/World.pdf; Freedom in the World 2007. Freedom House. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org /template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=334&year=2007 
 
Attitudinally, Americans are more tolerant of political, religious, ethnic and 
sexual diversity than Mexicans. Tolerance is a fundamental attitude among 
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citizens of well-functioning democracies and a focus of this study. In the 1999-
2000 WVS, 80 percent of U.S. citizens listed “tolerance and respect for other 
people” as an important value for children to learn, compared to 71 percent of 
Mexicans. Both countries are strongly religious, but no single Christian 
denomination in the U.S. approaches the dominance the Catholic Church enjoys 
in Mexico. Although Mexico is officially a secular state, local authorities often lend 
official sanction to Catholic ceremonies and sometimes persecute members of 
religious minorities. WVS data show that 24 percent of Mexicans would not want 
evangelical Protestants as neighbors, and 17 percent would not want Muslims 
next door, compared to 11 percent in the U.S. 
Though discrimination and hate crimes against gays and lesbians occur in 
both countries, Mexicans are significantly less tolerant of that community. Nearly 
45 percent of Mexicans would not want a homosexual living next door, compared 
to 23 percent of U.S. citizens. When asked to locate themselves on a scale of 1 
to 10, where 1 means homosexuality is “never justifiable” and 10 “always 
justifiable”, U.S. citizens average 4.8 and Mexicans, 3.6 (differences are 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level). Race relations do not have as 
important a place in Mexican political discourse as in American. Nonetheless (or 
perhaps as a result), on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that ethnic diversity 
“erodes a country’s unity” and 10 means that ethnic diversity “enriches my life” 
Americans average 7.6 and Mexicans 3.6 (differences are significant at the 95 
percent confidence interval)11. More notably, well over twice as many Mexicans 
than Americans place themselves on the lowest extreme of that scale. 
Government respect for individual rights, another aspect of democracy I 
explore in this chapter, is also weaker in Mexico than in the U.S. Despite a recent 
wave of reforms, Mexico’s justice system fails to provide justice for the majority of 
its citizens. According to Human Rights Watch (2006), over 40 percent of 
                                            




prisoners in Mexico have never been convicted of a crime and suspected 
criminals are held in pretrial detention for months and years while they await their 
trial. The Mexican government also has a poor record with regard to respect to 
the right to free speech. Reporters without Borders (2008) claims that Mexico is 
the most dangerous country in Latin America for reporters.  
Behaviorally, a wide range of forms of political participation is more 
prevalent in the U.S. than in Mexico (see e.g., Klesner, 2003; Tuner & Elordi, 
2001). Data from the 2005-2006 round of the World Values Survey (WVS) reveal 
that 63 percent in the U.S. as opposed to 21 percent in Mexico, reported having 
recently signed a petition, and 19 percent of Americans had joined a boycott 
compared with 3 percent of Mexicans. 59 percent of Americans claimed to be 
very or somewhat interested in politics, compared to only 34 percent of 
Mexicans. WVS data indicate that Mexicans out-participate their American 
counterparts only with respect to mass demonstrations.  
These gaps in the democratic beliefs and behaviors of the U.S. and 
Mexico are significant because if democratic diffusion should occur at the level of 
mass publics at all, it is most likely in situations where there are important 
differences between the political experiences transmitters (migrants living abroad 
or return migrants) and potential adopters (individuals living in the country of 
origin). The former should be exposed to significantly more democratic contexts 
than the latter. Otherwise, “When two countries are equally democratic or 
nondemocratic … emulation is a nonissue” (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006, p. 467).  
3.2.2 Migrants Adapt Politically and Learn in their Host Country 
There is ample empirical evidence that migrants embrace new political 
beliefs and behaviors in their more democratic host country (Armony, Barriga, & 
Schugurensky, 2004; Bean, Brown, & Rumbaut, 2006; Black, Niemi, & Powell, 
1987; Camp, 2001, 2003; De la Garza & Yetim, 2003). In the case of Mexico, De 
la Garza and Yetim (2003) find that exposure to “the United States influences the 
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beliefs, values, and attitudes toward democracy of Mexican Americans—
meaning individuals of Mexican origin who regardless of citizenship or immigrant 
status reside in the United States—so that their views differ from those of 
Mexicans who reside in Mexico” (p. 82). The views of Mexican Americans tend to 
fall squarely between those of Mexicans in Mexico and Americans without 
Mexican origins. Camp (2003) finds that Mexican Americans begin to adopt the 
prevailing American view of democracy within less than five years of moving to 
the U.S.  
Though explaining why migrants adopt host country political beliefs and 
behaviors is outside of the scope of this project, a brief review of the salient 
explanations is warranted. Some scholars argue that democratic learning occurs 
as a result of direct experience in well-functioning democracies (Dalton, 1994; 
Diamond, 1994, 1999; Finkel, Humphries, & Opp, 2001; Mishler & Rose, 2007). 
Studies that advance this argument focus mostly on changes in the political 
rights, rules and procedures that occur within peoples own countries of 
citizenship and residence. Migration scholars extend this framework to account 
for the changes that follow an individual’s move from one country and its political 
regime to another (see e.g., De la Garza & Yetim, 2003).  
Migrants’ experiences with their host countries’ democratic political 
institutions clearly differ from those of individuals whose own country of 
citizenship has undergone a democratic transition. Immigration status—meaning 
whether migrants are authorized to live in the host country and the extent to 
which they may engage the host country’s political and economic institutions—
constrains the range of democratic experiences that migrants may access. For 
instance, naturalized U.S. citizens are not eligible to become President or Vice 
President of their new country, and undocumented or “irregular” immigrants do 
not have the right to vote.  
Skeptics may justifiably question whether migrants’ marginal presence in 
their host country is compatible with institutional learning. However, despite 
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widespread beliefs to the contrary, most states that receive large numbers of 
migrants, particularly liberal democracies such as the U.S., permit all immigrants 
to engage their host country’s political process quite freely and extensively 
(Guiraudon, 1998; Hammar, 1990; Joppke, 2001; Layton-Henry, 1990; 
Plascencia, Freeman, & Setzler, 2003; Varsanyi, 2005, 2006). Regardless of 
their legal status, migrants have many opportunities to learn and adopt new 
political beliefs and practices as a result of their extensive rights to interact with 
host country institutions.  
Explanations of migrant political learning extend beyond institutional 
theories of democratic socialization. As rational actors, migrants may simply 
emulate those whom they perceive as more knowledgeable and capable of 
meeting their interests in the U.S., that is, Americans. Migrants may be 
responding to the cues that more politically incorporated immigrants and 
American citizens around them offer for how to behave in order to get ahead in 
the new country. This type of “learning” is quite distinct from that proposed by 
institutional theorists, but produces similar results. Both are consistent with 
Diamond’s conclusion that “experience with democracy and alternative regimes, 
and how well a formally democratic regime functions to deliver the “political 
goods” of democracy, have sizable independent effects on political attitudes and 
values” (1999, p. 192). The two explanations assume that migrants have 
significant social contact with the host country’s society, including both its 
institutions and people; the host country does not have to sanction the presence 
of migrants within its territory for them to learn new political beliefs and 
behaviors. 
Regardless of whether their presence in the host country is legally 
documented, foreign-born migrants observe how politics and society work in their 
more democratic host countries, operate under that country’s institutions and 
economy, and interact with its citizens as well as other more politically-
incorporated migrants. For instance, a survey of Latino immigrants in the United 
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States conducted in 2004 indicates that 44 percent of non-citizen immigrants 
reported volunteering for either a church or religious group, school or tutoring 
program, neighborhood, business or community group, or organizations 
representing their particular nationality, ethnic or racial group (Pew Hispanic 
Center and Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). Research also shows that non-
citizens join labor unions and act collectively to improve working conditions in 
migrant-dominated industries (Apostolidis, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2004; Repak, 1995, 
Varsanyi, 2005).  
Both undocumented migrants and legal permanent residents may also 
engage their host country’s political institutions directly. Non-citizens in the U.S. 
cannot vote, but they can and do participate in other ways that are not 
conditioned upon their immigration status (Bada, Fox, & Selee, 2006; Barreto & 
Muñoz, 2003; Leal, 2002; Varsanyi, 2005; Verba, Schlotzman & Brady, 1995). In 
2004, a full 18 percent of non-citizen Latinos reported that they had either 
attended a public meeting or demonstration in the community where they live, 
contacted an elected official, contributed money to a candidate running for public 
office, attended a political party meeting or function, or worked as a volunteer or 
for pay for a political candidate (Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2004). According to the Latino National Political Survey of 1989-90 
over 6 percent of non-citizens had signed a petition, and over 4 percent had 
written to a politician or attended a public meeting (Leal, 2002, p. 361). Non-
citizens have even become involved in electoral politics “through their local 
candidate’s endorsement process, by attending campaign rallies, and 
particularly, via participation in ‘‘get out the vote’’ (GOTV) drives” (Varsanyi, 
2005: p. 783). As the massive 2006 pro-immigrant rallies in major U.S. cities 
revealed, non-citizens can organize social movements and protest public policies 
in marches or assemblies. Additionally, legal permanent residents have peen 
permitted to enlist in the U.S. armed since the Revolutionary War; and about 
8,000 enlist each year (Hattiangadi, Quester, Lee, Lien, & MacLeod, 2005). In 
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2004, nearly 70,000 non-citizens served in the U.S. armed forces, making up 
about almost 5 percent of the active-duty force (Stock, 2006).  
In addition to having opportunities to learn the political beliefs and 
behaviors of their most democratic host country through observation and 
practice, the economic wellbeing and efficiency of most migrants’ host countries 
constitute powerful incentives for migrants to emulate what they observe there. 
Public opinion polls show that Mexicans admire the United States more than any 
Latin American country, particularly that country’s wealth and democracy 
(González & Minushkin, 2006). It is not unusual for migrants to ruminate on and 
discuss among themselves what makes the host country relatively more 
prosperous than their country of origin. As a consequence, migrants, overall, 
learn sufficiently during their time abroad to represent an important potential 
supply of new ideas for people who have not migrated.  
3.2.3 Trans-State Social Transactions as Information Pathways 
This project explores two potential pathways through which individual 
migrants may transmit to non-migrants the political beliefs and behaviors they 
learn in the U.S: returns and long-distance cross-border communication. The first 
pathway involves migrants (including naturalized citizens) who return to Mexico 
and share face-to-face with their co-nationals the ideas, beliefs, and practices 
they learned during their time away. The second involves immigrants who settle 
in the host country, yet sustain social contact with people who stay in the home 
country. Both of these processes are forms of trans-state social transactions that 
can serve as channels for the international diffusion of information.  
Migrant returns can indirectly expose millions of Mexicans to American 
social and political life. They represent an opportunity for non-migrant Mexicans 
to learn about U.S. political practices and values from people who experienced 
them first hand. As informants of foreign phenomena, returnees are exceptional 
because they are part of non-migrants’ referent group; returnees share with the 
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people of their community of origin a common social and economic background 
and similar concerns about their future in Mexico. Returnees can use familiar 
language and local metaphors to explain to others face-to-face their observations 
and experiences abroad. In theory, migrants who return to Mexico, as compared 
with the mass media or international NGOs, are “insiders”—members of their 
local community whose perspectives are dependable.  
Return migration from the U.S. has remained persistently high for 
decades. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) estimated that close to 50 percent of all 
migrants who entered the United States in 1971 had returned to their countries of 
origin by 1979. Estimates of Mexican return rates based on data from the same 
time period found that nearly half of migrants returned to Mexico within a year 
(Reyes & Mameesh, 2002). More recently, Reyes, Johnson and Van Swearingen 
(2002) found, based on Mexico’s 2000 census that 7 percent of those who 
emigrated to the U.S. two years prior to the survey returned to Mexico within the 
first six months and 11 percent had returned within a year (2002). Escobar Latapí 
and Martin (2006) report that, between 1997 and 2002, the percentage of 
migrants who returned to Mexico after three years was about 46. Of course, 
many immigrants return following longer stays as well.  
 A large number of migrants do not return home at all, opting to settle 
permanently in the host country instead. Of these, many remain in contact with 
friends and family who remain in the home country via telephone, the Internet 
and letters; temporary visits to the homeland; investment or remittances. The fact 
that such transactions are not face-to-face and the expense of long-distance 
communication could limit the range of subjects migrants wish to raise or have 
time discuss with non-migrants; these constraints could also diminish the quality 
of communication. Still, long-distance cross-border social transactions permit 
non-migrants to learn about foreign beliefs and practices from members of their 
referent group who they hold in high regard. There is evidence that the content of 
cross-border communication includes information about both American and 
  
83 
Mexican politics, including differences between the political practices and values 
of the two countries.12 Based on the 2006 Mexican Expatriate Study, McCann, 
Cornelius, and Leal (2007), find that the percentage of Mexicans living in the U.S. 
who claimed to follow the 2006 Mexican elections was equal to or greater than 
the percentage living in Mexico (p. 153). More significantly, between 15 and 20 
percent of immigrants reported discussing Mexican politics with friends and 
family at least a few times per week (p. 154).  
The intensity of long-distance cross-border communication varies. 
Waldinger (2008) finds that about one-in-ten Latino immigrants engages in 
communication, return visits, and remittances, while 63 percent engage in at 
least one of these activities. A survey conducted by the Inter-American Dialogue 
in 2003-2004, which assesses the frequency of contact between immigrants in 
the U.S. and people back home, reports that 28 percent of Mexicans travel home 
at least once a year, 73 percent make calls to relatives in Mexico at least once a 
week, and 82 percent of those phone calls last more than twenty minutes 
(Orozco, Lowell, Bump, & Fedewa, 2005). These data suggest that cross-border 
communication is sustained and significant. 
3.2.4 Non-Migrants as Adopters 
The democratization process that preceded Mexico’s historic 2000 
presidential elections involved the gradual dissolution of the corporatist 
apparatus that underpinned the PRI’s dominance (Collier, 1992; Teichman, 1992, 
1997). Prior to the 1980s, Mexicans channeled their demands to leaders via 
corporatist organizations centrally managed from the top down by the ruling party 
(see e.g., Collier & Collier, 1991). The PRI’s corporate structure grew to 
encompass not only peasants and workers, but also the military, and the growing 
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urban middle class. For decades, sustained economic growth permitted the PRI 
to address popular demands and maintain legitimacy by channeling 
participation—including the claims of dissidents and leaders— into mass 
organizations through patronage, social spending and cooptation. The debt crisis 
of the 1970s and 80s and neoliberal economic policies adopted in the 90s made 
it more difficult for the ruling party to afford these practices and in turn contributed 
to disrupting well-established patterns of state-society relations (Greene, 2007). 
As PRI-sanctioned corporatist channels broke down, citizens began to 
seek other ways to express their needs to the government or to meet them 
autonomously. Most notably, citizens’ organizations emerged both inside and 
outside of PRI-sanctioned channels with a view to increasing citizen participation, 
pressuring government officials through mass mobilizations, running candidates 
for local office, advocating for specific legislative initiatives, monitoring elections, 
and promoting human rights (Aguayo Quezada, 1998; Collier, 1999; Foweraker, 
1993; Harvey, 1994, 1998; Shefner, 2001; Tavera, 1999). This move from 
participation via corporatism to civic participation via other more democratic 
means from occurred alongside the institutional changes that ultimately led to 
Mexico’s democratic transition and culminated with Vicente Fox’s historic victory.  
Although Mexico’s transition to an electoral democracy is widely viewed as 
successful, elections, alone, have not sufficed to effectively channel citizen 
demands and hold leaders accountable. Elections have failed to address the 
critical problems associated with rapid urbanization, domestic and international 
migration, increasing crime rates, corruption, persistently weak rates of economic 
growth, and worsening public health and education services.  
These problems have sharpened citizens’ claims, yet levels of civic 
engagement in Mexico remain relatively low. Mexicans have fairly low levels of 
social trust; they show little faith in democratic ideals, and moderate confidence 
in political institutions (Norris, 2002). Participatory behavior is also limited. In 
2006, only 10 percent of Mexican citizens reported attending an open town 
  
85 
meeting, a lower percentage of citizens than seven other Latin American 
countries, including the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Haiti, and El Salvador (Parás & Coleman, 2006). Mexico has little participation in 
protest politics and demonstrations (Norris, 2002). Likewise the rate of informal 
participation through the community to resolve a local problem is about 30 
percent, surpassing only those of Bolivia, Panama, and Nicaragua in Latin 
America (Parás & Coleman, 2006). 
At the same time, Mexicans have a growing interest in improving the 
quality of their democracy. Mexico’s citizens have a predominantly normative 
understanding of democracy (Parás & Coleman, 2006). They are highly critical of 
their own political system, yet they aspire to live in a democracy characterized by 
freedom of speech, liberty, equality, the right to choose one’s leaders, and an 
effective system of elections (Moreno & Méndez, 2003, Norris, 2002; Parás & 
Coleman, 2006).  
3.3 Evaluating Migrant-Driven Democratic Diffusion:  Data and Methods 
Migrants who absorb new democratic beliefs and behaviors in the host 
country subsequently transfer them to people in their country of origin via two 
pathways: returns and long-distance cross-border communications. Are these 
trans-state social transactions sufficient to set diffusion among “ordinary citizens” 
in motion? Put differently, do these transactions contribute to changes in the 
political beliefs and behaviors of those who stay behind? If so, does the manner 
in which they influence change conform to the expectations that rational choice, 
bounded rationality, or constructivist approaches generate?  
To reprise, rational choice theory suggests that these conditions are 
sufficient as long as the foreign beliefs and behaviors are effective in the context 
of Mexican political institutions. Non-migrants will embrace the information sent 
by migrants currently living abroad, because migrants’ personal attributes 
indicate that, on average, they are relatively more knowledgeable and reliable 
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individuals with whom non-migrants close to them share interests. The 
information, advice, and ideas they share via social interactions are therefore 
worthy of following as a means to meet one’s interests. Return migrants, in turn, 
will import those practices and beliefs of their more democratic neighbors that 
they consider effective. Having seen that civic engagement produces democratic 
goods in the U.S., they will be eager to import and replicate this in their home 
country. Moreover, returnees should be particularly persuasive because they are 
especially well placed to adapt foreign practices and ideas to Mexican 
specificities. Only if rational migrants believe that U.S. style political beliefs and 
behaviors are infeasible in the Mexican context will they reject importation. In this 
case, we would not expect non-migrants communicating with friends and family 
to adopt the foreign innovations either. 
According to bounded rationality, migrants make it possible for non-
migrants residing in Mexico to have “easy access” to information about American 
political behaviors and beliefs. We should expect returnees to be strongly 
influenced by their experience abroad, precisely because nothing is more 
compelling than firsthand experience with a well functioning democracy. Their 
impression of how effectively some beliefs and behaviors produce the goods of 
democracy should persuade them that the U.S. model is worth emulating; it will 
limit their (already weak) incentives for exploring the modes of participation in 
other countries. Social transactions between migrants who have or continue 
living in the U.S. and Mexican who have never left Mexico make American style 
democracy particularly available, relative to other countries, because nearly all 
Mexican emigrants move to the U.S. The fact that the beliefs and behaviors 
originate in the more economically and politically powerful U.S. should be 
sufficient to make them attractive to potential adopters. Because individuals tend 
to be cognitively lazy, these factors will encourage non-migrant Mexicans to 
embrace the beliefs and behaviors of which they learn regardless of their proven 
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merits in the Mexican context; they will adopt without careful consideration under 
the assumption that they will work in Mexico too.  
Constructivists envision the international diffusion of democratic norms 
and models from more advanced, industrialized democracies (or international 
organizations in which such countries exercise significant power) to less-
developed ones. They predict that returnees and migrants who stay in the U.S. 
and fully embrace American political beliefs and values will actively work to 
spread them at home. Their conviction that these new beliefs and practices 
conform to a set of normatively superior, more democratic values will not waver, 
even when they introduce them into the Mexican context. In other words, even if 
the foreign political attitudes and practices do not appear to be effective in 
Mexico, migrants will persistently practice them simply because they believe in 
their underlying ideas. For the same reason, both types of migrants will seek to 
transform the beliefs and behaviors of their co-nationals who have not migrated.  
How do the outcomes produced by migrant-driven international diffusion in 
the case of Mexico compare to the theoretical expectations that each of these 
approaches suggests? Are there outcomes that these approaches fail to clarify?  
3.3.1 Research Method 
This section evaluates whether trans-state social transactions affect the 
political attitudes and behaviors of Mexican citizens living in Mexico. Specifically, 
I explore the effects of such transactions effects on three political attitudes (or 
beliefs): tolerance, satisfaction with Mexico’s democracy and evaluations of 
government respect for rights; and four behaviors: voting, individual non-electoral 
political activity, participation in organizations, and unobtrusive forms of protest. I 
estimate a separate model for each of the seven attitudes and behaviors. I 
observe differences in these attitudes and behaviors between people who have 
not migrated, but have friends and family living in the U.S.; individuals who have 
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returned after living in the U.S. as migrants; and individuals with no ties to 
migration at all. 
I evaluate the hypotheses using multi-level linear and logistic regressions. 
Multi-level models are used when data are structured into two or more levels, or 
units of analysis. In this case a multi-level model is appropriate because I 
evaluate both individual-level (individual migrant returns and individuals’ 
communication with friends and family abroad) and aggregate-level variables 
(municipal-level migration flows). For a detailed explanation of the data structure 
and models, consult Appendix A. 
Most of the data for this statistical analysis come from Desencanto 
Ciudadano en México. (See Appendix A for details on sample and data 
structure.) I also draw on publicly available data collected in 2000 by Mexico’s 
National Institute of Geographic Statistics and Information (INEGI) and the 
country’s National Population Council (Conapo). 
Ideally, determining whether migrants adopt and transmit political beliefs 
and practices would involve a dual-sited panel survey of migrants taken before 
they leave the country of origin, during their stay in the host country, and after 
their return (Fitzgerald, 2006; Glick-Schiller & Levitt, 2004). As many scholars 
have argued, we measure change most effectively by observing outcomes over 
time (Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, & Zeger, 2002). Additionally, because I focus on a 
process involving social relationships, it would be ideal to follow specific cross-
border interactions between migrants and non-migrants. The first strategy is 
nearly impossible to implement in practice, because migration decisions are 
contingent and highly unpredictable. Respondents might never engage in some 
or any of these international movements, or each decision might take years to 
undertake. Another challenge facing both strategies is that most migration from 
Mexico to the U.S. is clandestine; this makes it difficult to ‘follow’ migrants over 
time as they move across borders and to participate in their social lives on both 
sides of the border. The second method privileges the examination of small 
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samples, and precludes obtaining a national random sample of individual 
respondents, but one of my goals is to understand the significance and 
magnitude of migrant-led international diffusion at the national level. 
This chapter adopts the best possible approach given these limitations. It 
observes differences in political beliefs and behavior in a single setting—the 
country of origin—across the distinct groups of interest. I ask individuals who 
have migrated and returned about the international aspects of their lives and their 
current practices and beliefs in Mexico. I draw on information about long-distance 
cross-border relations that non-migrants living in Mexico provide. The analysis 
measures change cross-sectionally, at a fixed point in time by comparing groups 
with distinct migration experiences. 
 
3.3.2 Dependent Variables: Political Attitudes and Behaviors 
The analysis examines the effects of trans-state social transactions on 
political attitudes and behaviors observable among Mexican nationals living in 
Mexico. I focus on attitudes widely considered “essential” among mass publics in 
order for democracy to flourish and endure. The behaviors I assess include 
individual and collective political participation that attempts to influence public 
decision-making and hold leaders accountable.  
Attitudes. The attitudes I examine include tolerance, satisfaction with 
democracy, and evaluations of the government’s respect for rights. Tolerance is 
perhaps the most fundamental requisite of democracy. It is also an attitude that is 
relatively weak among Mexican citizens as compared with Americans. 
Democracies allow and protect political differences and other disagreements 
among citizens (Dahl 1971, Huntington 1984). A healthy practice of tolerance 
among citizens abets official tolerance. Conversely, when intolerant citizens 
translate their prejudices into law or seize power themselves, the result is often 
violent suppression of dissent. My operationalization of tolerance comprises 
three facets: politics, religion, and sexual orientation. Respondents were asked to 
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agree or disagree on a five-point scale with the statements that “a democracy 
guarantees the right for all social groups to protest peacefully”, “government 
policy should reflect the religious beliefs of the majority” (tolerant citizens 
disagreed with this statement), and “gays and lesbians have the right to organize 
public marches.” The overall tolerance score averaged the answers to these 
three items.  
This project also considers “critical citizens” vital to a healthy democracy 
(Norris, 1999). Citizen satisfaction with democracy represents an evaluation of 
public institutions, officials and their performance. Satisfaction does not have to 
be high in order for democracy to flourish. In fact critical citizens may be essential 
to holding leaders accountable and improving a country’s democratic institutions. 
Indeed established democracies abound with citizens who at times condemn 
policies, politicians, organizations, and laws quite vociferously but never waver in 
their support of democratic principles. To measure satisfaction with democracy, I 
use an item commonly used in cross-national public opinion work, “How satisfied 
are you with democracy in [Mexico]?” The five response categories range from 
“not at all” to “very”, with a neutral midpoint. This item is a summary indicator of 
overall satisfaction that comprehends a wide range of democracy’s constituent 
elements, including incumbents, policy outputs, political and economic 
performance, and democratic institutions and principles (Clarke, Dutt, & 
Kornberg, 1993).  
Assessments of how well a government protects the political and social 
rights of its citizens are one important component of satisfaction with democracy, 
and also reflect citizens’ underlying commitment to tolerance. The issue is 
particularly important to the case of Mexico, where organizations such as 
Reporters without Borders (RSF), Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) have recently intensified their criticism of Mexico’s human rights 
record despite the country’s transition to an electoral democracy.  
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For assessments of government adherence to political and human rights 
standards, I include two survey items that asked respondents to agree or 
disagree, also on a five-point scale, with the statements that the federal 
government and state governments “respect people’s rights”. These items 
correlated at .77, so I took their average as an indicator of respondents’ general 
assessment of how rights are faring under Mexican democracy. 
Behaviors. I examine four types of political behaviors (participation): 
voting, individual non-electoral political activity, participation in organizations, and 
protest. There is a marked difference in the degree to which Americans and 
Mexicans engage in each of these actions; Mexican participation rates are 
consistently lower. This is significant given that greater participation contributes 
to improving the quality of democracy by strengthening representative linkages 
between citizens and policy-makers and holding the latter accountable for their 
decisions. Democracy is more likely to thrive when citizens are well informed 
about issues of the day, are interested in politics, and participate actively in the 
political process (Almond & Verba, 1989; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993).  
Although modern democracies offer and require “a variety of competitive 
processes and channels for the expression of interests and values” (Karl & 
Schmitter, 1991, p. 78), most conceptions of democracy concur that the sine qua 
non of political participation is voting. Schumpeter argued that structured, regular 
voting was sufficient to make peaceful competition among leaders possible 
(1943). Rousseau argued that electoral participation, alone, could ensure that the 
benefits and burdens of policy outcomes would be equally shared; only if 
everyone voted could we ensure that “political equality is made effective in the 
decision-making assembly” (Pateman, 1976: p. 23). There are numerous 
conditions that can render elections insufficient to peacefully channel the public’s 
interest into leadership and policy choices. However imperfect electoral 
processes may be, voting is the only form of participation that is absolutely 
necessary and can also be sufficient for the realization of just and equitable 
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political competition. The indicator of electoral participation I use in this study is a 
dummy variable that accounts for individuals’ self-reported participation in the 
2000 presidential elections and 2003 mid-term elections. Respondents received 
a 1 on this indicator if they claimed to have participated in either of these 
elections. 
In addition to voting, individuals have several non-electoral means at their 
disposal to seek resolution of private problems, communicate their preferences to 
policy-makers, and influence fellow citizens. The indicator I use for such 
individual, non-electoral political activity is a dummy variable scored as 1 if a 
citizen engaged in at least one of these activities in the three years prior to the 
survey: signed a complaint, wrote a letter to the editor, called in to a political 
radio or TV program, wrote the president or another elected authority, handed 
out political flyers, or put up a campaign sign at their house. 
Citizens also organize groups to advance interests they hold in common. 
Some are explicitly political, others not, but even participation in non-political 
groups gives citizens self-confidence and organizational skills that may be readily 
transferred to the political arena (Putnam, 1995). Respondents received a value 
of 1 on this organizational participation dummy variable if, at the time of the 
survey, they participated, at least “occasionally”, in parties or other political 
associations, human rights groups, civic organizations, unions, cooperatives, or 
peasant, religious, professional, neighborhood, women’s, or environmental 
organizations.  
Frequently, citizens perceive that channeling demands through traditional 
representative institutions fails to get results, and they turn to more contentious 
forms of making claims on the political system. This study contemplates two: 
participation in marches or sit-ins. A respondent who undertook either of these 





3.3.3 Independent Variables: Trans-State Social Transactions 
The Desencanto Ciudadano survey provides measures for the two 
migration-led paths of diffusion of interest: 1) a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent ever lived in the U.S.13 2) a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent communicates with friends or family who reside outside 
of Mexico.  
Over six percent of respondents reported having lived in the U.S. and 
returned. Of these, most had stayed two years or more in the U.S. The most 
recent emigration had occurred within the last five years for nearly sixty percent 
of our sample. Returnees reported having a wide variety of experiences in the 
host country conducive to learning new political behaviors. Most notably, a full 43 
percent either attended public school or had an immediate relative who was 
attending public school during the time that they were away, and 38 percent of 
returnees claimed to have utilized public libraries. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below 
summarize these experiences. 
Nearly half of the sample has friends or family outside of Mexico; of this, 
93 percent (44 percent of the total sample) communicates with their migrant 
relations at least once a year. The mean frequency of communication is about 
once per month. 24 percent talk about politics, and 17 percent receive 
remittances. 109 respondents who reported speaking to friends and family 
                                            
13 I am confident that the survey effectively measures return migration. Migration takes many 
forms, including low- and high-skilled labor, forced, temporary, and permanent migration. It is 
possible that individuals who lived abroad and returned may not consider themselves migrants. 
For example, if asked, high-skilled individuals who resided in the U.S. for a four-year period of 
employment or education may not claim to have migrated; yet they fall into the theoretic purview 
of this study’s subjects. By asking whether respondents “lived” outside of Mexico instead of 
whether they “migrated” to another country, I accounted more fully for the population of interest. 
Indeed, all respondents who indicated that they had resided in the U.S. had done so for no less 




abroad were men, while a full 177 were female.14 About 40 percent of those 
reporting that they kept in contact with migrants abroad had completed 
secondary or some high school, while 16 percent had completed high school or 
studied beyond that level.  
 
Table  3.2: Migrant  Participation  in  U.S. Organizations  
Type of Organization 
% Who 
Participated 
Church Organizations 23 
Parent Organizations 3 
Migrant Clubs (e.g., 
Hometown Associations) 
9 








Table  3.3:  Returnees  Use  of  U.S. Public  Services  
Type of Service 
% Who 
Participated  
Public Transportation 73 
Public Library 38 





Self or Family Member 




                                            
14 Despite this difference, sex (an interaction term including the sex of the responded and the 
dummy indicating that they communicated with friends and family abroad) did not produce any 
statistically differences between with the respect to the outcomes I explore below.  
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The independent variables I evaluate are not mutually exclusive. 
Respondents may have lived in the U.S. and have family or friends in the U.S (11 
percent), for example. However, by including each of them in the regression 
model, I isolate the effects of each type of migration experience. 
 
3.3.4 Control Variables 
There are other critical determinants of attitudes and behavior. To ensure 
that the effects of trans-state social transactions are not confounded with those of 
other possible causes, the models I test contain a number of control variables. 
These include two migration-driven factors, other international forces that may 
compete with migration as sources of international democratic diffusion, and 
various personal attributes and municipal-level characteristics known to influence 
political attitudes and behavior.  
I control for two migration-driven phenomena. The first is remittances, or 
money sent from migrants abroad to family members back home. There is 
evidence to suggest that remittances affect the political behavior and attitudes of 
their recipients. However, these cash flows do not effect change by way of 
international diffusion. Rather, they represent a material resource that 
strengthens individuals vis-à-vis powerful state actors, encouraging them to vote 
for opposition parties (Merino, 2005; Kurtz, 2004), or hold local leaders 
accountable (Burgess, 2005). Remittances could also influence the political 
behavior of those who receive them via endogenous democratization if they 
reproduce the effects of modernization on a small scale by increasing receiving 
households’ purchasing power, expenditures on education and health, and 
general standard of living (Boix & Stokes, 2003). Given the possibility that 
remittances might affect the outcomes of interests through processes quite 
distinct from diffusion, the model includes a control variable for those who receive 
money from migrants abroad. I estimate the yearly amount (in thousand-peso 
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units) by multiplying the frequency with which respondents reported receiving 
remittances times the average amount received per transfer.  
The second migration-related control variable accounts for aggregate 
levels of migration in respondents’ communities. This control is important 
because individuals who have neither migrated and returned nor have friends 
and family abroad may nonetheless be susceptible to foreign influences as a 
result of migration if they live in an area where migration is prevalent. Assessing 
whether diffusion via such indirect ties to migration occurs is certainly of interest, 
but not the central objective of this chapter. The model thus includes the 
Migration Intensity Index to control for the extent to which the entire municipality 
in which a respondent resides is affected by international migration. Mexico’s 
National Population Council (Conapo) developed this index with data from the 
1995-2000 Mexican census (Conapo, 2002a). It contains a factor score that 
projects four key municipal-level indicators of international migration onto a 
single, continuous index: 1) percentage of households who receive remittances, 
2) percentage of households with one or more members residing outside of 
Mexico, 3) percentage of households with one or more members who have 
returned within the last five years after migrating internationally within the last five 
years, and 4) percentage of households with one or more members who have 
returned within the last five years after migrating internationally more than five 
years ago. The index ranges from -.87 to 2.58 with a median of -.40 in the 
sample. 
The model includes two variables (aggregate- and individual-level, 
respectively) representing international forces other than migration that may give 
rise to changes in attitudes and behavior: 1) border residence, a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the municipality in which a respondent lives lies on the U.S.-Mexico 
border and 2) media access, a factor score summarizing how often respondents 
watch TV, listen to the radio, and read newspapers. Living on the border (de la 
Garza & Yetim, 2003) and consuming news and entertainment (Held, McGrew, 
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Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999) both expose Mexicans, including those with no 
migration experience, to value systems of other countries—especially the United 
States, which dominates international news coverage in Mexico.  
I include four personal attributes shown by existing research to influence 
the outcomes of interest: gender, age, education, and income. There is empirical 
evidence that age and gender influence attitudes and behavior, too. In Mexico 
(and other new democracies), older survey respondents are more participative 
and tend to be less critical of their country’s democracy, since they have direct 
memories of the prior political regime. Gender shapes attitudes and behaviors to 
the extent that it conditions access to politics, including information and 
discussions about politics and decision-making in the political system itself. 
Individual resources, including income and education, influence both political 
attitudes and behaviors. As a material resource, income may shape an 
individual’s ability to influence public decisions, and people with higher incomes 
may have more time to participate politically. Additionally, higher income earners 
may be more satisfied with democracy simply because they are relatively more 
satisfied with their lives. Education gives citizens both the cognitive skills and 
knowledge that enable them to participate meaningfully in politics.  
Furthermore, the model contains two aggregate level control variables: the 
population of the municipality in which respondents reside and a municipal-level 
index of economic marginalization (Conapo, 2002b). Each of these might also 
exert effects on political attitudes and behavior. Urban populations are typically 
more informed and politically active, and are likelier to participate in civic 
organizations and protests. In contrast, marginalized municipalities have fewer 
resources to participate politically and their opportunities for learning about 
democracy are constrained. They are characterized by weak infrastructure, poor 
roads, and limited communications. Some municipalities do not have telephone 
communications at all, and many of the most marginalized municipalities have no 
secondary schools.  
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3.4 Migrant-Led International Diffusion: Results an d Discussion 
The results for each model appear in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. I find that in the 
case of return migrants, absorption and retention of U.S. culture moderately 
affected attitudes. Returnees are more tolerant and more critical of the Mexican 
government’s record on rights than their counterparts who have never lived in 
another country; but the analysis indicated that having migrated and returned is 
not associated with changes in political behaviors.  
In contrast, long-distance cross-border communication had a strong 
impact on political participation. Mexicans who communicate with migrants in the 
U.S. were much more politically engaged than those who do not know anyone 
living outside the country; they were more likely to have voted, more involved in 
individual political activity as well as civic organizations, and protest more. With 
respect to attitudes, however, cross-border communications had only a limited 
impact on the attitudes of non-migrants who communicated with friends or family 
living in the U.S.; specifically, they reduced satisfaction with Mexico’s democracy 
among non-migrants. I offer more detailed interpretations of these results below. 
The results suggest that communication between migrants and non-
migrants produce more diverse and differentiated patterns of diffusion than 
expected. Moreover, although the statistical analysis, alone, is inconclusive, it 
strongly suggests that rational choice and bounded rationality do not account for 
the patterns by which migrants diffuse political beliefs and behavior. The utility of 
constructivism remains in question; however the results indicate that behavioral 
and attitudinal norms do not flow unidirectionally from the more democratic U.S. 
to less democratic Mexico as most constructivists would predict. Finally, these 
results are surprising because they indicate that the two types of trans-state 
social transactions (long-distance cross-border communication and returns) do 




 Table 3.4 Multi-Level Linear Regressions of Belief  Indicators on      
Migration Variables  
(Cells Contain Parameters, SEs, and p-values) 
   Tolerance 
Satisfaction  with 
Democracy 
Evaluation of Govt. 
Respect for Rights 
Migrated to U.S. and Returned  .263** -.063 -.527** 
  0.107 .227 .194 
  (.015) (.782) (.007) 
Communicates with   .022 -.314** -.097 
Migrant Friends or Family  .052 0.109 .093 
  (.672) (.004) (.299) 
Municipal Migration Intensity Index  .053 .076 -.017 
  .060 .091 .076 
  (.377) (.407) (.819) 
Total Annual Remittances Received  .004 .000 -.006 
(in thousands of peso s) .003 .006 .005 
  (.185) (.954) (.202) 
Media Access  .125** .156* -.057 
  .048 .101 .086 
  .009 (.122) -0.509 
Sex -.07 .170 .124 
(Male = 1) .051 .107 .092 
  (.170) (.112) (.177) 
Age -.001 -.005 .002 
  .002 .004 .003 
  (.431) (.183) (.607) 
Educa tion  .023** -.002 -.018 
(in years of schooling)  .007 .015 .013 
  (.002) (.914) (.180) 
Income  .026 -.076 -.033 
(in thousands of pesos)  .024 .048 .041 
  (.280) (.117) (.418) 
Population of Municipality  .000 -.001 -.002** 
(in 10,000 inhabitants)  .001 .001 .001 
  (.976) (.467) (.019) 
Municipal marginalization index  -.053 -.139** -.059 
  .046 .071 .059 
  (.249) (.048) (.322) 
Municipality borders U.S. (dummy)  -.043 .141 .146 
  .146 .210 .175 
  (.771) (.503) (.403) 
Constant  3.33 3.27 3.02 
  .126 .248 .211 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) 
N 567 567 567 
R2 .132 .037 .050 
Log likelihood  --- --- --- 
Wald(12) 65 21.95 28.60 
Pr(X2) .000 .038 .004 
Rho .130 .013 .007 
**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; * statistically significant at p<.10 level. 
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Table 3.5 Multi-Level Logistic Regressions of Parti cipation                                
Indicators on Migration Variables 
(Cells Contain Parameters, SEs, and p-values) 







Migrated to U.S. and Returned -0.738 -0.813 .202 -.714 
  0.683 .528 .609 .453 
  (0.280) (.123) (.740) (.115) 
Communicates with   .888**  0.519* .937** .408* 
Migrant Friends or Family .304 0.294 .379 .216 
  (.003) (.078) (.013) (.060) 
Municipal Migration Intensity 
Index .281 0.025 .307 .560** 
  .298 0.23 .267 .240 
  (.346) (.914) (.250) (.019) 
Annual Remittances Received .009 .012 .002 -.035 
(in thousands of pesos) .012 .001 .000 .023 
  (.463) (.271) (.939) (.133) 
Media Access  .853**             .799** 1.136** .665** 
  .322 .244 .408 .207 
  (.008) (.001) (.005) (.001) 
Sex -.061 .034 .664* -.262 
(Male = 1) .298 .280 .353 .213 
  (.837) (.902) (.060) (.217) 
Age .015 .027** .026** .027** 
  0.011 .01 .012 .008 
  (.168) (.005) (.034) (.000) 
Education -.001 .09** .046 .008 
(in years of schooling) .044 .040 .051 .031 
  (.975) (.025) (.361) (.787) 
Income                .76** -.079 .000 .077 
(in thousands of pesos) .000 .126 .000 .100 
  (.042) (.530) (.722) (.443) 
Population of  Municipality  .007** -.003 -.001 -.002 
(in 10,000 inhabitants) .004 .003 .004 .003 
  (.046) (.190) (.833) (.534) 
Municipal marginalization index .276 .127 .424 .232 
  .242 .174 .212 .182 
  (.255) (.463) (.046) (.202) 
Municipality borders U.S. 
(dummy) .430 .652 .337 .900 
  .698 .529 .732 .578 
  (.537) (.218) (.645) (.119) 
Constant -3.844 .504 -4.75 -1.307 
  .765 .619 .909 .539 
  (.000) (.416) (.000) (.015) 
N 617 567 615 560 
Log likelihood -192.4 -202.17 -130.93 -344.59 
Wald(12) 28.93 38.4 26.23 37.18 
Pr(X2) .004 .000 .001 .000 
Rho .178 .000 .041 .164 




3.4.1 Effects of Emigrating and Returning 
Having lived abroad and returned made respondents more tolerant of 
different religions, political views, and sexual orientations. The process led to an 
average difference of .262 on the five-point tolerance scale, equivalent to 7 
percent of the dependent variable’s range. Holding all other variables at their 
means, those who lived abroad had a mean tolerance score of 3.4 (the midpoint 
is 3), compared to 3.33 for those who had not. Similarly, returnees were 
generally less sanguine about Mexican federal and state governments’ 
observance of rights, averaging .527 less on the rights scale (13 percent of the 
scale’s range) than their counterparts who have never lived outside Mexico. 
Return migrants’ average score was 2.48, a negative evaluation of the 
government’s performance in this area, while the mean for those who never left 
fell right around 3.01, reflecting a more ambivalent attitude.  
 
3.4.2 Effects of Long-Distance Cross-Border Communication  
Communication with migrants in the U.S. greatly raised individuals’ 
proclivity toward democratic participation. The log odds ratio of having voted in 
either the 2000 or 2003 elections was .519, meaning that the odds of having 
voted in either the 2000 or 2003 elections were 1.7 times higher among 
individuals engaged in this type of trans-state social transaction than in its 
absence. Additionally, the log odds ratio of engaging in some form of individual, 
non-electoral political participation was 0.888, meaning that the odds of this form 
of political participation were nearly two and a half times higher (2.43) for this 
group than for those who do not speak with family or friends abroad. If all other 
variables are held at their means, the friends and relatives of migrants had a 10.9 
percent probability of participating non-electorally, compared to 4.8 percent. 
The log odds ratio that respondents who communicate with family and 
friends abroad participate in at least one civic organization was .408, meaning 
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that the odds were one and a half times higher (1.51) than those for respondents 
who do not engage in such communication. The former group had a .47 chance 
of participating and the latter, a .37 probability. Additionally, the log odds ratio of 
participating in an organized protest was 0.937. This signifies that holding all 
other variables constant at their means, being in touch with friends and family 
abroad accounted for a 156 percent increase in the probability of participation in 
organized political protest.  
Social transactions with someone in the U.S. also changed political 
attitudes. Those in touch with family or friends abroad were less satisfied with 
Mexican democracy than those who were not in contact with Mexicans living 
outside the country. On average, the former group scored .314 less on the five-
point satisfaction scale (nearly 8 percent of the scale’s range) than the latter. The 
mean scores for the two groups (holding all other variables constant at their 
means) were 2.94, below the midpoint of 3, and 3.26, respectively. 
 
3.4.3 Rational Choice, Bounded Rationality, or Constructivism? 
Does rational choice, bounded rationality, or constructivism help us 
understand these outcomes? This section evaluates the results with respect to 
each of these theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 2. My objective is to 
determine whether the theoretical perspectives support the empirical outcomes 
that the statistical analysis generates. I begin with rational choice and conclude 
with constructivism, assessing the validity of each perspective with respect to 
returns and cross-border communication in turn. Because the present large-N 
analysis is insufficient to fully evaluate the nature of migrant-led international 
diffusion, I limit the discussion to eliminating rival explanations and identifying 
aspects about migrant-led international diffusion in the case of Mexico cannot be 
understood without further qualitative research. Chapters 4 and 5 aim to address 
these gaps in our understanding. 
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Rational Choice Theory. When rational migrants resettle in Mexico they 
should continue to practice the beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S., if 
they believe such actions and beliefs are also valuable and effective in Mexico. 
Alternatively, rational return migrants could fail to import new beliefs and 
behaviors if they did not learn any during their time in the U.S. Finally while 
rational choice purists would hold that inconsistent beliefs and behaviors are 
irrational, most rational choice scholars would argue that there are conditions 
under which rational actors can hold beliefs that do not conform to their actions. 
We require significant additional data to determine whether migrant-led 
international diffusion conforms to rational choice theory, because the statistical 
analysis produces a mixed set of results. These show that returnees do not 
import new political behaviors at all. They also indicate that the political beliefs of 
returnees differ from those of Mexicans who have never migrated.  
We lack conclusive evidence concerning whether the failure to import 
behaviors is due to their ineffectiveness or because migrants did not learn while 
abroad. The fact that returnees did obtain new political beliefs suggests that, on 
average, significant learning did take place in the U.S., however. The analysis 
does not provide sufficient information to determine whether returnees’ 
importation of beliefs is a rational decision. But, given that rational choice is 
highly utilitarian, it is difficult to envision how the importation of beliefs without 
corresponding behaviors could be rational.  
The rational explanation for the inconsistency between behaviors and 
beliefs is that individuals want to protect their status as people who are seen as 
worth emulating. Individuals (members of the mass public) turn to persons they 
perceive as knowledgeable, skilled and successful in order to make decisions 
about politics. Another key attribute individuals look for in selecting “opinion 
leaders” is that they be individuals with whom they share values and objectives. 
We saw earlier that migrants are both self selected and selected from the 
household precisely because they possess these qualities. 
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A return migrant who imports and diffuses foreign values and behaviors 
could place their role as an “opinion leader” at risk. To prevent such 
consequences rational returnees could publicly downplay their new beliefs and 
behaviors. They privately hold their new attitudes after crossing the border into 
Mexico and avoid engaging in new political behaviors entirely. We would expect 
such migrants to return to their pre-migration patterns of civic engagement to 
maintain their social status as “opinion leaders”. 
Qualitative research should focus on examining why returnees fail to 
import new political behaviors even as they import beliefs. Do returnees fail to 
learn new behaviors while abroad? Or do they abandon their new behaviors 
when they return home? How do returnees’ political beliefs and behaviors 
change as they move back from to the U.S. and back into Mexico? Furthermore, 
the qualitative research must assess whether returnees transmit to non-migrants 
their new beliefs they obtained in the U.S. and evaluate how non-migrants 
respond to the innovations that returnees introduce. 
Turning to non-migrants who communicate with friends or family living in 
the U.S., we find that they became significantly more participative, but 
experience limited attitudinal changes. The result could be consistent with a 
rational choice logic if the reasons that underlie the results are: (1) that U.S.-
based migrants transmit participatory behaviors to non-migrants in Mexico 
because they believe they can be effective in Mexico, and (2) that non-migrants 
follow the lead of migrants abroad because they perceive the latter as highly 
knowledgeable, capable and successful individuals with whom they share core 
interests.  
If both conditions hold, then the limited attitudinal changes observed 
among non-migrants with cross-border social ties is puzzling. If the reason 
underlying this outcome is simply that migrants in the U.S. choose not to share 
with non-migrants the political beliefs of Americans, then we cannot reject 
rational choice theory. Explaining beliefs might simply be too complicated from a 
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distance, for instance. However if non-migrants’ consciously reject the beliefs 
that migrants convey while simultaneously embracing the behaviors, then the 
inconsistency suggests that the diffusion process does not follow a rational 
choice logic. 
 We require additional evidence to determine whether U.S.-based 
migrants to transmit information concerning both American political beliefs and 
behaviors, and to explain their motivations for transmitting. The statistical 
evidence is insufficient to assess how non-migrants respond to the innovations 
that returnees introduce as compared to those transmitted by U.S.-based 
migrants. Qualitative research should assess why non-migrants embrace foreign 
political behaviors as effective democratic participation strategies, while 
returnees fail to import and diffuse new behaviors. If we are to accept a rational 
choice explanation, we must identify what motivates non-migrants who engage in 
cross-border communication to participate more; and we must reconcile these 
findings with data explaining returnees’ failure to increase their rates of 
participation.  
Bounded Rationality. The results of the statistical analysis are inconsistent 
with bounded rationality. The approach suggests that returnees should be highly 
likely to import U.S. political beliefs and behaviors since those are the examples 
of effective democratic civic engagement with which they are most familiar. For 
returnees with an interest in improving their country’s democracy, the American 
model should be not only the most available, but also the most compelling. 
Return migrants’ direct experience with U.S. political and economic products 
should be sufficient to have persuaded them that they can also serve to improve 
the quality of democracy in Mexico. Furthermore, we would expect non-migrants 
to encourage returnees to share with them the political practices and attitudes 
they learned abroad. To do so would represent a highly economical strategy, on 
the part of non-migrants, for resolving a domestic political problem with relatively 
little cognitive effort.  
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Another finding that is at odds with bounded rationality is that returnees 
import only beliefs, while non-migrants principally learn behaviors. Bounded 
rationality does not offer a coherent account for this uneven outcome. On one 
hand, it is possible that returnees learn behaviors with greater ease than they do 
attitudes; the former are more amenable to simple emulation. But this logic jars 
with returnees’ proclivity for importing beliefs; if anything, we would expect this 
group to import easily replicable behaviors.  
Constructivism. Assessing whether constructivism is a useful approach for 
explaining migrant-driven diffusion is more challenging. In so far as 
constructivists see democratic norms and models flowing from more advanced, 
industrialized democracies (or international organizations in which such countries 
exercise significant power) to less-developed ones, the findings in this chapter 
seem to be inconsistent with the approach. However, as I explained in Chapter 2, 
there exists a growing body of scholars that argues that beliefs held 
intersubjectively at the local level can stop or modify “superior” foreign norms that 
flow into a country. The statistical findings leave open the possibility that migrant-
led international diffusion follows this type of constructivist logic. We need 
qualitative data to determine whether collectively held ideas about what is 
appropriate are at work at all, and if so, to specify the specific nature of these 
intersubjective beliefs. 
Because returnees do not import American political behaviors—meaning 
that their own actions do not change to reflect whatever new behaviors they may 
have embraced or observed abroad—we cannot conclude that shared beliefs 
about democracy in the U.S. were powerful enough to overcome the beliefs and 
behaviors that migrants previously held. Their failure to introduce new political 
behaviors into Mexico also signifies that the norms and beliefs that underlie U.S. 
political practices were not compelling enough to persuade returnees to 
proselytize them in their home country. The outcomes I uncover, based on the 
statistical analysis with respect to returnees’ political behaviors, therefore clearly 
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challenge the dominant constructivist perspective on international diffusion, 
which sees democracy flowing from more to less advanced democracies in a 
uniform and unidirectional pattern. 
It is possible that returnees’ failure to import behaviors is nonetheless 
attributable to the presence of shared beliefs in Mexico that conflict with 
American norms of democratic citizenship enough to discourage returnees from 
introducing them into their home country. If so, then a less conventional 
interpretation of constructivism might well account for the forces that drive 
migrant-led diffusion. Qualitative evidence that explores why migrants do not 
import new political behaviors (if they learned any at all) is necessary to flesh out 
this possibility. Furthermore, this type of explanation requires that we better 
understand the collective beliefs in Mexico that could be influencing the diffusion 
process. 
After they re-enter Mexico, returnees do appear to retain the more 
democratic values they embraced in the U.S. This finding could be consistent 
with the prevailing constructivist understanding of diffusion if we find that 
migrants chose to retain these values because they consider them normatively 
superior. Even if returnees actively promote foreign political beliefs, non-migrant 
Mexican citizens may reject externally provided innovations if they do not 
conform to their local practices and norms. For instance, if local norms include 
hostility towards minorities and acceptance of violations of their rights, migrants 
may be unable to affect change with respect to tolerance for religious, sexual and 
political differences either via return migrants or via long-distance cross-border 
transactions. Thus any conclusions concerning the pertinence of constructivism 
merits an exploration of non-migrants’ responses to the foreign understandings of 
democracy that return migrants introduce. We need more evidence to assess 
whether returnees’ commitment to their new beliefs also leads them to actively 
persuade people back home of their inherent value. This is not possible with the 
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large-N data I collected via the Desencanto survey, because the survey does not 
ask returnees about their interactions with non-migrants.   
Based on the statistical analysis alone, I do not conclude that long-
distance cross-border ties between migrants who remain in the U.S. and non-
migrants unambiguously contribute to diffusion in ways consistent with 
constructivist theory, either. Such social transactions strongly influence political 
behaviors, while weakly influencing democratic attitudes. It is possible that the 
information that stayers transmit about political life in the U.S. contribute to 
modifying non-migrants shared understandings and beliefs about democracy 
among non-migrants, and that these, in turn, influence changes in their 
participatory behavior; but the fact that those ideas do not also influence 
democratic attitudes is puzzling. Again, if we are to accept a constructivist 
explanation, additional data is required to identify a coherent set of 
intersubjective beliefs that account for the paradoxical and uneven nature of the 
results observed based on the statistical analysis. 
Taken together, the evidence that the large-N statistical analysis produced 
with respect to both returns and cross-border social transactions suggests that 
we cannot rule out a constructivist explanation of migrant-led international 
diffusion. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that migrant-driven diffusion does 
not conform to the patterns of conventional constructivist arguments, which see 
ideas flowing from international structures to domestic actors, and from advanced 
to less developed democracies. However, it is possible that local intersubjective 
beliefs condition the outcomes I observe in other, more varied ways. 
 
3.4.4 Unexpected Uneven Results  
The results are unexpectedly uneven on two dimensions. First, and most 
importantly, it is somewhat counterintuitive that long-distance cross-border 
communications do not simply produce the same effects as returns, but with a 
lesser magnitude. Second, it is puzzling that beliefs and behaviors do not co-
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vary. These observations are significant beyond our evaluations of what 
theoretical approach best characterizes the diffusion process. 
Returns and long-distance cross-border communication do not uniformly 
affect any one dependent variable. Returns give rise to changes in precisely 
those outcomes that cross-border communication does not, and vice versa. This 
result challenges the assumption that long-distance cross-border ties and social 
links between returnees involve the same type of social transaction with different 
degrees of intensity. Under this assumption, we would expect that if migration 
should contribute to strengthening democratic beliefs and behaviors in the home 
country at all, then these effects should be strongest as a result of return 
migration. This is to be expected since returnees experienced political life in the 
U.S. firsthand and can share their observations and experiences in that country 
with family and friends in Mexico face-to-face when they return. It is therefore 
surprising that communication with friends and family abroad leads to greater 
political participation, while having emigrated and returned does not. A full 
account of migrant-led international diffusion warrants further exploration of this 
paradoxical finding. 
Migration does not appear to affect uniform changes in both political 
beliefs and behaviors. This is in contrast with the long-standing proposition that 
attitudes influence behavior. The outcome signifies that rational choice theory, in 
its strictest sense, does not adequately account for the migrant-led diffusion 
process; otherwise attitudes would accurately reflect beliefs, intentions would 
accurately reflect attitudes, and behaviors would accurately reflect intentions 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977). That is, individuals’ attitudes would underpin their 
utility-maximizing behavior. Moreover, as attitudes change, so would behaviors, 
since attitudes comprise some of the new information that shapes an individual’s 
reasoned decision about his actions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). 
Political behavior scholars have also observed that attitudes and 
behaviors do not necessarily co-vary, however (Ajzen, & Fishbein, 1977; Krysan, 
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1998; Wicker, 1969). One explanation for their dissonance is that the processes 
by which attitudes and behaviors change could involve modifications in one prior 
to the other; nonetheless, because people are naturally averse to having 
dissonant beliefs and behavior, the two will become aligned over time (Festinger, 
1964). Another possibility is that that the attitudes that underlie the democratic 
behaviors I evaluate require significantly less effort to learn than do the more 
abstract beliefs about democracy I explore. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The optimal conditions for migrant-led international diffusion are in place in 
the case of the U.S. and Mexico. However, observations of the political beliefs 
and behaviors of Mexicans who have emigrated to the U.S. and then returned 
permanently to Mexico, and of non-migrant Mexicans who communicate with 
their co-nationals living abroad, indicate that diffusion does not produce the 
expected outcomes. Trans-state social transactions linking migrants with new 
beliefs and behaviors to non-migrants with an interest in improving the quality of 
their democracy are insufficient to produce diffusion uniformly. Though further 
evidence is necessary, the large-N statistical analysis, despite being a first-cut at 
understanding migrant-led international diffusion suggests that none of the 
approaches unambiguously account for the results; however, we need additional 
evidence to rule out rational choice explanations, and it is possible that shared 
beliefs shape these outcomes in a fashion consistent with constructivism’s broad 
tenets, but inconsistent with its dominant view of norms as flowing from political 
entities that are located higher up in the international hierarchy—so to speak—to 
those that are located at lower levels (Risse, 2007). 
We must explore these various puzzles in greater depth. Some next steps 
are to utilize qualitative data to explore differences between what return migrants 
and U.S.-based migrants learn in the U.S. The following chapters evaluate return 
migrants’ motivations for importing new political beliefs, while leaving new 
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political behaviors behind. If they fail to learn behaviors, why do they learn 
beliefs? If they face constraints on behavior when they re-enter Mexico, why do 
these constraints not affect the importation of beliefs? Alternatively, if migrants 
have evidence that U.S. behaviors are ineffective in Mexico, how do their 
understandings of the value of American political beliefs differ? Finally, how do 
Mexican norms and beliefs influence migrants propensity to share and hence 
these uneven outcomes?  
Chapters 4 and 5 also examine why non-migrants who are in touch with 
Mexicans residing in the U.S. participate more, yet do not learn new attitudes. Do 
non-migrants respond to persuasive arguments in favor of foreign forms of 
participation provided by a trusted, more able, skilled and successful co-national 
living abroad, as rational choice predicts? If so, then why do they fail to embrace 
new political attitudes?  
The uneven results suggest that we should pay more attention to the 
object and international context of diffusion. Specifically, we should consider the 
possibility that beliefs versus behaviors travel across borders in different ways. 
Additionally, although returns and long-distance cross-border transactions 
appear to be two sides of the same coin, the findings suggest that we should 
take their differences seriously. Does the fact that one set of migrants 
communicates from within Mexico while another transmits from outside matter? 
The findings suggest that long-distance social transactions consistently produce 
one set of effects, while returns uniformly give rise to another. It is possible that a 
migrants’ location, either at home in Mexico or abroad in the U.S. is therefore a 




CHAPTER 4: RETURN MIGRANTS, THE WEAKEST LINK  
4.1 Introduction 
The large-N statistical analysis presented in Chapter 3 indicates that 
Mexicans who return permanently to Mexico after emigrating to the U.S. import 
the more democratic beliefs they learned and embraced in the U.S.; however, 
they do not import new political behaviors. The result is puzzling in various 
respects. First, it implies that the three conditions thought to impel migrant-led 
international diffusion: (1) the presence of Mexican migrants capable of 
transmitting to Mexico the democratic beliefs and behaviors they learned in the 
U.S.; (2) the demand for a higher quality of democracy among Mexicans living in 
Mexico; and, (3) the ongoing trans-state social transactions between migrants 
and non-migrants that serve as channels through which migrants’ transmit their 
new experiences with democracy, are not sufficient to uniformly change the 
political beliefs and behaviors of returnees. Second, the changes in (or absence 
of) political beliefs and behaviors to which emigrating and then returning gives 
rise seem to be inconsistent with the expectations generated by rational choice, 
bounded rationality, and constructivism.  
We cannot fully comprehend how returnees contribute to the diffusion of 
American political beliefs and behaviors based on the statistical analysis alone, 
however, because the data set it employs lacks information both about returnees’ 
interactions with non-migrant Mexicans and about how non-migrants receive 
returnees and any foreign ideas they convey. We require observations of a 
different nature to understand if migrants fail to import to Mexico the political 
behaviors they learn in the U.S. because they know such actions will be 
ineffective in the context of the country of origin, or if another force (e.g., shame, 
disinterest, fear) motivates their decision. Additional data can also help us 
determine whether returnees impart to their friends and family in Mexico the new 
beliefs that they import, and, if not, what stops them.  
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To address these questions, this chapter draws on a set of in-depth 
interviews with return migrants, non-migrants who are in contact with returnees, 
and the local leaders of various municipalities from which large numbers of 
individuals emigrate. The core objective is to find the best explanation for the 
surprising results observed among returnees, and to systematically eliminate 
rival accounts. I begin by evaluating whether returnees simply do not learn new 
democratic beliefs and behaviors while they are abroad. I find that migrants who 
return from the U.S. to Mexico generally learn both American political beliefs and 
behaviors, and therefore reject the possibility that a systematic failure to learn 
new beliefs and behaviors is the underlying reason why returnee political 
participation is no different or less intense than that of Mexicans who have never 
left Mexico.  
Subsequently, I assess why returnees nonetheless leave the behaviors 
they learn at the border. Is the decision consistent with either rational choice or 
constructivist theoretical perspectives? Chapter 3 found that rational choice, 
bounded rationality, and constructivism do not clearly account for migrant-driven 
diffusion. This tentative conclusion is based solely on what we can infer from the 
large-N statistical analysis. The qualitative field work that I report in this chapter 
reveals that return migrants fail to diffuse political beliefs and behaviors for 
reasons that conform to a modified constructivist argument. 
Although returnees who learn new behaviors in the U.S. are generally 
interested in improving the quality of democracy in Mexico and believe that 
American-style participation could effectively contribute to this end, they do not 
effectively introduce these innovations in their home communities. Their failure to 
do so is neither because the foreign practices and beliefs are incompatible with 
the laws and rules that govern political participation in Mexico nor because they 
are dangerously costly. Instead, the forces that hinder them are the shared 
attitudes of non-migrants towards migrants who return from the U.S. 
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Non-migrant Mexicans have a somewhat negative view of return migrants. 
They are perceived as relatively unproductive and having an exaggerated sense 
of their own importance as a result of the resources they gained abroad. Non-
migrants believe that the U.S. experience “changes people” for the worse, 
making them think they can resolve any problem on their own now, particularly if 
they were able to save and bring home dollars. Most non-migrants do not want to 
attend to returnees once they are no longer in danger, at a distance, alone, or 
sending home remittances; they believe returnees ought to adapt to their 
situation at home again. Even without considering what their co-nationals have to 
share, non-migrants consider that migrants who return no longer offer any unique 
pathway to improving their lives.  
These attitudes reflect the more general sentiments that Mexicans feel 
toward the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations. Specifically, they reflect Mexico’s 
documented tradition of defining itself in comparison with other states and 
cultures—particularly its dominant neighbor to the north (Fuentes, 1994; Morris, 
2001, 2005; Paz, 1990; Ramos, 1963; Selee, 2005). This comparative self- 
definition causes Mexicans to see themselves and their country as weak, and 
leads them to feel schadenfreude whenever they see Americans or their country 
suffer. Rejecting migrants thus represents a way to reject the U.S.  
The final substantive section of the chapter explores the conditions that 
make such soft constraints strong behavioral deterrents for returnees. I find that 
returnees lack the will to implement the behaviors they observed and learned 
abroad because they overestimate the extent to which the U.S. has a uniquely 
ideal context within which democratic participation produces effective outcomes, 
and because having migrated internationally attenuates returnees’ sense of 
membership in their Mexican community of origin. Together, these qualities 
dampen migrants’ will to engage in new forms of participation in their home 
communities once they run into rather limited forms of resistance. 
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In sum, migrants learn both new political beliefs and behaviors abroad, 
and they believe these forms of civic engagement could be effective in their 
home country. The reason migrants fail to import behaviors is not that they fail to 
learn any in the U.S. Nor is it because migrants believe such innovations would 
not contribute to strengthening the quality of democracy in Mexico. The obstacle 
to migrant-led international diffusion therefore does not arise from a rational 
choice logic. Instead, “soft” ideational constraints interfere with diffusion. Non-
migrants’ attitudes towards return migrants, and the latters’ attitudinal response 
to the ideation context they re-enter impedes them from introducing the political 
beliefs and behaviors of the U.S. into Mexico. These findings are consistent with 
constructivism to the extent that they emphasize intersubjective beliefs and ideas 
about social life, while downplaying rational calculations that link causes and 
effects. However the intersubjective ideas at work concern migrants themselves, 
not the specific ideas about politics they have to share.  
4.2 Data and Methods 
In addition to the data obtained via the Desencanto Ciudadano en México 
survey, which I describe in Chapter 3, this chapter draws on information obtained 
via in-depth interviews of return migrants living in Mexico, friends and family of 
returnees and leaders of municipalities from which large numbers of people 
emigrate. I employ two distinct research methods: (1) fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative qualitative Analysis; (2) multi-level logistic and linear regressions. 
4.2.1 Small-N Data 
This chapter draws on information obtained from 99 semi-structured, in-
depth interviews conducted in various states of Mexico throughout 2008. The 
interviews involve three different samples: 31 return migrants; 47 people who 




Small-N research is often utilized to explore macro-social phenomena for 
which only a limited number of cases exist. Return migrants and their friends and 
family are not limited in Mexico; however small-N research is appropriate for 
numerous reasons. First, creating two separate regionally or nationally random 
samples (one of return migrants and another of friends and family of migrants) 
that we could analyze with probabilistic statistical methods is practically 
impossible, because such individuals are difficult to identify. Data concerning the 
migrants who have resettled in Mexico after migrating is elusive, if not non-
existent. Our knowledge of who returns, to what locations and for how long is 
extremely limited. Filling this lacuna would constitute a massive research project 
in and of itself. Second, conducting in-depth unstructured interviews with a 
nationally random sample of at least 100 each, of returnees, friends and family of 
returnees, and local leaders (in addition to the groups I interviewed for the 
analysis in Chapter 5) would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming. 
Finally, small-N research permits researchers to document actors’ stories in 
greater detail, and this, in turn, helps us to explain processes more effectively. 
In making broader inferences based on a small number of observations, 
careful sample selection is essential. Case selection “has the same twin 
objectives as random sampling; that is, one desires (1) a representative sample 
and (2) useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest” (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008, p.3). By purposively selecting cases in light of the theoretical 
questions that interest us, we can enhance our ability to make inferences based 
on a small number of cases. I employed two distinct approaches to selecting 
interview respondents: the diverse case and extreme case methods. The former 
involves selecting as diverse a sample as possible along both independent and 
dependent variables of theoretical interest. In the latter cases are selected 
because they possess key theoretical characteristics that are well above or 
below the mean. I used the diverse case strategy to select returnee respondents 
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and their friends and family, and the extreme case approach to select the 
leaders.  
My goal with respect to return migrants was to create a sample that was 
diverse along three dimensions: the personal attributes of respondents (age, 
education, English language skills, sex, and income); the conditions of their 
migration (immigration status, how they entered the country, whether they had a 
job lined up prior to arriving, the duration of their stay, etc.); and, the situation to 
which they returned (urban/rural, community with many return 
migrants/community with few, employed/unemployed, etc.). These dimensions 
may be associated with migrants’ propensity to learn and adopt new political 
beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. (Bean, Brown, & Rumbaut, 2006); they contain 
characteristics that can contribute to their ongoing personal interest in Mexico 
and its politics (McCann, Cornelius, & Leal, 2007); and they may condition their 
capability to import changes. I also sought to ensure variation in the individual 
and community-level situations to which migrants return, because these may 
condition both migrants’ levels of interest in importing change to their sending 
community and the receptiveness of non-migrants towards migrants. For 
example, a community from which few people emigrate might be more interested 
in the information a migrant provides because migration itself will be more of a 
novelty to them. This in turn may encourage migrants to import or share what 
they learned abroad, rather than discouraging them. See Appendix B for specific 
characteristics about the return migrants who participated in the in-depth 
interviews.  
With respect to friends and family, I used paired samples where possible. 
In other words, I interviewed the friends and families of the return migrant 
respondents. However, I moved beyond using a paired sample in order to 
increase diversity on those dimensions known to influence individuals’ political 
beliefs and participation in Mexico such as age, education, income, type of 
employment, and interest in politics. This simultaneously involved accounting for 
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diverse forms of relationships, meaning that the sample included spouses, 
parents, siblings and adult sons and daughters of migrants, as well as friends. 
Relational diversity is important in and of itself because the diffusion process 
between migrants and friends and family members could differ, depending on the 
nature of the relationship. For example, a wife may be more responsive to her 
migrant husband than vice versa; a brother more responsive than a father; or a 
former employer less responsive than a former employee. See Appendix B for 
details about the sample. 
To select leaders I used the extreme case method, and selected 
individuals based on their membership in municipalities with migration intensity 
index levels that are well above the mean of each state.15 I spoke with 18 leaders 
from four municipalities, three in the state of Tlaxcala (Tlaxcala, Nanacamilpa 
and Atlangatepec), and one in Puebla (San Diego la Meza Tochimiltzingo). The 
first three municipalities have populations of 15,000 or less; communities in this 
population range produce a disproportionate number of migrants and are 
underrepresented in the sample taken for the Desencanto survey. Except for the 
leaders from Tlaxcala, who worked for the state government, all of the leaders I 
interviewed held positions at the municipal level. My objective was to speak to 
leaders of communities from localities where migration is a fundamental part of 
everyday life—communities whose leaders had undoubtedly had the opportunity 
to interact with returnees whose civic engagement had increased as a result of 
having emigrated.  
Interviews were structured, but open. I utilized two distinct questionnaires 
to guide the interviews (the scripts are in Appendix E), but deviated from their 
format as necessary, particularly if the returnee respondent was eager to share 
useful, but unsolicited information.  
                                            
15 Chapter 3 explains the migration intensity index in greater detail. 
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The questionnaire designed for return migrants inquired about their 
experiences abroad with a view to gauging engagement in activities that lead to 
learning the political beliefs and behaviors of Americans. It also inquired about 
migrants’ reintegration into their country of origin, including their political 
participation and beliefs, from right after returning to Mexico up to the present. 
What factors about the home country context encouraged them to put into 
practice and reaffirm new, “foreign” beliefs and behaviors, and what did they find 
discouraging? 
The semi-structured interviews with people who know returnees, as well 
as with community leaders, aimed to assess non-migrants’ attitudes towards 
migration and migrants and to characterize their relationships with the latter. One 
goal was to gauge whether non-migrants consider migration and migrants 
beneficial to their household, community, or Mexico in general. For example, I 
asked them to share with me the challenges and opportunities they believe return 
migrants bring to their community. Another objective was to determine if non-
migrants discriminate between different “types” of migrants. For instance, did 
they consider the immigration status of migrants important (whether their 
presence in the U.S. is undocumented, if they are legal permanent residents or 
have become citizens)? Were their views towards migrants close to them 
different from their views of “others”? Did they perceive migrants abroad as 
compared with returnees in a different light? 
All respondents were over the age of 18 and either Mexican citizens or 
born in Mexico to Mexican citizen parents. I conducted all 99 interviews in 
Spanish, 88 face-to-face, and 11 by electronic mail. Face-to-face interviews 
lasted from 45 minutes to two hours. Unless respondents objected, I conducted 
face-to-face interviews outside their home, in a neutral locality such as a park, 
and away from other household members or co-workers. 
Interviews via electronic correspondence were implemented via a written 
questionnaire (the same questionnaire that guided my face-to-face interviews). I 
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sent respondents follow up questions to clarify their written answers as 
necessary. Respondents took about 45 minutes to complete the written 
interviews. 
4.2.2 Large-N Data 
Chapter 3 describes the information that the Desencanto survey gathered 
in some detail; here, I describe only the aspects of the dataset that are pertinent 
to this chapter. Return migrants comprised about 6 percent of the random 
national sample that participated in the survey. 85 percent of returnee 
participants had lived in the U.S. for two or more years. Overall, return migrants 
had engaged in a wide variety of experiences in the U.S. from which they could 
learn new political beliefs and behaviors. 
4.2.3 Methods 
This chapter employs two methods of analysis: qualitative comparative 
analysis and multi-level linear and logistic regression analysis. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. I use qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) as put forth by Charles Ragin in Fuzzy Set Social Science (2000) and 
Redesigning Social Inquiry (2008) to evaluate data I obtained through in-depth 
field interviews. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is an analytical 
technique that uses Boolean algebra to determine which causal combinations (or 
configurations), among all of those that are theoretically possible, are either 
necessary or sufficient to cause a given outcome. QCA helps make the 
qualitative analysis of a relatively small number of non-random cases more 
systematic. 
The key distinction between QCA and linear regressions is that the former 
uses a set theoretic, rather than correlational, logic. The approach is not 
probabilistic; however, the inferences I make based on this research method are 
quite compelling in view of the strategy I used to select the interview respondents 
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from whom I obtained data. The findings are all the more convincing if we 
consider them in light of evidence obtained via the large-N statistical techniques. 
QCA can be used to analyze both crisp and fuzzy sets. This chapter 
evaluates data that has been converted into both types of sets. Crisp sets are 
simply conventional sets in which the degree of membership in a set can be 
either zero or one. An object is either in or out of a set. Fuzzy sets can be utilized 
to evaluate the same relationships that traditional “crisp” sets assess, such as 
membership, intersection and union. However, fuzzy sets allow various degrees 
of membership within a set. Rather than limit membership scores to zero or one, 
fuzzy sets also allow membership scores to range anywhere in between. 
Developing a fuzzy data set requires researchers to determine membership 
scores carefully, evaluating each case with respect to a concretely defined set 
(Ragin, 2000, 2006, and 2008). For instance, with the crisp set “Migrants who 
Stayed in the U.S. Two Years”, an individual who stayed 22 months would be 
scored zero, exactly like an individual who stayed 8 months. In making that same 
set fuzzy, we can assign to the first a score of 0.6 and the second a score of 
zero. Fuzzy sets thus allow us to account for borderline cases that do not clearly 
fall in or out of a set. The approach is useful for coding data obtained qualitatively 
because rather than requiring researchers to fit research findings into strict binary 
sets or categorical variables; it encourages us to account for as much diversity as 
we observed (provided of course that it is theoretically useful). 
Statistical analysis. This chapter runs multi-level linear and logistic 
regressions similar to those in Chapter 3. I modify the model to account for the 
findings I obtain via fs/QCA. Specifically, because I find that living in the U.S. 
more than two years is a necessary condition for learning, I rerun the multi-level 
linear and logistic regressions to ensure that a return migrant’s duration in the 
U.S. does not account for the surprising results reported in Chapter 3.   
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4.3 Do Returnees Simply Fail to Learn Abroad? 
Chapter 3 finds that returnees fail to import political behaviors. There are a 
number of reasons why this may be true. One possibility we should consider is 
that return migrants simply do not learn and embrace any new behaviors during 
their time abroad. This could be the case, for example, if as the literature 
suggests, the individual attributes of return migrants are not conducive to 
learning or if one of the factors driving decisions to return is migrants’ negative 
experience in the U.S. This section shows empirically that return migrants do 
learn new, more democratic political behaviors. It finds that the conditions that 
lead migrants to learn abroad are diverse and can include qualities not typically 
associated with a propensity to incorporate politically, such as poor English 
language skills and undocumented immigration status.  
Some scholars suggest that return migrants are negatively selected, 
meaning that those whose experience in the U.S. does not meet their 
expectations are more likely to return (Herzog & Schlottmann, 1983), while those 
who get ahead in the U.S. stay. They argue that returnees tend to be those 
individuals who struggled most to adapt to the host country, be it for cultural 
reasons (they may simply dislike life in the U.S.) or because they did not find a 
stable source of employment. If true, this would imply that returnees are also 
least likely to have had the sort of experience in the U.S. that is conducive to 
democratic learning.  
Additionally, the experiences in the U.S. of migrants with this particular set 
of characteristics may have been consistently negative since such individuals are 
least likely to receive a universally warm welcome (Fetzer, 2000; Huntington, 
2004; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2004). The 
attitudes of host country nationals and institutional policies towards migrants who 
are poorly equipped and disposed to adapt to the host country could weaken the 




Empirical evidence indicating a negative selection bias among return 
migrants is inconclusive (see, e.g., Coulon & Piracha, 2005; Gitter, Gitter, & 
Southgate, 2008).16 Additionally, as we saw in Chapter 3, all migrants have 
significant opportunities to engage the U.S. political system. In contrast to the 
conventional wisdom, there is ample evidence to challenge the claim that the 
presence in the U.S. of migrants who posses the qualities that have been 
observed among returnees (limited English, undocumented, poor skills) is 
politically marginal. Nonetheless, given the salience of theories concerning 
negative selection among return migrants, we must verify empirically that this 
group’s failure to import behaviors into Mexico is not a consequence of their 
failure to learn any.  
 This section employs a fuzzy data set that I developed based on the 31 in-
depth field interviews I conducted with return migrants to determine what 
conditions are necessary and sufficient for migrants to learn. Specifically, to 
assess necessity I utilize the fs/QCA 2.0 software developed by Ragin, Drass, 
and Davey (2006) to explore whether membership in any of the following causal 
fuzzy sets: “Stayed Two Years or More”; “Regularly Interacted with Americans”; 
“Fluent English Speaker”; and, “Documented Immigrant” is a subset of the 
outcome “Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors”. To assess sufficiency, 
I utilize the Truth Table Algorithm in fs/QCA to evaluate the causal combinations 
of conditions of which “Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors” is a 
subset. 
With fuzzy sets, researchers can organize data obtained via in-depth 
qualitative interviews by assigning to each respondent a value indicating the 
degree to which she is a member of the sets in question. Respondents may 
                                            
16 There is evidence that migrants return if they save sufficient dollars to set in motion a long-term 
dream at home, such as a small business or the construction of a dream home. Additionally, 
scholars show that economic opportunities in the specific locality from which a migrant hails also 
strongly influence the likelihood of returning. 
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receive scores on conditions of interest, ranging from zero to one, with one 
indicating full membership and zero full non-membership. Note that these are not 
categorical divisions; rather they indicate degrees of membership in a set. The 
number of possible scores between 0 and 1 is infinite. In theory we can employ 
as many intervals as necessary to account for the diverse degrees of 
membership in a set that we observe in our cases; however, it is useful to divide 
the range into five or seven intervals. For instance in a five value set a 
respondent can receive a score of 0, .25, .5, .75, or 1, with .5 indicating 
borderline cases.  
For example, a migrant may have a 0.25 membership in the set “Fluent 
English Speaker” if she understands only sufficient English to carry out her job 
duties and the most necessary daily tasks, while an individual, who writes, 
speaks and reads English proficiently would have full membership (1.0), and an 
individual with absolutely no ability to read, write, speak, or comprehend spoken 
English would have full non-membership (0.0). Membership scores greater than 
.5 indicate that a case is more in than out of the set, whereas scores close to 1.0 
indicate that a case is mostly in, and scores close to 0.0 indicate that a case is 
mostly out. For an overview of the use of fuzzy sets in social science research, 
see Fuzzy Set Social Science (Ragin, 2000).  
Here, I develop an original fuzzy data set based on the in-depth interviews 
I conducted with return migrants. Appendix C summarizes the definition of full-
membership in each fuzzy set, the values that I could assign to a respondent with 
respect to each set, and the criteria for assessing membership.  
Taken together, the average fuzzy set membership score of the 31 cases 
in the outcome “Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors” was .64, 
indicating that migrants generally learned at least one belief or behavior essential 
to democracy; however, twelve individuals scored .83 or 1, indicating that about 




What types of new behaviors do return migrants embrace? Table 4.1, 
below, contains some examples of the forms of political behaviors that migrants 
reported introducing into Mexico after returning. They are the strongest possible 
evidence of behavioral learning, because they involve real actions that returnees 
reportedly took in their home country—actions returnees claim they probably 
would not have taken prior to migrating. The examples are classified into 
participation in organizations, collective action, and individual participation, 
consistent with the dependent variables I explored in chapter 3 (I exclude voting, 
because responses do not yield interesting stories). I quote some responses 
directly and paraphrase others. 
Table 4.1: Political Behaviors Returnees Import and  Practice in Mexico 
Type of 
Participation Example Drawn from In-depth Field Interview 
Participation in 
Organizations 
Helped found two NGOs to combat poverty, specifically to help women. 
Started a new women’s football (soccer) club. 
“I tried to start an Alcoholics Anonymous club here. There are many drunks here. I belonged 
to AA there. I tried to explain to the people here about the problems with alcohol, especially 
to the young people.” 
Collective 
action 
Routinely takes people to clean up streets and the town in general. 
Tried to pave street collectively with neighbors. 
Initiated and almost completed paving two roads. 
“I proposed to the neighbors that we work together to make things better—to change street 
lighting, the quality of streets and those things, rather than ask the government.” 
“At first, when I came back, I tried to work with other migrants to improve the annual 
municipal fair. We obtained private sponsors (new idea brought from outside) to make it 




Volunteered to translate into English the signs and information posted in the local archeology 
museum. 
Has run for office two times and won, never thought of participating before, now believes that 
if you want change you have to do it yourself. 
 “I suggest to people that they not throw their trash in the street, I tell them to use a trash bin 
or recycle.” 
 
The examples below represent responses to one of the following 
questions: “Do you now do things regularly to help improve your community that 
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you did not do before you emigrated?”; “Did you adopt any new habits while you 
lived in the U.S.?”; or, “Do you participate more or less in your community than 
you did prior to emigrating?” (If this question was misunderstood, it was reworded 
as “Do you do more or less to help your community since you returned?”). We 
can see that returnees’ attempts to do something to improve their home 
communities through means other than electoral participation are significant and 
diverse. The most notable change appears to be their interest in organizing 
people either into formal groups with long-term objectives or simply to work 
collectively on one project—to resolve community problems quite apart from the 
government. 
In sum, based on in-depth interviews with a relatively small, non-random 
sample of return migrants, I find that this type of migrant learns new, more 
participative forms of political behaviors abroad. The findings reported in Chapter 
3 may nonetheless reflect returnees’ systematic failure to embrace new beliefs 
and behaviors; indeed the sample is representative at the national level.  
I therefore use the fuzzy data set drawn from interviews with returnees to 
ascertain the results obtained statistically. First, I use fs/QCA software to 
determine whether there exist any conditions necessary or sufficient for the 
outcome “Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors” to obtain. 
Subsequently, I assess whether incorporating the findings produced by the fuzzy 
set analysis into the multi-level regression models presented in Chapter 3 gives 
rise to a different set of outcomes. I explain this process in detail below. 
Causal necessity means that a condition must be present in all instances 
of the outcome. Conversely, the absence of the condition means that the 
outcome will not obtain. A necessary condition is not inevitably also sufficient, 
however; a necessary causal condition may be in place, yet we may not observe 
the outcome of interest. Set theory permits us to evaluate necessity quite 
effectively. Whenever a causal condition is necessary (but not sufficient for the 
outcome) the fuzzy set membership scores of the outcome should be a subset of 
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the fuzzy set membership scores in the causal condition. That is, the former 
should be less than or equal to the latter. This subset relationship can be 
represented graphically on an x (causal condition) y (outcome) plot in which all 
observations fall below or on the diagonal, i.e., x≥y.  
I use fs/QCA to analyze whether strong membership in any of the 
following sets is causally necessary to produce the outcome “Embraced U.S. 
Political Beliefs and Behaviors”: (1) “Stayed Two Years or More”; (2) “Interacted 
Regularly with Americans”; (3) “Fluent English Speaker”; (4) “Documented 
Immigrant”; and (5) “Highly Educated”. The results indicate that strong 
membership in the set of migrants who stayed in the U.S. at least two years is 
causally necessary for return migrants to have learned new, more democratic 
political beliefs and behaviors as migrants in the U.S.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between “Stayed 2 Years or More” 
and “Embraced U.S. Beliefs and Behaviors.” Not all of the observations fall below 
the diagonal, because in this case, the subset relation has a consistency score of 
0.83. Consistency indicates the degree to which membership in the outcome is a 
subset of membership in the causal condition.17  In contrast to the formal 
definition of necessity, this subset relationship obtains in 83 percent of outcomes 
as opposed to all of them. This level of consistency is not earth shattering, but it 
is high enough to warrant our attention.18  
Figure 4.1 also notes that the subset relation has a coverage score of 
0.69. Coverage indicates the proportion of cases in which the necessary 
condition leads to the outcome. The indicator permits us to distinguish between 
trivial conditions—meaning those that are “strongly present in most cases, 
                                            
17 Note, with crisp sets, consistency is simply the proportion of cases with a given cause (or 
combination of causes). Perfect consistency generates a score of 1. With fuzzy sets, the measure 
of consistency is: Consistency (Y i≤ Xi) = Σ(min(Xi, Yi))/Σ(Yi)    (Ragin, 2006). 
 
18 Ragin (2006) notes that researchers should be very cautious in making claims about subset 
relations with consistency scores below .75. 
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whether or not these cases display the outcome,” and non-trivial necessary 
conditions, meaning conditions that are strongly present mostly in cases that 
display the outcome (Ragin, 2006, p. 12).  
 
Figure 4.1 Necessary Condition for “Embraced U.S. Be liefs and Behaviors” 
(Fuzzy scores have been slightly modified so that readers can see the multiple cases with similar 
scores on both conditions) 
A coverage score of 0.69 indicates fairly high coverage. We can 
confidently conclude that remaining in the U.S. two years or more appears to be 
a non-trivial necessary condition for embracing U.S. political beliefs and 
behaviors. The analysis revealed that membership in the outcome of interest was 
a highly consistent subset of joint membership in the causal conditions “Stayed 
Two Years or More” and each of the other fuzzy sets. The coverage of each of 
these joint causes was quite low, however. There was no evidence that 
Consistency = .83 
Coverage = .69 
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membership in the other sets is causally necessary for migrants to embrace U.S. 
beliefs and behaviors.  
Figure 4.1 also notes that the subset relation has a coverage score of 
0.69. Coverage indicates the proportion of cases in which the necessary 
condition leads to the outcome. The indicator permits us to distinguish between 
trivial conditions—meaning those that are “strongly present in most cases, 
whether or not these cases display the outcome,” and non-trivial necessary 
conditions, meaning conditions that are strongly present mostly in cases that 
display the outcome (Ragin, 2006, p. 12). A coverage score of 0.69 indicates 
fairly high coverage. We can confidently conclude that remaining in the U.S. two 
years or more appears to be a non-trivial necessary condition for embracing U.S. 
political beliefs and behaviors. The analysis revealed that membership in the 
outcome of interest was a highly consistent subset of joint membership in the 
causal conditions “Stayed Two Years or More” and each of the other fuzzy sets. 
The coverage of each of these joint causes was quite low, however. There was 
no evidence that membership in the other sets is causally necessary for migrants 
to embrace U.S. beliefs and behaviors.  
The finding produced by the analysis of causal necessity using fuzzy sets 
implies the following: If the results of the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 are due 
to migrants’ failure to learn, then controlling for the time that returnees spent 
abroad should filter out most of the learners from the non-learners. The model I 
tested contains a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent had lived in 
the U.S and returned; it did not account for the duration of a migrant’s stay. I 
therefore substituted the original dummy variable with another indicating whether 
a migrant had lived in the U.S. for two or more years and then returned. The 
results are reported in Appendix D. The results do not substantively change. 
Returns continue to represent a weak path for the diffusion of new political 
behaviors, and cross-border communications a strong one; however, this model 
finds that both pathways are only fair channels for the diffusion of beliefs. 
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Contrary to what we would expect, controlling for time abroad leads to a slight 
reduction in migrants’ propensity to come home more tolerant.  
Previous research shows that education, income, time in country and 
immigration status in the United States are strong correlates of immigrant political 
incorporation or learning (Bean, Brown, & Rumbaut, 2006; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 
1992; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Yang, 1994). The 
above exercise suggests that most of these conditions are not necessary for 
migrants to learn new forms of civic engagement; however, they may be 
sufficient. That, is, although migrants may be able to learn new, more democratic 
political beliefs and behaviors in the absence of these conditions, the presence of 
these conditions may strongly contribute to learning.  
Fs/QCA allows researchers to implement a method called a Fuzzy Truth 
Table Algorithm (Ragin, 2008) to assess all of the combinations of causal 
conditions that give rise to an outcome of interest. The algorithm transforms the 
fuzzy set data into a crisp set truth table, taking into account: (1) any agreement 
between the rows of a crisp truth table and the fuzzy set causal conditions; (2) 
the distribution of cases across all of the possible combinations of causal 
conditions; and (3) the degree to which membership in the outcome is a 
consistent (fuzzy) subset of the causal configurations (Ragin, 2006, p. 74).19 It 
then proceeds to evaluating sufficiency by determining whether each outcome of 
interest is a consistent subset of the causal configuration. 
Here, I evaluate all of the possible combinations of the causal conditions 
summarized in Appendix C to determine if any are sufficient to lead migrants to 
embrace U.S. political values and beliefs. Note that the dependent variable is the 
same as in the analysis of necessity above; it measures returnees’ membership 
in the set of people who learned new political beliefs and behaviors while in the 
United States.  I find that the following three causal configurations lead migrants 
                                            




to continue to embrace U.S. political beliefs and behaviors after they return to 
Mexico20: 
• Weak membership in the set of immigrants who stayed two years 
or more coupled with weak membership in the set of immigrants 
who are highly educated. (.95) 
• Strong membership in the set of immigrants who interacted with 
Americans coupled with weak membership in the set of immigrants 
who stayed two years. (.89 ) 
• Weak membership in the set of fluent English speakers combined 
with strong membership in the set of documented immigrants and 
strong membership in the set of immigrants who stayed two years 
(.99) 
Each of these causal combinations are highly consistent subsets of the outcome 
(.95, .89, .99 respectively). Consistency measures the degree to which 
membership in each solution term is a subset of the outcome. It signifies, for 
example, that the causal combination weak membership in the set of migrants 
who stayed two years or more, coupled with weak membership in the set of 
migrants who are highly educated, is a subset of the outcome “Embraced U.S. 
Behaviors and Beliefs” in nearly all cases.  
The three causal configurations together (the set of solution terms) explain 
about 44.5 percent the outcome (coverage). The third solution term accounts for 
a full 55 percent of this coverage, the second for 25 percent and the third for 20. 
The last two solution terms combined therefore account for about twenty percent 
of the total outcome. 
It is surprising that two of the configurations in the solution set involve 
weak membership in the set of migrants who stayed two years or more in the 
                                            
20 This result that I present for both of the fuzzy set assessments of sufficiency I conduct in this 
chapter are the intermediate solution to the Truth Table Algorithm based on fs/QCA 2.0. Fs/QCA 
uses a Quine-McCluskey algorithm. I selected a consistency cutoff of .95 in both analyses. 
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U.S. since we previously found strong membership in that set to be fairly 
necessary for learning to occur. The absence of a necessary condition for 
learning can be a sufficient condition because we have loosened the definition of 
a necessary condition so that it does not require 100 percent consistency. Recall 
that strong membership in the set of migrants who stayed in the U.S. two years 
of more is a necessary condition with a consistency score of 83 percent. This 
signifies that in about 17 percent of the cases, strong membership in the set of 
individuals who stayed two years or more is not necessary.  Moreover, in nearly 
all such cases learning happened nevertheless. Put differently, in the large 
majority of cases, learning happens due to a 2-year stay; however, among the 17 
percent for whom staying two years is not a necessary condition, weak 
membership in that set, combined high membership in the set of migrants who 
engage in frequent interaction with Americans, high membership in the set of 
immigrants who were legally present in the U.S., and low membership scores in 
the set of highly educated are sufficient for political learning to obtain.  
Note that fs/QCA 2.0 calculates necessary and sufficient conditions 
independently. Each calculation uses a distinct algorithm for evaluating fuzzy set 
scores; as a result the calculations of both the coverage of necessary and 
sufficient conditions do not match precisely. 
We can see right away that there are some surprises. The causal 
configuration involving both weak membership in the set of immigrants who 
stayed two years or more and weak membership in the set of immigrants who 
are highly educated seems counterintuitive. Further field research is necessary to 
understand the conditions under which migrants learn new political beliefs and 
behaviors in the U.S. Interestingly, the results suggest that there are various 
paths to learning. Furthermore, even though correlational studies of immigrant 
incorporation point to the importance of factors such as time in country, 
documented status, education, and English language abilities, this analysis 
indicates that the presence of one of these qualities may compensate for the 
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absence of another. This is important, since return migrants vary significantly on 
these personal attributes. For example, highly educated migrants stay in the U.S. 
illegally; non-English speaking immigrants interact with Spanish speaking 
Americans; documented migrants may not speak English, and so forth.  
Section 4.3 started with the proposition that one reason why returnees 
may not import behaviors is that they differ systematically from migrants who stay 
in the U.S. This may be true; returnees may have learned and embraced the 
beliefs and behaviors of their host country to a lesser degree than migrants who 
stay abroad, because they are negatively selected. Nonetheless, as long as 
returnees learn behaviors that are new to them and to the friends and family with 
whom they communicate when they return home, they should be able to set 
diffusion in motion. The analysis I present here indicates that return migrants 
obtain a new perspective on the types of political actions that can lead to 
improving political outcomes in a democracy. These behaviors are probably new 
to the non-migrants with whom returnees interact back home too.  
My field interviews also reveal that return migrants overwhelmingly do not 
consider their U.S. experience, including their interaction with U.S. institutions 
and authorities, to be negative. I asked interviewees two sets of questions to 
evaluate this issue: “How did your employers and government authorities treat 
you in the U.S.?” and “Do employers and government authorities in Mexico treat 
you better or worse than those in the U.S., or is the treatment you received from 
U.S. and Mexican employers and government authorities the same?” 
Respondents universally indicated that employers and government authorities in 
the U.S. treated them either the same as in Mexico or better.  
Most strikingly, with respect to the treatment by government authorities, 
two migrants who had been deported noted that the U.S. officials who processed 
their deportation were more respectful towards them than the Mexican customs 
authorities who received them. One undocumented migrant who moved to the 
Virginia area was surprised that he could walk around the nation’s capital freely, 
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and noted that in his hometown a foreigner could not walk around without being 
stopped by the police. Large numbers of respondents remarked that Mexican 
authorities are arrogant and corrupt, and interested in filling their own pockets, 
whereas in the U.S., authorities are much friendlier and take service more 
seriously, even when dealing with undocumented migrants. 
With respect to their treatment by employers, many migrants reported that 
they were surprised by the number of non-governmental organizations interested 
in offering voluntary services to migrants in the workplace. For example, one 
individual shared that lawyers approached him from the Mexican American Legal 
Defense Fund to see if he was being treated well by his employer. And others 
noted that members of a church group helped him and others to complete their 
income tax forms and to access recreational activities. Civic associations also 
approached migrants to offer health and safety education that served them both 
in the workplace and at home. Four individuals commented to the effect that the 
conventional wisdom concerning the racism and discrimination that migrants 
suffer (largely promoted by the images of migrants’ lives in the U.S. that the 
major television networks in Mexico depict), is highly exaggerated; they noted, 
without prompting, that they never felt discriminated by their employer while 
abroad. 
 This section refutes the claim that the reason return migrants do not 
import new political behaviors is that they do not learn any during their time in the 
U.S. I show that whether or not migrants are negatively selected, they may 
nonetheless learn new beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. There is only one 
condition that is even fairly necessary to learn and embrace new forms of civic 
engagement. Moreover, if we incorporate this condition into the statistical model 
presented in Chapter 3, we do not observe any significant changes in the general 
pattern by which returnees contribute to the diffusion process. Finally, the 
conditions that are sufficient for migrants to embrace new practices and beliefs 
are fairly diverse, and can include low levels of education and English—
  
135 
conditions typically observed among (perhaps negatively selected) return 
migrants.  
 I also challenge the argument that migrants cannot learn because their 
experience in the U.S. is consistently negative. Migrants themselves report that 
Americans—particularly employers and government authorities who are in the 
strongest position to abuse them—are generally respectful and interested in their 
wellbeing. In fact, the consensus is that they treat Mexicans better than do 
Mexican authorities and employers at home.  
4.4 Crossing the Border with U.S. Political Beliefs  and Behaviors 
If migrants who return to Mexico generally learned both political beliefs 
and behaviors in the U.S., what prevents them from practicing the new behaviors 
after crossing the border into Mexico, where they can legally exercise their 
citizenship rights to their fullest possible extent? Do returnees share their new 
political beliefs with fellow Mexicans back home? Or does the same force that 
constrains their behaviors also keep them from diffusing beliefs?   
4.4.1 Theoretical Framework 
Chapter 3 did not offer conclusive evidence to support any of the three 
theoretical perspectives that scholars typically employ to explain diffusion. 
Nonetheless, it argued that further evidence would be needed to justify rejecting 
a rational choice or constructivist interpretation of the process. Each of these 
perspectives is associated with a widely different argument concerning the 
causal processes that motivate and limit individual actions and choices. Each has 
a different implication about the kind of forces capable of constraining returnees 
from diffusing in Mexico the forms of civic engagement they learned abroad.  
Rational choice approaches to diffusion suggest that return migrants ought 
to bring home both the political beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S. if 
they have strong grounds to believe they would be effective in Mexico. Migrants 
should abstain from importing effective foreign beliefs only if they face material or 
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objective constraints such as prohibitive laws, exorbitant expenses, or a credible 
threat of serious physical harm or loss of liberty. Furthermore, migrants should 
import both behaviors and beliefs to be rationally consistent. 
Rational non-migrants should embrace the innovations returnees import 
under two conditions. They may conclude after careful consideration that such 
innovations represent an optimal strategy for improving the quality of their 
democracy. Or, more likely, they may choose to emulate non-migrants because 
they consider them highly capable individuals who have a wider range of political 
experiences, and with whom they share interests; such individuals have often 
achieved their objectives. 
In the constructivist perspective, returnees may not introduce and non-
migrants may not receive warmly, any new beliefs and behaviors that challenge 
local understandings of what is appropriate. By introducing new ideas about how 
to participate politically, or about the principles that underpin a well-functioning 
democracy, returnees may elicit criticism, alienate people close to them, or even 
worse, become a victim of harassment by individuals who believe that their 
interests are under threat.21 According to constructivism, the ultimate force 
behind a migrant’s decision not to import innovations and a non-migrant’s choice 
not to adopt should be that they are compelled to conform to local social norms 
and ideas.  
The section draws on my in-depth interviews with return migrants to 
evaluate what happens to their political behaviors once they re-enter Mexico. It 
helps us understand one aspect of the migrant-led diffusion process itself, and to 
specify its theoretical nature. The main findings are that migrants introduce new 
behaviors into the communities in Mexico to which they return, but abandon 
these efforts shortly after arriving; additionally, although migrants import new 
beliefs, they fail to share these with non-migrants. The reasons for these 
                                            
21 Note that these constraints differ from those put forth by rational choice theorists because they 
do not involve material costs or the threat of physical harm or loss of liberty. 
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behaviors are akin to those advanced by constructivist scholars. Returnees opt 
out of transmitting innovations because their co-nationals do not support them, 
but this lack of support is founded on non-migrants’ shared understandings that 
the value of individual migrants depends on whether they are located north of 
south of the border. 
4.4.2 The Path of Beliefs 
 The statistical analysis I present in Chapter 3 finds that migrants import 
new political beliefs. The qualitative interviews provide additional evidence to 
support the claim that most migrants who return to Mexico also learn new 
behaviors when they are in the U.S. Of the 31 returnees I interviewed, 27 
indicated that they learned and imported into Mexico new beliefs. Table 4.2 
presents some examples of the beliefs that most migrants learned and bought 
back to Mexico. They are classified into three categories of beliefs: (1) tolerance; 
(2) political efficacy, meaning citizens’ beliefs in their ability to influence the 
political system; and (3) support for the rule of law and justice. I reviewed the 
importance of tolerance in Chapter 3. Although I did not assess the latter two 
statistically, I consider them here because in-depth interviews offer a better 
approach to assessing such difficult-to-gage concepts. Moreover, the two beliefs 
are particularly important in the case of Mexico, where the ineffective rule of law 
remains a significant obstacles to improving the quality of democracy (Magaloni, 
2003), and citizens’ feelings of political efficacy have declined since 1997 
(Holzner, 2007). 
The questions I asked respondents with respect to beliefs were “Do you 
think your way of thinking or seeing things changed as a result of having 
emigrated to the U.S.? Or, do you think that they did not change at all? Explain. If 
you did change, have you conserved your new ways of thinking?” The questions 




Table 4.2: Political Beliefs that Migrants Import i nto Mexico 
Type of Behavior  Example Drawn from In -depth Field Interview  
Political Efficacy 
“Government and society should support private initiatives. Here in Mexico, people 
consider any initiative a threat.” 
“Now I don’t just let things happen or wait for the government to fix them, now I try to 
fix my own problems.” 
“I learned to be more critical of government – to have more opinions about what my 
government is doing for me. It can be beneficial.” 
“I learned to value service and voluntarism. I think public officials here do not 
understand the meaning of being a public servant.” 
“Working as a team rather than for myself. People should organize themselves to fix 
things that are not working, not just worry about their own affairs and let the 
government take care of everything else.” 
“I can become politically active without going through a political party. I am 
interested in participating in politics without joining a party.” 
“I learned that people here need to know how to ask the government for things. We 
have to knock on doors to get things done. We can’t always wait until the 
government does things.”  
Rule of Law and 
Justice 
“I learned the habits of a good citizen, like respecting others and the laws.” 
“Learned how labor rights are part of a legal system that works well and that there 
are many groups interested in helping laborers whose rights have been violated. 
People don’t help each other that way here…nobody respects the law, especially 
employers.” 
“The community has a role in ensuring safety, not just the police.” 
Tolerance 
“Now I have much respect for people with physical and mental disabilities.” 
“I learned that I can get along well with blacks, because I worked with them on the 
tobacco farms. I never in my live imagined that I would have black friends.” 
“I learned that nothing [bad] happens if a country has people of different races—
Blacks, Japanese.” 
“I have seen that men and women can work the same. Now I believe there is not 
much of a difference between men and women.” 
“I learned tolerance and respect for people who think differently from me…When I 
returned, I was surprised by the social discrimination that exists in Mexico.” 
 
Return migrants bring home significant, new, more democratic beliefs. 
Most interestingly, migration to the U.S. appears to enhance Mexicans’ beliefs 
that they can influence the political system. Numerous respondents stated that 
they returned home believing that their potential is greater than they imagined 
prior to emigrating; they claimed that maximizing their potential is their own 
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responsibility, rather than that of the government. Others made remarks 
indicating that their understanding of the role of the Mexican state and their 
relation with it had changed. Returnees also repeatedly said that they now 
consider beneficial government protection of the rights of people with disabilities, 
as well as support for women and racial diversity. Three migrants noted that they 
now “see” these people around them in Mexico, whereas prior to immigrating 
they were invisible.  
Of the 27 returnees who reported learning and importing new political 
values, beliefs, or attitudes from the U.S., few claimed to share them with others 
in Mexico. About 20 percent of returnees said that they had shared their new 
ideas about order and cleanliness, such as by encouraging others to put trash in 
the proper receptacles. They tended to encourage actions rather than engage 
others in discussion concerning the values, beliefs or attitudes that underpin 
these actions. About 50 percent of migrants reported sharing with their children 
the importance of respecting others. Otherwise, migrants uniformly indicated that 
they do not share with friends or family in Mexico the new political beliefs they 
learned in the U.S. 
4.4.3 The Path of Behaviors 
The interviews reveal that there are two behavioral trajectories among 
return migrants, active and inactive returnees. Figure 4.2 indicates that 52 
percent of respondents reported that their political behaviors changed as a result 
of having lived in the U.S., while 48 percent indicated that their behaviors did not 
change. Note that the graph does not represent levels of participation (e.g., high 
and low), but rather whether or not the migrant engaged in new forms. This 
signifies that some highly active returnees fall in the dark gray shaded area. For 
example various migrants held leadership positions prior to leaving for the U.S. 
Such individuals generally said they conducted business as usual upon their 
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return. Additionally, some returnees did not engage in new forms of participation 
because they did not learn any. 
However, as Figure 4.3 shows, among the 52 percent of returnees, a full 
80 percent of those who engaged in new forms of participation also reported 
giving up their efforts within a couple of years of arriving in Mexico. Their 
participation generally either declined to pre-migration levels or even lower. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Percent of Migrants who engaged in New Forms of Political 
Participation After Returning to Mexico 
 
Thus, of the 31 individuals I interviewed, only about 12 percent claimed to 
continue engaging in the new forms of civic engagement they learned abroad. 
This finding is consistent with the statistical finding that returnees do not engage 
in more democratic political behaviors than their non-migrant counterparts. 
However, the qualitative investigation reveals that returnees initially intend to 






Figure 4.3: Percentage of Newly Participating Migra nts that Persisted in               
New Forms of Participation 
4.5 Explaining the Failure to Persist with New Beha viors or Share Beliefs 
Why do migrants engage in new political behaviors after returning from the 
U.S. and then quit? Why do they keep their new beliefs to themselves? Do they 
find that such behaviors do not represent effective strategies to achieve their 
political objectives? Do they run into insurmountable constraints? Are their new 
beliefs and behaviors incompatible with local norms and standards of 
appropriateness?  
The interviews indicate that migrants unequivocally believed the new types 
of actions in which they engaged would and can still be effective. Thus, their 
failure to keep promoting this kind of behavior was not due rational feasibility. 
They also claimed that the political beliefs they learned in the U.S. are among the 
most valuable benefits they obtained in that country; yet most migrants chose not 
to share their new political beliefs. Returnees quit their new behaviors and fail to 
share beliefs not because they have no value of effectiveness in the Mexican 
context, but because they perceive a lack of social support among their co-
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nationals. This lack of support is founded on a combination of resentment, 
mistrust, and envy towards the United States. 
 
Table 4.3: Constraints on Continuing with New Forms  of Political Behaviors  
Description of 











“There was no support for my initiative, no interest in making the museum more useful 
and attractive to tourists, the majority of whom are Americans or foreigners better able 
to read English than Spanish. I am not going to insist on carrying out a voluntary act if 





“We wanted to build a new paved road, various migrants, with our money that we 
saved and put together, but the government made it very difficult for us, giving us the 
option of building it through people’s land, they expected us to ask our own people if 
we could put a road through their land... there were other ways…The government 
didn’t like that we were doing things to improve the community. They thought “these 
people return from the North and want to change things just because they have 





“Others think migrants are just trying to get ahead for themselves, looking out for their 
own interests, they can’t understand why you would do something for the 
community…I started putting trash in my pocket when I work rather than just throwing 
on the ground and people said, "They changed you up there. Sure, you think since 




“There is no support, people feel threatened by change. It is very difficult for someone 





“People take it the wrong way when you try to become involved in resolving the 
problems of the community. I managed to pave one road and started, but didn't finish 
a second, because there was no support, no unity….Even if you just make your little 
convenience store bigger, people start to talk because you are getting ahead. The 





“At first I tried to organize the people to clean up the playground and paint the school. 
But people are negative against change…they are not committed to your 





“I tried to start an Alcoholics Anonymous club here. There are many drunks here. I 
belonged to AA there. I tried to explain to the people here about the problems with 
alcohol, especially to the young people” 
“People called me crazy. They didn't believe what I told them about the problem of 
alcoholism. They said “This is Mexico, if you liked it there, you should go 






“People don’t support your initiatives. I tried to get people to cooperate to improve the 









My housekeeper told me that people around town were calling me “La Loca” [the 
crazy woman] because I went out to pick up trash everyday. So I started confronting 







“People here mistreat you if you try to excel or get ahead, they think migrants who 
bring money back use it for themselves for their own interests…People here don't 





“I tried to get people to report crimes to the police…People don't support you… I 
couldn't get people on board. They said Mexico is not like the U.S., things don’t work 







“We tried to improve the municipal fair…My story, it is a very bitter one. People don't 
like the ideas that you bring home, they opine differently, they seem to like to reject 
your ideas because you think they are superior. They don't like that your new ideas 








“When we tried to build a road with the money [earnings from abroad] we put together 
with migrants who are out there, the municipal leaders who were there [in power] at 








“I tried to organize the neighbors to clean up the neighborhood, but people didn't 







“I helped paint the church and we upgraded the arches that are at the entrance to the 
town…I responded to an invitation; I didn’t do more because I wasn’t invited again.” 
**These individuals persisted in their efforts, their response indicates the types of constraints they faced, but      
overcame. Small municipalities have a population of 15,000 or less. Medium municipalities have a 
population of 15-99,000. Large municipalities have a population greater than 100,000. 
 
The right hand column of Table 4.3, below, contains quotes from 16 
interviews in which respondents reported engaging in new political behaviors 
upon returning. The quotes represent the essence of how each respondent 
characterized the constraints they faced as a result of engaging in new types of 
political actions. The left hand column indicates the sex, education, and age of 
respondents as well as the size of the locality to which they return. Note that the 
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table also includes those respondents who persisted with their new behaviors; 
those Individuals are marked with an asterisk.22  
Throughout the interviews, not a single returnee alluded to a constraint on 
their behaviors or beliefs consistent with a rational choice theory. They did not 
remark that they had learned that their new forms of participation turn out to be 
ineffective; nor did they indicate that their behaviors or beliefs were problematic 
because they challenged local laws and political institutions, or because they 
created a situation for themselves or their family that involved the threat of 
physical harm or loss of liberty. Instead, the core adverse condition that migrants 
reported was the lack of support from their co-nationals.  
A careful analysis of each complete interview with those who initiated new 
forms of behaviors after returning permits us to classify into five categories the 
various types of “lack of support” returnees claimed to encounter as follows: 
1.  Lack of interest or collective action dilemma. 
2.  Lack of support due to suspicion or resentment of migrants’ newly 
acquired wealth—of their acquisition of dollars. 
3.  General resistance to change. 
4. Resistance specifically to change that originates in the U.S. 
5.  Perception of change as a threat.  
Each individual interview may fall into more than one category. For 
example, the respondent who indicated that he faced resistance to his efforts to 
improve the local fair pointed to a lack of support due to the suspicion of local 
leaders of returnees who bring home dollars as well as to resistance to changes 
(new rules for safety) originating in the U.S.  
 We can use QCA to assess the degree to which the decision to abandon 
new behaviors is due to one or more of these types of “lack of support.” Here, I 
                                            




coded each respondent’s description of constraints on continuing their new 
behaviors either zero or one on each type of “lack of support” listed above, with 
one indicating full membership in a category and zero indicating full non-
membership. I then ran the crisp set Truth Table Algorithm using the fs/QCA 
software.  
 The results indicate that three causal configurations are sufficient to give 
rise to nearly all (92 percent) instances of the outcome “Quit New Forms of 
Engagement”. The membership of an individual’s response in the set “General 
lack of interest or collective action dilemma”, alone, was sufficient to discourage 
returnees from persisting with their new form of behavior in 46 percent of the 
cases. A returnee’s perception that their new forms of behavior faced 
“Resistance specifically to change that originates in the U.S.” was sufficient to 
cause them to quit the new actions in 38 percent of the cases. Additionally, 
membership in the causal configuration “Lack of support due to suspicion or 
resentment of migrants’ newly acquired wealth—of their acquisition of dollars” 
combined with both “General Resistance to Change” and “Perception of change 
as a threat” was sufficient to give rise to about 8 percent of the cases of 
abandoning new political actions. Of the various forms of “lack of support”, the 
causal combinations that fully account for the outcome “Quit New Forms of 
Engagement” in about half the cases are therefore related to non-migrants’ 
attitudes towards the U.S. Non-migrants tend to resist change that originates in 
the north, and they are suspicious of migrants who return home with dollars and 
seek to use their new money to bring about change. 
 The reasons why returnees did not share their new beliefs were similar. In 
this case, migrants reported that they could hold their new beliefs, while 
simultaneously avoiding the frustration that their co-nationals’ lack of support 
creates, simply by keeping the beliefs private. A few returnees claimed that they 
cherished their new ideas concerning political efficacy too much to risk tainting 
them with the unfavorable responses of non-migrants. Nearly all migrants who 
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had children noted that they share the values they learned abroad with them 
consistently, but in private, especially in family settings.  
 My conversations with non-migrants reveal that returnees’ understandings 
of non-migrants’ receptivity towards their new political actions and beliefs are on 
the mark. The majority of non-migrants show little support for the new political 
actions in which return migrants engage. And, their attitudes towards non-
migrants range from indifferent—meaning that they feel no particular interest or 
enthusiasm for the migrant in question as compared to before they left for the 
U.S.—to alienated, frustrated, and resentful.23 
 This dissertation reviews non-migrant Mexicans’ responses to two 
questions concerning return migrants, including both friends and family and 
leaders: “In your opinion do returnees mostly contribute positively to their 
households, communities and/or to Mexico, or is their return mostly detrimental 
to their household, community and/or Mexico? Why?” Second, “In your opinion, 
do migrants who return re-integrate and adapt themselves once again to their 
home country environment with ease or with difficulty? Why?”24 
While respondents universally indicated that they were always delighted to 
have friends and family close to them again, they were not so sanguine about the 
benefits these individuals bring home. The most salient—if not the only—positive 
contribution that non-migrants noted time and again is that returnees have made 
it possible for their communities to have many large, well-built, homes. A 26 year 
old police officer’s remark that “If you look out from here, you can see how nice 
all of those houses are…Those are the houses that migrants have built” is typical 
of many other responses. But most non-migrant Mexicans also note that this 
                                            
23 By alienated, I mean that non-migrants feel unfriendly, hostile, or indifferent towards a migrant 
and his or her choices and beliefs where they formerly felt attachment; by frustrated I mean that 
non-migrants feel discouraged by return migrants; and by resentful, I mean that non-migrants feel 
indignant displeasure or persistent ill will towards returnees. These definitions are drawn from 
www.merriam-webster.com. 
 
24 To see the specific wording and format of the question, please see Appendix 4-E. 
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represents a private gain, from which only members of the returnees’ household 
benefit. Nearly all respondents from small to medium size municipalities (about 
70 percent of all the non-migrants I interviewed, including leaders) made note of 
the change that returnees have made with respect to what the “homes look like” 
now.  
Beyond this contribution, non-migrants did not consider migrants who 
return particularly beneficial to Mexico, its communities or specific households. 
About 30 percent of non-migrants were indifferent to returnees, believing that 
they—including those to whom they do not personally relate—neither contribute 
to nor serve as a detriment to their places of origin. This group of respondents 
believes that returnees’ role back home is not much different than it was prior to 
their departure. They do not consider that migration makes migrants either more 
or less able to fit in and function effectively within the community of origin.  Finally 
non-migrants who were indifferent to migrants that return to Mexico did not think 
that latter face obstacles upon their return such as the “lack of support” that 
returnees report.  
The other seventy percent of non-migrants with whom I spoke reported 
that returnees import more problems than benefits. Non-migrants listed 
numerous reasons for holding this belief. Many claimed that migrants who return 
permanently to Mexico do not contribute to the place of origin and fail to adapt to 
life in Mexico. Non-migrants in rural areas perceive returnees as lazy, while 
respondents located in all types of localities complained that returnees are 
unwilling to accept the terms of work in Mexico; in both cases the failure of 
migrants to get moving as they did in the U.S. frustrates those who never left 
Mexico. 
Another common theme I heard was that non-migrants resent returnees’ 
ability to purchase a better quality of life in Mexico. They also resent that 
returnees continue to look north, even after they have decided to resettle in 
Mexico. For example, the perception that returnees are dissatisfied with the 
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country to which they ought to be loyal because they constantly compare it to the 
U.S. appeared to aggravate non-migrants.  
Furthermore, I detected that non-migrants feel alienated from their 
returnee friends and kin, because they perceive them as coming home arrogant 
and idealistic and with an entirely new perspective on their present surroundings 
and future possibilities. That is, they believe that returnees come back 
“Americanized”.  Non-migrants claim that migrants who resettle in Mexico 
struggle to reintegrate and re-adapt precisely because of the ideas, habits or 
resources they obtained abroad. No single respondent alluded to the ease with 
which return migrants get up and move, either in their personal or work lives, 
even better than they did prior to leaving. Non-migrants did not report that 
returnees inspire and motivate them to transform their lives and communities. 
Instead their claims contained elements of frustration, resentment, and alienation 
towards returnees.  
Table 4.4 below summarizes the most common problems that non-
migrants mentioned with respect to the reintegration of returnees. The right 
column contains a description of the essence of each category. I indicate in 
parentheses whether each response indicates that non-migrants feel either 
frustrated, resentful or alienated vis-à-vis return migrants. The left column 
indicates the number of responses that fell into each category and the 
relationship that the respondents in question had to a migrant. The responses of 
some individuals may fall into more than one category. Note that my interlocutors 
often shared with me their views of returnees in general, as opposed to about a 
specific returnee.  
Chapter 5 compares non-migrants’ view of returnees to their opinions of 
migrants who remain in the United States in order to draw more complete and 
persuasive conclusions about their attitudes towards migrants in general. 
Nonetheless, we can see here how non-migrants’ attitudes towards returnees 




Table 4.4: Non-Migrant Claims as to Why Returnees d o not                     
Benefit Places of Origin 
Number and General 
Characteristics of Respondent 
Nature of the Problem 
Friend male (8), female (1) 
Father (2), Mother (3) 
Spouse, Female (5) 
Small, rural towns only. 
When they return, migrants live off of the earnings they made in the 
U.S. They do not work. They do not do anything. They are “good for 
nothing” when they return.  
(Resentment, Frustration) 
Friend, male (7), female (3) 
Mother (4) 
Spouse, Female (7) 
All types of localities, but especially 
small, rural towns. 
Returnees cannot find work when they return, or they work much 
harder and get paid much, much less. The situation leads them to drink 
or spend time unproductively. 
(Resentment, Frustration) 
Friend, Male (4) 
Father (4), Mother (4) 
Spouse, Female (5) 
Leaders (14) 
All types of localities. 
Migrants bring home vices and the bad customs and values of the U.S.  
(Alienation, Frustration) 




All types of localities. 
Migrants return believing they are superior as a result of having lived in 
the U.S. 
(Alienation, Resentment) 
Friend, Male (7) 
Mother (1), Father (4) 
Leaders (15) 
All types of localities, especially small, 
rural towns. 
Migrants return thinking that anything can be bought—that everything 
can be resolved with the mighty dollar. (Resentment) 
Friend, male (6), Female (2) 
Mother (3), Father (4) 
Spouse, female (4), male (1) 
Sibling (4) 
All types of localities. 
Migrants return feeling idealistic and empowered. They forget how 
things work in Mexico and think they can and should change things 
here just because they understand how things work in the north.  
(Alienation, Resentment) 
Friend, Male (4), Female (1) 
Mother (4) 
Spouse, Female (7) 
Sibling (5) 
Leaders (10) 
All types of localities 
They complain a great deal that everything in Mexico is dysfunctional. 
(Alienation, Resentment) 
Friend, Male (8) 
Spouse, Female(6) 
Leaders (13) 
All types of localities. 
Returnees are focused on getting back to the U.S. The hope of 
migrating again attenuates their relationship to Mexico.  
(Alienation, Resentment) 
Mother (6) 
Spouse, Female (8), male (1) 
Sibling (3) 
All types of localities. 
Returnees become accustomed to living on their own and struggle to 
live in the same household with family again. (Alienation) 
Friend, Male (4), Female (1) 
Spouse, Female (4) 
Sibling (2) 
Small, rural towns only. 
Returnees are surprised by how busy their co-nationals at home are. 
They want friends and family to sit down and talk, but there is no free 




4.6 Returnees and Mexicans’ Intersubjective Beliefs  about the U.S. 
 Non-migrants’ attitudes toward returnees are embedded in a broader set 
of attitudes concerning the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations. The structure of 
Mexican beliefs towards the U.S. is complex, because Mexicans hold both strong 
positive and negative views of the U.S.; and many hold both simultaneously. 
Ulises Beltrán (2001), a well known scholar of political behavior, finds based on 
public opinion surveys that about half of the variation in Mexicans’ perceptions of 
the U.S. fall into one or another of two dimensions, one positive and another 
negative. The first involves Mexicans’ beliefs about how that the U.S. mistreats 
Mexicans and represents an ongoing threat to Mexico. In contrast, the second 
dimension constitutes Mexicans’ assessment of the U.S. as a strong democracy 
that offers tremendous economic opportunities. Like numerous other Mexican 
scholars, Beltrán claims that ambivalent perceptions of the U.S. and perceptions 
are “firmly rooted in the collective consciousness” of Mexicans (2001, p. 27).  
 Other scholars corroborate Beltrán’s claims concerning the core content of 
Mexicans’ negative views of the U.S., albeit via different research methods. 
Morris (2000) analyzes images of the United States as depicted in written and 
illustrated responses to events such as the financial bailout that followed the 
1994-1995 peso crisis, and the annual debate in the U.S. Congress concerning 
the now defunct drug certification process. Based on a review of various national 
newspapers Morris finds that “the most prominent theme illustrated in the 
treatment of each of the events centers on the preponderance of U.S. power and, 
more importantly, the abuse of that power” (p. 115). Depictions in the press of 
this aspect of migrants’ beliefs about the U.S. encompass not only state to state 
relations, but also how the U.S. government treats Mexican individuals. For 
example, coverage in the Mexican press of capital punishment and the actions 
that the U.S. government takes to control the flow of undocumented migrants 
through its southern border depict a U.S. that does not value Mexican lives; 
moreover many caricatures characterize the U.S. as racist (Morris, 2000, p. 116). 
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Along similar lines, Morris finds that Mexicans are skeptical of U.S. intentions 
towards their country; they mistrust U.S. policies.  
 Another idea that permeates Mexicans’ attitudes about the U.S. concerns 
its self-perception in relation to the U.S. Carlos Fuentes argues that Mexican 
democracy, sovereignty, nationalism and identity are defined by Mexico’s 
relationship to the U.S. (1994). Octavio Paz famously noted that the U.S. 
represents an “indiscreet mirror” that reflects to Mexicans a negative image of 
their country—an image constructed in comparison to the U.S (1990). Paz 
portrays the U.S. as a giant shadow that covers the entire North American 
continent. Morris too, finds that Mexican editorials and cartoons depict the 
Mexico as weak, dependent, and violated in relation to the U.S. (p. 125). 
Moreover he argues that this weakness leads to a “desire to turn the tables and 
in a sense assume to moral authority against a powerful other” (p.129). 
Chapter 5 shows in greater depth that Mexicans’ attitudes towards 
returnees as compared to migrants who remain in the U.S. reflect Mexicans’ 
ambivalent attitudes towards the U.S. quite faithfully—that is, we will see that 
their positive orientation towards U.S.-based migrants contrasts with their 
negative attitudes towards migrants who have returned home. In this chapter, we 
can see that non-migrants’ attitudes towards returnees represent a broader 
interest in contributing to weakening the relative status of that country with 
respect to Mexico. This proclivity is part of a long Mexican tradition of defining 
their political identity by reference to the United States. Because return migrants 
come home having changed (they come home “pochos”), and excited about the 
new ideas they learned in the U.S., they are seen as partial members of the 
American community that Mexicans resent. They therefore represent ideal 
targets against which non-migrants can channel their frustration at being 
consistently in the shadow of the U.S. Although non-migrants’ attitudes have 




4.7 Explaining the Feebleness of Returnees before “S oft” Constraints 
 Why do return migrants give up their new actions and keep their new 
beliefs private although the challenges these come up against are of such a “soft” 
nature? Do returnees simply lack interest or commitment to their new forms of 
civic engagement?  
Constructivists have shown that agents of diffusion may employ a variety 
of strategies in order to get potential adopters to buy into the foreign ideas they 
seek to promote. International migrants do not appear to utilize any of such 
strategies. Instead, their idealization of the U.S., and frustration with Mexico, 
along with the ever-present possibility of emigrating again, dampens their 
commitment to bringing about change.  
 The literature on the international diffusion of principles and policies shows 
that foreign innovations often require a little help in order to gain acceptance 
among key domestic actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998), for instance, show that 
framing a foreign innovation to which the public in a any given country may be 
hostile in terms of another issue for which there is already wide acceptance can 
help garner support for the first innovation. Framing involves agents acting 
purposively and strategically to advance the principles they seek to diffuse. 
Similarly, Acharya (2004) finds that agents of international diffusion may bring 
about change if they successfully “localize” foreign principles or policies. 
Localization entails active domestic agents of diffusion (individuals in the 
potential adopting country who embrace the foreign innovation in question) 
helping external agents to adapt and interpret the foreign innovation in question 
to fit the norms and values of the adopting country.  
Return migrants do not appear to employ these or any other strategies 
that scholars have found to help foreign ideas get a foothold in new countries. 
Indeed, the in-depth interviews reveal that migrants typically do not work 
creatively at all to overcome resistance to their ideas concerning civic 
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engagement.25 For instance, the individual who tried to start an Alcoholics 
Anonymous organization in his hometown reported working tirelessly for a year 
to try to get the group running, but he did not refer to attempting to change the 
nature of the organization, its purpose or target audience, or any effort to enjoin 
non-migrant Mexicans to his project. 
One individual remarked that it is simply not possible to explain the new 
forms of civic engagement to people who have not been to the U.S.; he argued 
that Mexicans whose entire experience is rooted in their country of origin simply 
cannot imagine what is possible and true in the U.S., and that people have to see 
it to understand (this comment was in reference not only to political outcomes, 
but also economic). The woman who claimed to encourage her co-nationals to 
report crimes to the police at no point offered to accompany individuals to the 
police or to report a crime on their behalf (modeling); she simply accepted their 
rejection and moved on. This pattern is surprising. We would expect migrants, as 
both insiders and outsiders, to be particularly well placed to convey to their own 
people information about the political practices and beliefs they personally 
experienced and observed in the U.S. 
Returnees do not work actively and creatively to promote the foreign ideas 
they import for three reasons. First, most migrants are just ordinary members of 
the mass public, whose potential for spreading ideas rests principally in prosaic 
social interactions. They are not purposive, active agents of political change. 
They lack the zeal of bona-fide transnational activists; therefore they tend to back 
down easily before limited resistance. Their influence is inadvertent; and they 
transmit information via quotidian social transactions. 
                                            
25
 One possible exception may be group of return migrants who were elected to their municipal 
government on a joint ticket. The group’s electoral success may be attributed to their ability to 
convince others of their merit, given their status as return migrants; however, my conversations 




A second factor that prevents migrants from fighting to promote their new, 
more democratic political beliefs and behaviors is their vilification of Mexico and 
idealization of the U.S. Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 offer some examples of return 
migrants’ attitudes towards Mexico and its non-migrants. Returnees perceive 
their co-nationals as disinterested and resistant to change, while progress and 
action orientation are among the qualities they admire about Americans. This 
creates a situation in which returnees come to consider Mexico less worthy of 
their efforts and hard work.  
In addition to the disappointment they feel towards their disinterested co-
nationals, returnees are also highly critical of the government of their country of 
origin. Every respondent made note of aspects of the U.S. that they believed 
would most likely never exist in Mexico, even though that country would stand to 
gain from them, such as a more effective rule of law, lower levels of both 
government and citizen corruption, and an important tradition of voluntarism 
among citizens. Again, their belief that these improvements are not possible in 
Mexico is due to their perception that the country’s leaders and institutions are 
highly resistant to change, particularly that which appears to borrow from or 
emulate their neighbor to the north.  
The habit of comparing Mexico to the U.S. only intensifies returnees’ 
pessimistic views towards their country’s government, especially because they 
tend to idealize the U.S. government. About thirty percent of respondents said 
they would like the Mexican government to provide public services such as 
universal health care and extensive free public education at levels comparable to 
the U.S. In fact these services are at least as generous in Mexico as they are in 
the U.S. (plus, the constitution guarantees both in Mexico). One migrant noted 
admiringly that “U.S. leaders have unquestionable authority over the people” and 
that the “problem in Mexico is that the government does not dominate the 
people”. He complained that in Mexico politicians cannot act because the public 
has too much freedom to criticize them, whereas in the U.S. this is not the case. 
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Another respondent stated that although he admires the cleanliness and order in 
the U.S., this is principally a government-produced outcome. An example, he 
specified, is that the government has responsibility for keeping residential 
neighborhoods and peoples’ front yards clean. These romanticized beliefs about 
the U.S. government are consistent with non-migrants’ accounts (reported in 
Table 4.4) of why returnees struggle to adapt to their country of origin, and why 
they do not make positive contributions when they return home. They indicate 
that returnees repeatedly set the U.S. government and political system in stark 
contrast with the Mexican one for the purpose of disparaging it rather than 
contributing to its improvement. 
Returnees can sustain these jaded perceptions of Mexico because the 
possibility of migrating again is ever-present. Returnees’ perceptions of the 
Mexico to which they return encourage them to seek an exit; while at the same 
time, the possibility of emigrating again appears to embolden and intensify their 
belief that it is not worth their effort to try to bring about change in their home 
country.  
I concluded each of the semi-structured interviews with returnees by 
asking them if they intended to move north again, and if so, why? Just one of the 
31 respondents replied that they never intended to return to the U.S. This is 
consistent with existing research indicating that having emigrated is associated 
with a strong probability of moving again (Massey, 1987; Massey & Espinosa, 
1997). About 60 percent of the sample (principally those who had never obtained 
either legal permanent residency or citizenship in the U.S.) was keen to return to 
the U.S. for good and with their entire families if possible26. More than 80 percent 
of those respondents with a strong interest in emigrating again said that they 
actively work towards this objective on an ongoing basis, such as by staying in 
                                            
26 Permanent residents and citizens generally left that option open. The ease of exit for this group 
makes their responses with respect to intention to migrate again difficult to assess. In general, 
because of their immigration status in the U.S. such migrants can emigrate again anytime. 
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contact with employers abroad and by following the debate on immigration policy 
reform. This signifies that the proportion of returnees working to overcome 
obstacles to emigrating (.48) is higher than those who persisted against their 
non-migrant co-nationals’ lack of support for the new political beliefs and 
behaviors they brought home from abroad (.12). Migrants who return are 
therefore weakly committed to their home country. 
It is not difficult to see how returnees’ belief that Mexico and its people are 
highly resistant to change, coupled with their weak commitment to that country 
that results from a compelling exit option, would prevent returnees from 
purposefully promoting the ideas they learned abroad via strategies such as 
localization. 
4.8 Conclusion  
 This chapter presents a rich analysis of qualitative data gathered through 
99 in-depth field interviews with migrants, their kin and friends, and community 
leaders to complement the statistical findings presented in Chapter 3. It finds that 
the experiences in the U.S. of returnees, who may be negatively self-selected, 
are nonetheless generally compatible with learning new, more democratic 
political beliefs and behaviors. Nonetheless, the analysis reveals that returnees 
fail to engage in new political actions persistently over time after they return and 
do not share the beliefs they import. The chief obstacle that migrants interested 
in implementing new types of civic engagement face is returnees’ perception of a 
“lack of support” from their non-migrant co-nationals. Returnees back down 
before this weak impediment without persistently engaging in new types of 
political behaviors because they are not activists; because they have jaded views 
of Mexico and romanticize the U.S.; and because the ever-present possibility of 
emigrating again attenuates their commitment to Mexico. 
The findings are inconsistent with the perspectives of rational choice 
theorists, who understand individual choices to be driven by objective constraints 
  
157 
and interests. In this case, returnee and non-migrant perceptions of one another; 
returnees’ perspectives on Mexico; and non-migrants’ resistance to the U.S. 
influence the choices of return migrants. The “lack of support” that migrants 
perceive rests in large part on non-migrants’ resentment of changes that initiate 
in the north, and changes funded by the mighty dollar; it results from a mixture of 
resentment, alienation, and frustration that non-migrants feel towards return 
migrants.  
This causal story is similar to those that constructivist scholars advance in 
that it is driven by intersubjective beliefs; however in the case of migrant-driven 
diffusion I find that the more democratic beliefs and behaviors of one country do 
not simply transcend international borders to enter less democratic ones, as 
many constructivists believe. Rather, nation-state borders fundamentally and 
differentially shape the interests, attitudes and perceptions of the actors they 
contain, on one hand, and those who move beyond them, on the other.    
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CHAPTER 5: THE STRENGTH OF LONG-DISTANCE TIES 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 indicates that non-migrant Mexicans who communicate with 
emigrants in the U.S. are more participative than non-migrants who do not 
engage in such transactions. We lack evidence to attribute this outcome to the 
transmission of information via long-distance cross-border social transactions 
between migrants to their friends and kin, however. Chapter 4 found that 
migrants who return to their home country do not effectively diffuse the political 
beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S. because they perceive a lack of 
support among their co-nationals in Mexico. It argued that non-migrants’ attitudes 
towards migrants condition the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors via 
returns. In light of that conclusion, non-migrants’ adoption of the political 
practices that migrants transmit abroad seems paradoxical. This chapter 
therefore has two objectives. The first is to show that the changes in the political 
behaviors of non-migrants who communicate with their friends and family living in 
the U.S. in fact result from international diffusion. The second is to determine 
whether the diffusion process set in motion by migrants who stay abroad also 
conforms to the modified constructivist causal logic observed among return 
migrants; that is, if diffusion via long-distance cross-border ties is also 
conditioned by the ambivalent attitudes that non-migrants hold towards 
emigration to the U.S. and the U.S. itself. 
 Diffusion is a process, not an outcome (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Chapter 
3 indicates that social transactions between non-migrants and their co-nationals 
abroad are associated with statistically different political behavioral outcomes.  It 
points to observable differences between the political participation of individuals 
who communicate with migrants, and those who do not, for which multiple 
explanations are possible. This chapter provides evidence that the differences 
are due to social communication between migrants and non-migrants, and not to 
other migration-related processes. Specifically, I show that the cash remittances 
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that many non-migrants who communicate with friends and family abroad also 
receive do not create these behavioral differences. Instead non-migrants’ 
behaviors change as a result of what they learn via communication with 
Mexicans who live in the U.S. 
Chapters 3 and 4 rigorously explored the possibility that either rational 
choice theory or bounded rationality contribute to explaining migrants’ decisions 
to import and share the innovations they picked up in the U.S. as well as non-
migrants’ choice to either adopt or reject these innovations. The chapters 
advance considerable evidence to invalidate these approaches to understanding 
migrant-led international diffusion. The analysis below therefore focuses on 
finding evidence that either confirms and clarifies or invalidates the new type of 
constructivist account advanced in Chapter 4. I conduct theory-driven process 
tracing to evaluate whether non-migrants’ perceptions of migrants abroad 
consistently condition their receptivity to the innovations that migrants share with 
them; I explore how and to what degree these attitudes influence migrants’ 
interest and willingness to share what they have learned. I find that non-migrants’ 
attitudes and beliefs about migrants critically influence both, just as they did in 
the case of diffusion via migrants who return to their home country.   
The same attitudinal dynamics that diminish non-migrants’ receptivity 
towards those who return to Mexico also enhance their openness to the ideas 
transmitted by migrants who remain in the U.S. However, whereas returnees give 
rise to sentiments of resentment, alienation and frustration, migrants who stay 
abroad create feelings of empathy, interest, and realization. This radically 
different response to migrants leads non-migrants to evaluate differently the 
information that migrants transmit, depending on whether they are located 
abroad or have returned home. A migrant’s location thus represents an important 
signal to non-migrants concerning the value and trustworthiness of the 
innovations that migrants have to share. This signifies that all else held constant, 
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non-migrants are more willing to consider the political behaviors migrants 
transmit from abroad, even if these are identical to those that returnees transmit.  
Non-migrants’ inconsistent responses to return migrants are rationally 
inconsistent because they are primarily rooted in the beliefs that Mexicans share 
concerning the U.S.  They give rise to biased choices, but they are a coherent 
consequence of the ambivalent beliefs that Mexicans share towards the U.S. and 
emigration to that country. 
Beliefs about emigrants reflect a broader set of incongruous 
consequences of Mexican migration to the United States. On one hand Mexico 
benefits tremendously from the movement of its people to the north. Hundreds of 
thousands of households depend on the earnings that migrants send from 
abroad (Lozano Ascencio, 2007; Taylor, Mora, Adams, & Feldman, 2005), and 
the more than $20 billion that migrants remit contribute to keeping Mexico’s 
current account balance stable (Bugamelli & Paterno, 2005). Positive effects 
such as these stand in stark contrast to migration’s significant costs. For 
example, the number of migrant deaths that occur along the border has 
increased at least tenfold since the 1990s (Cooper, 2008). In just the first six 
months of the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2008, the number of migrants who 
died in their attempt to enter the U.S. clandestinely increased a full seven percent 
(Rotstein, 2009). Additionally, whereas emigrants have traditionally departed 
from just a few regions of Mexico and comprised individuals with low job skills 
and education, contemporary emigration to the U.S. originates throughout 
Mexico (see e.g., Cornelius, Fitzgerald, & Lewin Fischer, 2008); and emigration 
is also progressively depriving the country of its brightest, most educated and 
capable people (Corchado, 2008).  
To the extent that migration simultaneously both weakens and strengthens 
Mexico and its citizens, attitudes about migration and migrants also range from 
negative to positive. For example, politically, there is evidence that the collective 
philanthropic investments that Mexican hometown organizations make via 
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government matching funds programs contribute to strengthening local 
government accountability (Burgess, 2005). But, others have found that high 
aggregate levels of migration contribute to increasing levels of political 
disengagement (Hiskey & Goodman, 2007). Economically, numerous scholars 
argue that migrants’ remittances can give rise to economic growth (Orozco & 
Welle, 2005; Taylor, 1999) or simply to reducing poverty levels (Conway & 
Cohen, 1998) in Mexico. Furthermore there is evidence that migration improves 
non-migrants’ access to primary health care (Reanne, 2005; Reanne et al., 
2009). However, research also shows that the international movement of people 
can weaken the mental health of people involved, including both migrants and 
those who stay in the country of origin (see, e.g., Gorges, Breslau, Su, Miller, 
Medina-Mora, & Aguilar-Gaxiola, 2009). Consequently, popular understandings 
of the migration experience simultaneously glorify it as an exceptional opportunity 
and condemn it as an economically necessary evil that entails subjecting oneself 
to suffering at home and American exploitation, racism and mistreatment abroad.  
In contrast to migrants who return, stayers are generally held in high 
regard. From the perspective of non-migrants, stayers demonstrate not only their 
capacity to enter the U.S. successfully, but to confront, on an ongoing basis, the 
challenges they face in that country. Staying indicates the capability to adapt to 
U.S. social, economic and political life; it makes migrants look courageous and 
accomplished in the eyes of their friends and kin who remain in Mexico. As long 
as migrants remain in the U.S., they represent for non-migrants a direct 
connection to that country’s wealth, power opportunities, and constant progress. 
Their presence across the international border and far away makes them the 
subject of constant interest and concern. Migrants abroad therefore do not 
encounter the “lack of support” that return migrants report. To the contrary, they 
find among their co-nationals in Mexico a receptive and cooperative audience. 
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5.2 Rival Explanations for Behavioral Changes: Remi ttances 
Remittances, or money, sent from migrants abroad to family members 
back home, may affect the political behavior of their recipients by ways quite 
distinct from international diffusion. First, there is evidence that remittances 
represent a material resource that strengthens individuals vis-à-vis powerful state 
actors, encouraging them to vote for opposition parties (Merino, 2005; Kurtz, 
2004), or hold local leaders accountable (Burgess, 2005). Receiving remittances 
could similarly influence non-migrants’ propensity to participate in the various 
non-electoral forms of political participation, collective protest, and the social 
organizations I explore in this project.  
Another process by which remittances could influence the political 
behavior of those who receive them is by producing the effects of modernization 
on a small scale, at the individual level. Modernization theory argues that 
economic development has systematic and predictable cultural, social, and 
political consequences that transform social structures and generate cultural 
changes supportive of democracy. The theory concerns macro-level political and 
economic changes and sees industrialization as the principal force driving 
change (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).   
Remittances may drive an alternative form of modernization that 
contributes to modifying personal attitudes and values even if the structural and 
cultural changes associated with industrialization do not occur; the process would 
represent a unique path to what Klingemann and Fuchs call “individual 
modernization” (1995, pp. 11-13). Although the extent to which remittances 
contribute to productive, value-added, and employment-generating enterprises is 
a subject of great debate (Durand, Kandel, Parrado, & Massey, 1996; Orozco & 
Welle, 2005; Taylor, 1999; Woodruff & Zentento, 2001; Zárate-Hoyos, 2005), 
there is considerable evidence that non-migrants invest the money they receive 
from migrants in services such as health care and education (see e.g., Borraz, 
2005; Reanne, Palma-Coca, Rauda-Esquivel, Olaiz-Fernández, Díaz-
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Olavarrieta, & Acevedo-García, 2009). Additionally, international money transfers 
between families benefit the poor by increasing their purchasing power and 
standard of living, and contribute to diminishing income inequalities (Adams & 
Page, 2005; Taylor, Mora, Adams, & Feldman, 2005). Non-migrants who receive 
remittances could thus become more participative and develop more democratic 
attitudes and beliefs because remittances improve the material quality of their 
lives and make them more capable citizens.27  
To evaluate the effects of remittances I turn to the results of the multi-level 
linear and logistic regression analysis presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 
describes the data, methods and model for this analysis in detail. The models 
include a control variable for those who receive money from migrants abroad. 
The variable estimates the yearly amount of remittances that respondents 
receive (in thousand-peso units) by multiplying the frequency with which 
respondents reported receiving remittances times the average amount received 
per transfer. The results are in Table 3.3.  
Remittances produce no statistically significant effect on any of the 
behavioral or attitudinal dependent variables of interest. This signifies that cash 
transfers from migrants to non-migrants do not have the independent effect on 
non-migrant beliefs and behaviors that we would expect if remittances 
contributed to individual modernization. The result also implies that remittances 
do not make their recipients more likely to challenge the government by 
increasing their levels of political participation.  
These findings are in contrast to those reported by other scholars and to 
the conventional wisdom concerning the potential effects of remittances 
(Burgess, 2005, Kurtz, 2004; Merino, 2005). More importantly, they suggest that 
the effects of communication, stripped of the potential confounding effect of 
                                            
27 Here I refer indirectly to Inglehart’s (1997) concept of post-material values; however Inglehart 
employs it to characterize the values of entire societies and he implies a significantly greater level 
of aggregate level socio-economic development than that which migrants may achieve. 
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remittances, are quite significant; in contrast, remittances, stripped of 
confounding factors for which scholars typically do not control (communication 
with immigrants, having migrated and returned, living in a community in which 
migration is prevalent), have no effect. Long-distance cross-border 
communications therefore appear to be independently responsible for significant 
behavioral changes among non-migrants. 
5.3 Evidence of Behavioral Transmission via Cross-B order Social 
Transactions  
 International diffusion is a process by which innovations are 
communicated through certain channels over time across state borders (Rogers, 
1995). This chapter examines one way in which migrants seem to contribute to 
this process: the transmission of innovations pertaining to civic engagement from 
migrants who live in the U.S. to non-migrants living in Mexico. The statistical 
results show that non-migrants who communicate with their migrant friends and 
family are on average more participative than are non-migrants who do not. The 
finding strongly suggests that diffusion occurs; nonetheless, to provide a more 
compelling case, I explore the process more closely, based on in-depth 
qualitative research. What is the nature of cross-border communication? What 
ideas do migrants transmit to non-migrants, and which do non-migrants 
embrace? 
5.3.1 Data and Methods 
 To understand how migrants in the U.S. contribute to diffusion, this section 
evaluates the content of 129 in-depth field interviews that addressed these 
questions. I interviewed 48 individuals who communicate with migrants in the 
U.S. 38 of these respondents were also in close contact with returnees and 
comprise the sample I interviewed for the analysis in Chapter 4. Additionally, I 
interviewed 10 individuals who communicate with friends and family in the U.S., 
but are not simultaneously in close contact with returnees. I also use data 
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gathered through 51 interviews with migrants, including the 31 return migrants 
described in Chapter 4 and 20 interviews with migrants who currently live in the 
U.S.  
 I used the same script to guide my semi-structured interviews with all non-
migrants. In other words, the ten additional interviews I conducted with the family 
and friends of migrants who live in the U.S. contained the same questions that I 
asked the family and friends of returnees. I conducted all interviews with the 
friends and family of migrants face-to-face and privately—outside of the 
respondent’s home.  
 The set of questions I asked the 20 migrants who live in the U.S. were 
unique and are available in Appendix F.  I conducted the interviews with U.S. 
based immigrants either by way of a written questionnaire implemented via 
electronic mail, or over the phone. Subsequently, I sent electronic mails with 
additional clarification questions as necessary. The questionnaire that structured 
my interviews with migrants who have returned to Mexico is in Appendix 4-E. 
 With regard to the sample of migrants living in the U.S., I used the diverse 
case selection approach. To identify migrants living in the U.S., I used various 
strategies. First, I relied on Clara Pérez-Méndez of Boulder, Colorado. Clara has 
worked with the Spanish-speaking migrant community in Boulder County for over 
twenty years; the trust and respect she enjoys in that community helped me to 
efficiently gain access to respondents. Second, I turned to my personal 
knowledge of migrants living in the United States and subsequently used the 
snowball method.  Finally, I contacted various relatives of non-migrants who I 
interviewed in Mexico. With respect to the ten non-migrants living in Mexico who 
do not relate to return migrants, I identified potential respondents at the 
suggestion of other interviewees and used the snowball sampling method. The 
characteristics of the additional interview respondents from whom I obtained 
information are summarized in Appendix G. 
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5.3.2 Characterizing Long-Distance Cross-Border Communication 
 Immigrants who live in the U.S. and non-migrants residing in Mexico 
reported engaging extensively in cross-border communication. The main types of 
social transactions were phone calls, migrant visits to Mexico, and visits of family 
and friends to the United States.  
19 out of the 20 U.S. based interviewees claimed that they spoke with 
friends and family in Mexico by phone regularly; the average frequency was once 
per week. 11 of 20 reported visiting home at least once per year and 2 less than 
once per year. Among those who travel home, three indicated that their visits 
home initiated only after they obtained legal residency. Seven U.S.-based 
respondents had not returned home since they entered the U.S., presumably 
because they would have to re-enter clandestinely.  
 Similarly, nearly all non-migrants reported regularly communicating with 
their migrant friends and family by phone. The average frequency was once per 
month. The proportion that had seen their migrant relation in person since the 
last time they emigrated was relatively low, however. Only 13 percent (6 of 48) 
had traveled to the U.S. to see their relations, and about one in five had received 
in Mexico a visit from their friend or family member (other than to resettle 
permanently).  
 The topics of conversation guiding these long-distance cross-border social 
transactions between migrants and non-migrants (in order of importance) are: (1) 
the wellbeing and health of the family; (2) everyday life in the U.S.; (3) future 
plans of both the non-migrant and his interlocutors; (4) the economic and security 
problems that currently plague Mexico; and, (5) U.S. immigration policy. 
 Migrants are principally interested in discussing the health and wellbeing 
of those who they leave behind. For the majority of migrants, this concern is 
altogether separate from and superior to worries about one another’s personal or 
familial economic situation. 
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 “Everyday life” is a broad subject of conversation. The category includes 
observations about the social, political and economic lives of migrants in the U.S. 
For example, migrants share with their friends and family in Mexico their personal 
experiences with public or private services such as education and health; they 
narrate the process of getting immigration documents in order; or they report 
their experiences as consumers. Migrants note that they prioritize talking about 
these other issues over talking about their job. The topic “everyday life” precludes 
discussions about Mexico or the U.S. writ large, such as conversations about 
current events or the political and economic future of each country. 
 The topic “future plans” includes discussions about the education, 
employment, migration, and family plans of both migrants and non-migrants. For 
example, migrants discuss their intentions to return to Mexico, their intention to 
marry or have children, and their plans to invest in education and training. They 
may also share their interests in or decisions to purchase a major asset. 
 Cross-border communication often concerns Mexico’s economy and the 
crime and drug-related violence that plague that country (security issues). The 
majority of migrants said that the economy of Mexico concerns them 
continuously because it affects the specific economic future of their immediate 
family members and because it influences their choice to either return to Mexico 
or stay in the U.S. With respect to security issues, respondents indicated that 
non-migrants share with them horrific stories, while interlocutors on both sides 
discuss and critique the policy responses of the government as well as what non-
governmental actors do or can do to help alleviate the situation. 
 Finally, a frequent topic of conversation among undocumented immigrants 
and their friends and family in Mexico is U.S. immigration policy. They discuss 
news concerning the recent intensification of immigration control activities within 
the U.S. (e.g., workplace immigration raids) as opposed to simply at the border; 
they contemplate the construction of the new high tech fence—the so called “wall 
of shame”—that the U.S. government has built along the border during the past 
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three years; and they share their views concerning the likelihood of a major 
immigration reform bill. 
5.3.3 The Incidental Transmission of Political Ideas 
 When asked, respondents indicated that discussing U.S. or Mexican 
politics was not a priority during their cross-border social interactions. Migrants 
almost universally noted that they never initiate conversations specifically about 
politics, nor do they instruct or coach their family and friends back home on how 
to think about politics or engage their political system. On the other hand, when 
migrants freely described the content of their discussions, they revealed that they 
share with their friends and kin back home a great deal of American political 
ideas and practices and many of their observations or understandings of political 
life in the U.S.  
 Long-distance cross-border communication is therefore rich in the content 
that concerns the present research; however, its transmission is incidental and 
unintentional. When migrants are abroad, a majority convey to their non-migrant 
friends and kin the new political beliefs and behaviors that they observe and even 
embrace in the U.S. (15 of the 20 U.S.-based immigrants that I interviewed and 
over half of the return migrants)—if only inadvertently. In this section, I report 
numerous examples of the “political” content of long-distance cross-border 
conversations. The content can be roughly grouped into four categories: (1) the 
nature of transactions with police and bureaucrats in the U.S.; (2) the importance 
of voluntary activities in America; (3) the level of personal responsibility that 
Americans assume vis-à-vis their government and the outcomes it produces; and 
(4) Americans’ and their government’s respect for individual and human rights.  
 Many migrants noted that they share with family and friends in Mexico 
their surprise at the relatively high level of trust citizens appear to feel towards 
the police and government bureaucrats, as well as the expedience and efficiency 
of transactions between such workers and citizens. One college educated male 
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immigrant noted that because they are corrupt and inefficient, “We avoid 
institutions such as the police in Mexico. But these are vital in the U.S. and very 
much part of daily life. This has changed my perception of how important these 
institutions are. And I now think it is our responsibility to make these institutions 
part of Mexico’s daily life as well.”  He claimed that he tried to convey this 
perspective to his co-nationals at home whenever possible. Similarly, an 
undocumented female migrant with a primary school education shared that she 
tries to encourage her “parents to participate in the government services 
available for older people, and I tell my sisters to go to education programs that 
the government sponsors. In Mexico, we complain about government services a 
lot, but we don’t use the services to the extent that we could either.” A male 
migrant with a high school education said that he remarks often to non-migrants 
that “it is amazing how much American bureaucrats and police are at the service 
of the people. Of course there are the problems with the police that we see on 
the news and all that, but overall, the role that public servants assume in the U.S. 
is different; the police and the bureaucrats want to help the public, not just 
themselves.”  
Another salient message concerns the value of volunteering. Migrants 
abroad tell non-migrants about how Americans work collectively—independent of 
the government—to help produce the social, political and economic outcomes 
they desire. For example, one college-educated male said that he tries to 
“educate people on the value of volunteering and working on behalf of their 
community. I tell them about the culture of help and NGOs. In Mexico we are 
always waiting for the government to do everything for us, we do not initiate 
community based programs or non-governmental projects to help one another 
and our communities.” Similarly, an undocumented female with a middle school 
education said she tells people about the “value of volunteering, how 
volunteering can even help improve the economy. For example, my sister here, 
now she takes care of kids voluntarily so that their moms can go to work. They 
  
170 
help each other get ahead. This never happens in Mexico; people don’t volunteer 
to help outside the family.”  
A closely related area of discussion is individual civic responsibility. 
Migrants relate the many ways in which Americans take individual actions to 
contribute to their political system’s effectiveness and to enhance the outcomes it 
produces. For instance, one undocumented woman with a middle school 
education noted that she tries to explain to her family in Mexico that Americans 
participate a great deal in the decisions of their community; that they are 
persistent in teaching their children ethics and the dangers of corruption; and that 
they are oriented towards helping to improve life in their community. Another 
woman who arrived in the U.S. with a primary school education, but has since 
completed high school, said that she tells her family about how she—not the 
government—took responsibility for her education. “I saved the money from my 
work to pay for my studies. I investigated about the opportunities and went after 
them. The government here [in the U.S.] provides a lot of opportunities, but 
individuals have to actively pursue them. In Mexico people don’t take 
responsibility for going after their interests.”  Similarly, a male respondent with a 
Mexican college education who arrived without documents, but now resides 
permanently in the U.S., said, “I try to share stories that will encourage people in 
Mexico to get political, to get active and go after their interests rather than wait 
around.”  
The role of personal responsibility vis-à-vis corruption is also a common 
theme. One undocumented woman noted, “When I talk with my family about the 
economic and security problems in Mexico, I ask them if they give bribes…We 
have to change our own actions, and stop violating the rules and laws. I have 
learned a lot here about the value of starting change with your own actions.”  
Another, college-educated women said she has conveyed her amazement at the 
seriousness and care with which Americans prepare and submit their tax returns. 
“Paying taxes is something that most Americans think you should do. It is 
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something that they are very aware of. They do it without any real coercion.”  
Another respondent noted, “I have told my relations in Mexico about how people 
here know the laws; they are aware of what the law says. We need to do that too. 
It’s something we can do to make the law more important.” 
Finally, migrants also convey their understanding that Americans and their 
government seem to make considerable efforts to respect human and individual 
rights. One college-educated woman said “I talk to my friends and family in 
Mexico about how my job here at the university is to look out for the rights of 
minorities and I compare the situation here to that of indigenous people and 
women in Mexico. A lot more can be done to protect minority rights in Mexico.” 
Another undocumented woman with a primary education related that her adult 
brother has a learning disability and is not economically active as is the case for 
most people with disabilities in Mexico. “I am always telling my parents that it is 
possible for adults with disabilities to work and become more independent. They 
can have lives that are almost normal. They can contribute to the economy.”  
  We can see why respondents might not consider that the comments cited 
above pertain to politics. By and large migrants do not converse with non-
migrants about political events or institutions, candidates, elections, parties, or 
social movements. On the other hand, they clearly share the types of political 
beliefs and behaviors that I evaluate in this study—beliefs and behaviors that 
contribute to strengthening democracy. Migrants convey examples and express 
approval of the responsibilities that citizens in the U.S. democracy assume. They 
share their sense that relations between citizens and the state are different in the 
U.S. And, they relate their surprise at and admiration for Americans’ commitment 
to individual and human rights. Furthermore, in their communications with non-
migrants, Mexican immigrants in the U.S. intimate that each of these aspects of 
U.S. political life is worth emulating.  
 The observations that migrants share mingle beliefs and behaviors, 
making it difficult to determine whether they serve to transmit one or the other. 
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When asked, respondents tended to claim that migration had not fundamentally 
changed their beliefs. For example, some noted that they have always believed 
that all individuals, regardless of race or gender, should have equal rights, while 
others indicated that their ideas concerning citizens’ theoretical responsibility to 
the state had not changed. However, they remarked that in the U.S. they had 
seen their beliefs effectively reflected in multiple aspects of everyday social, 
economic and political life to an extent they had previously considered 
impossible. “We work side by side with blacks, my kids play with blacks, and 
people discuss their attitudes toward race issues and homosexuality here. In 
Mexico we don’t even discuss these things”, said one undocumented female with 
a sixth grade education. “I am now aware that in Mexico, indigenous people are 
totally marginalized. I have always supported the idea that indigenous Mexicans 
have the same rights as any other Mexican, but now I see that so much more 
can be done,” noted a college-educated male. Overall, respondents explained 
that their understanding of what citizens and government can do to make their 
political beliefs real had changed radically. The nature of what migrants transmit 
can therefore best be characterized as descriptions of actions that fulfill 
fundamental democratic values and beliefs. 
5.4 Unexpected Changes among Mexicans Who Stay Home   
The theoretical argument advanced in Chapter 4 suggests that non-
migrants’ attitudes towards both the U.S. and emigrants to that country could 
preclude the adoption of any behavioral predispositions and beliefs that U.S.-
based migrants transmit. Based on that theory, one could think that non-migrants 
in Mexico reject the foreign ideas that U.S.-based migrants convey, even if non-
migrants and Mexico in general would stand to benefit from emulating them. 
However, the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that non-migrants who 
communicate with friends and family living in the U.S. are significantly more 
participative than their co-nationals who do not engage in such social 
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transactions. Furthermore, my in-depth field interviews reveal that non-migrants 
who communicate with Mexicans in the U.S. embrace new political behaviors 
similar to those that return migrants claim to practice just after re-entering Mexico 
and then abandon. This paradoxical outcome indicates that non-migrants are not 
averse to the specific behaviors and attitudes that emanate from the U.S., but 
rather that they respond negatively when returnees transmit them. It is not the 
content of the message that is decisive, but rather the messenger.  
Table 5.1 below presents some examples of the new political behaviors in 
which non-migrants reported engaging since their friend or family member left for 
the U.S., as a result of the information that their migrant relation shares with 
them. There are strong parallels between the new behaviors that non-migrants 
claim to “learn” from migrants in the U.S., on one hand, and the beliefs and 
behaviors that return migrants import into Mexico, on the other. To show this 
clearly, I have organized the examples of what non-migrants learn from Mexicans 
in the U.S. according to the same categories I used in Chapter 4 to characterize 
the beliefs and behaviors that returnees import.  
Table 5.1: Non-Migrants’ Adoption of Behavioral Pre dispositions that U.S.-
based Migrants Transmit from Across the Border  
Type of 
Participation New Actions that Non-Migrants learn from Migrants  who Stay in the U.S. 
Participation in 
Organizations 
“There are ways to get involved other than through political parties. I used to avoid 
politics because I don’t like to meddle with the parties. But [migrant relation] has made 




“I have learned that we can cooperate to support public works. We don’t have to wait 
for the government to do things and then just complain if there is not enough money. 
We can get private money, ask for donations, get sponsors, and ask the migrants who 
are on the other side to help us by putting in their dollars.” 
“Women have to get together, organize, protect their interests; we organized a group 
to give information to the young girls about domestic violence.” 
Individual 
participation 
“My mother carries an extra plastic bag with her everywhere she goes. It’s to pick up 
trash. She says she can’t get everything and there is still a lot of trash all around, but 
at least she’s doing her part now.” 
“I follow local news and issues more. I think it’s important to know what is going on. I 
didn’t pay attention before. We watch CNN.”  
“I follow international news more – I want to know what is happening in the north 
because our son lives there and because now our life also depends on what is going 
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on outside this country. “ 
Political Efficacy 
“I try to attend public meetings and pay attention to how things are changing. I read 
and become informed…I don’t let others influence decisions on my behalf so much 
anymore. I used to think that public affairs didn’t concern me, they just happened to 
me and I had to live with them. Now I see things a little differently.” 
“I am trying to know more about my rights—about the things that I am permitted to do 
and what I can’t do.” 
Rule of Law and 
Justice 
“I report crimes and even my suspicion of a crime to the police. I tell people to call the 
police.” 
“I try not to offer bribes, to teach the kids the importance of not offering bribes. They 
should go through the formal procedures to resolve any legal issues. But it’s hard, they 
are very unpractical. It takes a lot of time.” 
Tolerance 
“We are trying to improve the community so that people with disabilities can live better 
here. We made some ramps. But it’s difficult. The people don’t always understand 
why we should spend so much for just a few people. The problem is that there is no 
money.” 
“My husband is supporting the education of our two younger daughters now that he 
sees that our other daughter is coming out ahead and getting an education up there.” 
 
The U.S.-based migrants did not report transmitting beliefs, and the 
statistical analysis did not reveal that non-migrants who communicate with 
Mexicans in the U.S. change their political beliefs. Nonetheless, as I explained 
earlier, both migrants and non-migrants refer to talking about and engaging in 
actions that are clearly motivated by beliefs that sustain effective democracies 
(tolerance, political efficacy, and support for the rule of law). I have placed 
examples of new behaviors that are associated with these beliefs accordingly. 
The evidence—both statistical and qualitative—that Mexicans back home 
change their behaviors as a result of communicating with migrants appears to 
counter the argument that their shared attitudes toward both the U.S. and 
emigration to that country condition their receptivity to the ideas that migrants 
transmit. Indeed, it suggests that there exist some conditions under which non-
migrants embrace the innovations that migrants share.  
Under what conditions are non-migrants open to learning from migrants 
about how political life operates in the U.S. and then changing their own actions? 
Under what conditions do they snub migrants, and when do they champion 
them? Are non-migrants’ disparate attitudes towards migrants and the foreign 
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ideas they introduce into Mexico consistent with the neo-constructivist 
explanation I advance in Chapter 4? 
5.5 The Paradox of Long-Distance Ties 
Non-migrants’ simultaneous rejection of returnees and acceptance of the 
innovations that migrant stayers transmit to Mexico can be explained by their 
attitudes toward the United States and immigration to the north. The paradox 
arises from the shared love-hate sentiments that Mexicans have toward the U.S. 
These ambivalent sentiments lead them to respond positively toward migrants 
who remain in the U.S, as opposed to their negative reaction to individuals who 
return to Mexico. The contradictory outcomes are therefore fully consistent with 
the constructivist interpretation I advance in Chapter 4.  
5.5.1 Data and Methods 
This section uses theory-driven, process tracing to evaluate the interviews 
I conducted with both non-migrants and migrants (including stayers and 
returnees). The objective is twofold. It evaluates how new ideas about political 
beliefs and behaviors flow from migrants living in the U.S. to non-migrants living 
in Mexico. And is explores why non-migrants embrace the foreign ideas that the 
friends and kin in the U.S. transmit, while they reject the same ideas when they 
issue from returnees.  
Process tracing is a research method that requires scholars to trace the 
process leading to an outcome to determine whether each step along the way 
conforms to the expectations generated by the theory under consideration 
(George & Bennett, 2005). According to George and McKeown (1985), process 
tracing: 
attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process 
that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior 
that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on 
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attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of 
interest on attention, processing, and behavior (p. 35). 
In this case, I seek to verify that diffusion via migrants abroad follows the 
constructivist interpretation I advanced in Chapter 4 with respect to non-diffusion 
by way of return migrants. 
 Like Qualitative Comparative Analysis, process tracing differs from 
research methods that rest on a correlational logic. Instead it involves evaluating 
systematically whether the process under examination follows the theory in 
question or not. The technique does not even require comparison. However, 
here, I employ it comparatively to show that the way in which stayers diffuse 
political beliefs and behaviors conforms to the same theoretical logic that 
explains return migrants’ weak contribution to diffusion. My objective is to show 
that the theory accounts for diffusion from abroad as well as for non-diffusion via 
returnees. As a result, although the section focuses principally on the role of 
migrants abroad, I compare my findings with respect to this population to the 
findings reported in Chapter 4 to show that the explanations are consistent 
throughout.  
5.5.2 U.S.-Based Migrant Transmission-Initial Motivations and Persistence over 
Time 
 Like return migrants, stayers are motivated to share the political beliefs 
and behaviors they observe and embrace in the U.S. when they think these 
might also function effectively in Mexico; they share information they believe 
could improve social, political and economic life in Mexico—including the quality 
of its democracy. U.S.-based respondents consistently noted that their interest in 
Mexico and its future had either remained the same or increased since 
emigrating (2 and 18, respectively); no respondent indicated that their interest 
had declined. The reasons include the ongoing presence of family in Mexico, the 
possibility of returning, and the belief that, as one migrant stated, “witnessing 
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how another country works makes you think about everything that might be 
possible in your own country, and you feel responsible.”  
 Unlike return migrants, stayers do not start off enthusiastic about 
introducing into Mexico new behaviors and then quit. Among the twenty U.S.-
based interviewees that reported sharing the content I summarized in Section 
5.3.1, all indicated that their transmission is ongoing. More interestingly, most 
return migrants noted that when they were in the U.S., they shared their new 
political beliefs and behavioral dispositions without inhibitions; they did not stop 
sharing until they reentered Mexico. Why do migrants persist in their efforts to 
introduce foreign innovations when they remain in the U.S., rather than quit?  
 Chapter 4 revealed that return migrants quit their new political actions 
because they felt discouraged by co-nationals in Mexico who did not seem to 
support them. I find evidence that non-migrants’ sentiments toward migrants 
while they remain in the U.S. are quite the contrary. Not only do U.S.-based 
migrants fail to perceive the discouraging lack of support reported by those who 
return, Mexicans in the U.S. claim that non-migrants respond to them with 
interest, admiration, and even joy.  
 Respondents universally indicated that their family and friends respond 
with great interest to whatever they share about life in the U.S. At the same time, 
they also concurred that their friends and kin in Mexico generally consider that 
the narratives they relate would be implausible in Mexico. One woman indicated 
that her family argues that Mexicans are incapable of change. Several 
respondents coincided in claiming that their family and friends are happy that 
they left Mexico. For example, one undocumented woman with a high school 
education said, “they [my family] congratulate me and tell me how happy they are 
for me that I left Mexico because there are more possibilities here.”  Another 
woman explained, “they say I should stay in the U.S…that our children will be 
much better off than if we return to Mexico.” A male respondent with a college 
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education said that his long-distance interlocutors were very interested in how 
things work in the U.S., but generally apathetic.  
 Despite the pessimism that U.S.-based migrants often confronted, they 
remained undeterred from sharing continuously over time. The reason is that 
non-migrants’ attitudes toward migrants who remain in the U.S. differ radically 
from their attitudes toward returnees. Non-migrants want to hear what migrants 
who are outside of Mexico have to share, because they hold these individuals in 
high regard. Their attitudes towards migrants at home, versus abroad, are part of 
a broader ambivalence that is characteristic of Mexicans’ attitudes towards the 
U.S. and Mexico’s relations with that country. Mexican economist Luis Rubio 
captures this ambivalence eloquently in a 2006 article entitled, “The Gulf of 
Mexico.” He writes:  
Mexico has spent the better part of the past two centuries trying to define 
itself against the reflection of its powerful neighbor to the north…It has 
preferred ambiguity so that the responsibilities of being either a clear 
friend or an enemy of the United States did not impose themselves. In this 
way Mexico has maintained the pride of distance while still enjoying the 
practical benefits of propinquity (Rubio, 2006, p 1). 
With respect to migrants, having a friend or family member who resides in 
the U.S. implies significant practical benefits. At the same time, it costs little to 
assert national pride and sovereignty by keeping return migrants at a distance.  
Table 5.2 below specifies the types of supportive attitudes that non-
migrants expressed in their interviews. The left column indicates whether the 
attitude was most prevalent with respect to U.S.-based migrants without 
documents permitting their presence in the United States, with such documents, 
or both.28 The center column explains the source of the supportive attitude, 
meaning the underlying condition that causes non-migrants to have positive 
                                            
28 Here, documented migrants are those with valid visas other than tourist visas. That is, with 
permits for long-term stays in the U.S. such as student visas, “green-cards,” and work permits 
such as H-1 visas. 
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sentiments towards migrants in the U.S., quite in contrast to their feelings 
towards returnees. To depict the sources of support as best as possible, I either 
paraphrased representative responses (these are marked in quotes) or 
summarized their nature succinctly in my own words. The right hand column 
indicates the type of supportive attitude associated with each source of support. I 
identified four types of attitudes: (1) Empathy; (2) Distance; (3) 
Opportunity/Membership; and, (4) Reciprocal obligations. I briefly explain each of 
these in the following paragraphs. 
Empathy. The understandings that non-migrants widely share concerning 
the challenges that migrants face in the U.S. (compared to within Mexico) are the 
stuff of urban legends. Mexicans’ beliefs about the U.S., Americans and bilateral 
relations between Mexico and the U.S. fundamentally underpin popular discourse 
concerning migrants’ lives in the U.S. As we saw in Chapter 4, the salient 
negative perception of the U.S. concerns how the U.S. treats Mexico and 
Mexicans. 49 percent of Mexicans perceive Americans as a little bit to fully 
intolerant, and 73 percent believe that they are either racist or very racist 
(CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). For 63 percent of Mexicans, the best explanation for the 
wealth of the U.S. as compared to Mexico is that the U.S. exploits the riches of 
others (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). 










Undocumented “They work so hard out there” 
“They are exploited” 
Empathy 
Undocumented “When they don’t have work [either because they just arrived 
or because they are between jobs] it’s so hard to stay afloat, 
we worry about them when there is no work.” 
Empathy  
Both “We know that they discriminate against our people up there.” Empathy  
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Undocumented “Crossing the border is so dangerous, and now the 
authorities are looking for migrants at the factories and at 
work.” 
Empathy 




Both “They miss home. They have to adapt to new foods, a 
different language, a different housing situation.” 
Empathy 
Distance 
Both Infrequent communication Distance 




Both  “He says that he is fixing his papers so that he can take us all 
up there. We’re just waiting for him to fix the papers.” 
Opportunity/ 
Membership 
Both Pride at migrant’s integration in community. Including 
employment, education, participation in the community, 
receipt of awards, acquisition of new assets, etc… 
Opportunity/ 
Membership 
Documented Migrant is a citizen of the U.S. Opportunity/
Membership 
Undocumented “Because of the money that [migrant] sends home, our two 
kids are finishing school and attending university.” 
Reciprocal 
obligations 
Undocumented “Because of the money that [migrant] sends home, we can 





A 2006 public opinion poll revealed that 38 percent of Mexicans feel resentment 
towards the U.S., this figure increased to 42 percent in the central and southeast 
regions of Mexico that have the longest traditions of emigration (Gonzalez & 
Minushkin, 2006).   
Undocumented migrants are therefore seen as suffering victims. The 
Mexican national press feeds these perceptions by accentuating the 
exceptionally injurious consequences of migration such as the incidence of 
deaths at the border, cases of migrants who are on death row, and stories 
concerning the deportation of undocumented Mexican migrants who then choose 
to leave their children in the U.S. (i.e., the U.S. government’s separation of 
families). Non-migrant Mexicans therefore worry a great deal about their friends 
and kin in the U.S. Their concerns orient them favorably towards U.S.-based 
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migrants, since the latter are believed to sacrifice their physical and emotional 
wellbeing in order to improve their personal situation and that of their family.  
 Distance. In this case, distance is both literal and figurative. It refers not 
only to the territory separating migrants and “home”, but to the cultural divide that 
stands between the two. Distance can cause empathy, but it has another unique 
effect on non-migrants’ attitudes towards U.S.-based migrants as well. Because 
cross-border, long-distance communication necessarily happens by phone, 
letters, the Internet, or expensive travel, this type of social transaction is relatively 
infrequent and unsatisfying in length as compared with the everyday transactions 
in which non-migrants can engage with returnees. The relative scarcity of 
communication between non-migrants and their co-nationals in the U.S. 
enhances the interlocutors’ mutual attentiveness. Furthermore, distance 
inherently enhances the intensity of long-distance communication, since it is 
essential in order for migrants and non-migrants to maintain and reaffirm their 
long-distance cross-border relationships. Finally, the cultural dimensions of 
distance, such as concerns about a migrant’s ability to adapt to American food, 
serve to further enhance non-migrants’ interest in their friends and family abroad. 
Indeed, my interviews suggest that some migrants, because of the response they 
elicit, perpetuate perceptions of how difficult it is to adapt to life abroad.  
Opportunity/Membership. Migrants’ ongoing presence in the U.S. 
represents a link to both the possibilities available in the U.S. In other words, 
migrants create for non-migrants a form of vicarious membership in the host 
country—particularly for their immediate family. These possibilities are both real 
and imagined. Some examples of how long-distance social transactions create 
concrete forms of indirect membership include households that benefit materially 
from receiving remittances. Non-migrants in such households have indirect 
membership in the U.S. economy. Additionally, since family reunification is one of 
the key principles behind current U.S. immigration policy, having a migrant family 
member in the U.S. can signify the possibility of emigrating for other members of 
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the household; it signifies potential future membership. Even for those who 
migrate without documents, an individual with family or friends abroad will be 
more likely to emigrate for the first time than someone without such ties, because 
friends and family provide “insider” information on the workings of the U.S., job 
availability, and how to migrate (Massey, Alarcón, Durand, & González, 1987).  
More symbolic forms of membership sentiments that emerge include, for 
instance, non-migrants’ satisfaction in the various levels of membership that their 
migrant relations attain in the more wealthy and powerful U.S. (e.g., job 
promotions, awards, marrying an American, etc.). Many family members of 
migrants boasted about the success of their family member in the U.S. as if it 
were their own personal achievement. Ironically, as migrants become more 
integrated in the country that most Mexicans resent, they become a source of 
pride and optimism for non-migrants. A migrant’s success—particularly a family 
member—can affect feelings of personal efficacy among non-migrants even if the 
migrant does not send home cash or facilitate migration. Somehow, the presence 
of a close relative in the U.S. makes people at home more hopeful about the 
future. 
Ambivalent sentiments about the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations thus 
underpin non-migrants’ attitudes towards Mexicans who live in the U.S. We saw 
in Chapter 4 and above that the core of negative feelings towards the U.S. 
concerns the country’s historical place as a giant that casts its shadow over the 
continent and mistreats Mexicans. Such sentiments are in contrast to Mexicans’ 
positive sentiments towards their northern neighbor. The latter revolve around 
the quality of the U.S. democracy and the economic opportunity the country 
offers.  Thus while Mexicans resent U.S. interference in their country and their 
perception that their northern neighbor wants to take over the world (Beltrán, 
Krauze, 2005), about 50 percent of respondents believe that their life would 
improve if they cross the border illegally.  Similarly, while Mexicans blame U.S. 
interference for Mexico’s political and economic problems, they yearn to study 
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politics and economics in American universities. As Krauze notes, the border is 
thus both a scar and opportunity. 
Attitudes towards migrants reflect these ambiguities. While migrants are 
abroad, they represent a link to these opportunities (both real and symbolic), yet 
they are also perceived as self sacrificing for putting up with American arrogance, 
discrimination and racism. Combined with the distance that separates migrants 
from non-migrants, these paradoxical perceptions contribute to strengthening ties 
between migrants and their friends and kin who stay in Mexico. 
Reciprocity. Research shows that undocumented migration is often a 
collective economic strategy in which migrants fulfill certain functions and 
household members who stay behind perform others (Bustamante, Jasso, 
Taylor, & Legarreta, 1998; Cohen, 2001; Conway & Cohen, 1998; Massey, 1990; 
Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994; Warnes, 1992). Within this context migrants 
hold a special status as risk-takers that were selected from the household for 
their fitness to undertake the challenge of moving north. Migrants’ stays in the 
U.S. are thus a unique time during which household members on both sides of 
the border support each other mutually and are especially responsive to one 
another. 
 Empathy, distance, opportunity/membership and reciprocal obligations are 
the attitudes that underlie the elevated social status of migrants who are in the 
U.S. Migrants who remain in the U.S. thus enjoy an elevated status when they 
are in the U.S., precisely because they are away and in the country towards 
which Mexicans hold such ambiguous sentiments. These attitudes make social 
transactions between Mexicans at home and abroad more assiduous, 
conscientious and compassionate as compared with social transactions between 
returnees and the co-nationals who receive them in their country of origin. 
 Significantly, these attitudes do not reflect objective differences between 
migrants who stay and migrants who return. Non-migrants do not respond to 
U.S.-based migrants with greater interest because they consistently convey 
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better ideas, are more effective communicators, or possess other attributes that 
indicate they are better leaders or more expert than returnees. In fact, stayers 
and returnees convey much of the same content; and returnees are capable of 
explaining and demonstrating face-to-face the actions they propose; but, non-
migrants are more responsive to U.S.-based migrants. A migrant’s location either 
in the U.S. or Mexico is the key variable that influences non-migrants’ receptivity 
to the information each type of migrant shares. This finding clearly contradicts the 
rational approaches to social learning.  
 The accounts that return migrants provide about how these attitudes of 
their friends and family changed following their return confirm this argument. 
Several returnees commented to the effect that after they return, people no 
longer make time to speak with them. For example, one male said that after a 
six-year undocumented trip to the U.S., “I converse less with my family now that I 
am here. Being away brings the family together, but now everybody says they 
are very busy here.” Non-migrants also shared frustration that returnees want to 
talk when there is much work there is to be done. They claim that their 
relationship with returnees weakens because they no longer work as hard as 
they did while they were away. However, my interviews also reveal that their 
communication and the effects of empathy, distance and reciprocity are strongest 
during the time when U.S.-based migrants are unemployed or otherwise 
struggling to stay afloat in the north. This signifies that the time that non-migrants 
make to listen to migrants differs depending on whether they are at home or 
abroad. 
 Another migrant said that while he was in the U.S. his family celebrated 
his narratives. They were happy for him and his achievements in the U.S. They 
remarked that his decision to leave Mexico to make his life in the north had been 
for the best, because Mexico does not afford the same level of opportunities. 
Nonetheless, upon his return, when he tried to provide to those individuals with 
the behavioral and attitudinal innovations that could help to create those 
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opportunities in Mexico, they accused him of being impractical, having changed 
and forgetting where he comes from (Mexico). When he was away, they were 
proud of his ability to adapt and get ahead in a country they perceive as politically 
and economically dominant; his success indicated to non-migrants his ability to 
overcome the intolerance and exploitation that they believe migrants face in the 
U.S. When he returned, non-migrants tagged him as a “pocho” (a derogatory 
term for migrants who are no longer seen as fully Mexican or American) as a 
result of the ways in which he had changed in the U.S.; after he returned non-
migrants accused him of thinking he was better than others.  
 Similarly, one individual noted that migrants’ efforts to contribute 
collectively to improving their hometowns by investing remittances that they have 
pooled together are better received when the migrants are abroad than if they 
have returned home. The Programa 3x1 Para Migrantes, a Mexican government 
program that matches the funds that migrants invest collectively in public 
infrastructure, encourages this outcome to some degree because it requires that 
donations come from migrant organizations that are based in the U.S. But such 
organizations often do not go through this program, either because they want to 
avoid the bureaucratic and political process it entails, or simply because migrant 
funds outstrip the program’s capabilities to match funds.  
 A more fundamental reason for the weaker reception of collective 
remittances invested from within Mexico has to do with localization. Non-migrants 
can utilize the funds of U.S.-based migrants to implement projects that they have 
planned together without necessarily having to negotiate every detail with the 
migrant donors. Migrants may return home to help supervise the project 
occasionally, but they are not the principal implementers. This means there are 
fewer opportunities for non-migrants and migrants to clash over how the output 
should look. Migrants are less likely to stress to non-migrants their perception 
that the project simply does not look like it does in the U.S.; as a result they are 
less likely to become frustrated by how things are done in Mexico and to have 
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second thoughts about their investment. At the same time non-migrants are freer 
to implement the project according to the procedures and customs with which 
they are familiar in Mexico.  
 This pattern is evident in other circumstances as well. The fact that 
migrants’ communication with non-migrants is of limited duration and their 
location far away from the home community insulates them from seeing the 
differences between Mexico and the U.S. as sharply as do returnees. Stayers are 
generally more optimistic about what is possible in Mexico than are returnees. 
They can share their new political behavioral dispositions and beliefs with non-
migrants without simultaneously facing the challenges of re-integrating and 
adapting back into life in the home country. Moreover, because they are away, 
the supportive attitudes of non-migrants encourage them to share their 
understandings of U.S. political and social life. 
 In addition to being more open to the ideas that U.S.-based migrants—as 
opposed to returnees—convey, non-migrants can put into action the ideas they 
receive without having to confront the migrants’ concern that the innovation 
actually resembles the U.S. model. Non-migrants only have to imagine in the 
Mexican context how the information that migrants convey could improve 
Mexican politics; because they have never lived under the umbrella of U.S. 
democracy, they cannot compare their version of the U.S. idea to the true model. 
As a result they are less likely to become frustrated and quit. 
  A key implication is that we may not observe the replications of specific 
behaviors. Instead, non-migrants may take action where they can and know how 
as a result of the broader narrative that they hear from their friends and family in 
the U.S. Though this process may give rise to less radical forms of change, the 
changes it produces are probably less likely to generate resistance and therefore 
more likely to persist in the long run.  
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5.6 Conclusion  
 This chapter shows cross-border communication is prevalent, frequent, 
and rich in narratives about political life in the U.S., including its traditions of civic 
participation. Migrants transmit similar observations about U.S. political life that 
return migrants import; however they do so incidentally and unintentionally in the 
course of conversations about more personal concerns. Nonetheless, whereas 
non-migrants reject the innovations that returnees import, their communications 
with migrants abroad give rise to changes in their political participation.  
 I show that Mexicans’ ambivalent attitudes towards the U.S. and 
emigration to that country explain non-migrants’ paradoxical rejection and 
acceptance of foreign political ideas and practices. Long-distance channels of 
communication are stronger pathways for the diffusion of democratic beliefs and 
behaviors because non-migrants feel empathy for U.S.-based immigrants, while 
distance strengthens the quality of their communication, and the migration 
process itself creates reciprocal obligations. In contrast to relations with 
returnees, which non-migrants employ as an opportunity to reject the U.S., its 
people and customs, social ties with U.S.-based immigrants draw out Mexicans’ 
desire to be close to their neighbor to the north. 
 The reasons for these paradoxical outcomes have some material basis, 
but non-migrants’ beliefs about the negative aspects of the U.S. and Americans 
exceed the truth. Anti-Americanism in Mexico is what Katzenstein and Keohane 
(2006) classify as a bias as opposed to an opinion. The latter involve unfavorable 
specific judgments about the U.S and its policies, while the latter entails a 
systematic negative predisposition toward the U.S. that keeps individuals from 
fairly evaluating that country and its policies. Mexican anti-Americanism is rooted 
in history and ideas (Krauze, 2005), more than in concrete contemporary political 
events.  
Migration itself strongly influences contemporary views concerning U.S.-
Mexico relations and the U.S., but non-migrants’ interpretation of political issues 
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that focus on the border, as well as their understanding of Mexicans’ experiences 
in the U.S., are highly biased.  Their biases in this respect are a result of non-
migrants’ systematic tendency to negatively judge the U.S.; and this, in turn, is 
because their historical relations with that country causes them to mistrust U.S. 
intentions and believe that the country and its people only seek aggrandizement 
at the expense of others. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 The ongoing political incorporation of millions of Mexican-born nationals in 
the U.S., the interest in improving the quality of democracy among Mexican 
citizens in their home country, and the existence of trans-state channels of 
communication linking these two populations—migrant returns and long-distance 
communication—suggest that migration could lead to the diffusion of democratic 
beliefs and behaviors from migrants’ more democratic host countries to their 
countries of origin. This dissertation first explores whether Mexican migrants to 
the U.S. transmit to non-migrants, either when they return to Mexico or via cross-
border communication, the more democratic beliefs and behaviors they learn in 
their host country. Then it seeks to provide a theoretical explanation for the 
counterintuitive outcomes that each of the two channels of diffusion produces. 
Chapter 2 explains the theoretical argument. Chapter 3 provides statistical 
evidence to suggest that migrants do indeed contribute to diffusion, but in more 
varied ways than we might have expected. Chapter 4 draws on in-depth 
interviews with migrants who have returned to Mexico and with Mexican non-
migrants to explain why returnees contribute weakly to the diffusion of new 
political beliefs and behaviors. Finally, Chapter 5 explains analyses interviews 
with U.S.-based migrants, non-migrants and returnees to explain why migrants 
who remain in the U.S., despite their physical distance from home, contribute to 
changing the political behaviors of the friends and kin they leave behind in 
Mexico. 
 This chapter pulls together the evidence and arguments I presented in 
Chapters 3 through 5, and considers their broader implications and applicability. 
It begins by summarizing the main findings of the dissertation. Subsequently, I 
consider the implications of my research for Mexico’s democracy and for North 
American integration. Thirdly, I consider the applicability of my theoretical 
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argument beyond migrants to other actors at the level of mass publics. I conclude 
by setting an agenda for future research. 
6.1 Main Findings and Core Argument 
This dissertation advances a new theory of migrant-driven international 
diffusion based on research conducted in the critical case of Mexico-U.S. 
migration. Of the three theoretical approaches that this dissertation tested—
rational choice, bounded rationality, and constructivism—constructivism best 
accounts for the process through which migrants contribute to the diffusion of 
political beliefs and behaviors from their more democratic host country to their 
less democratic country of origin. I advance a theory that embraces 
constructivists’ chief assertion that: 
human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply 
material ones; that the most important ideational factors are widely shared 
or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and that 
these shared beliefs construct the interests of purposive actors 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 391). 
 
However, I break with constructivist research that has focused on unidirectional 
causality. That is, I put forth that international ideas and practices do not simply 
influence change on domestic actors automatically, from the outside in. Instead, 
domestic understandings condition diffusion processes so that the outcomes they 
produce are significantly more diverse and complex than we would expect.  
My approach is consistent with the work of constructivists like Acharya 
(2004), Checkel (2001), Gurowitz (1999), Legro (1997), and Risse-Kappen 
(1994), who argue that domestic factors such as institutional structures, 
organization culture, and state identities account for the uneven impact of 
international norms on domestic political choices.  
The core argument of this dissertation is that Mexicans’ shared 
understandings about both the U.S., and Mexico’s relationship with the U.S., 
fundamentally shape both non-migrants’ demand for information about the forms 
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of civic engagement that Americans practice and migrants’ own propensity to 
share with non-migrants what they learned abroad in this respect. My argument 
is similar to Gurowitz’s (1999) claim that differences in how international norms 
affect political debates about immigration in Germany and Japan “are largely due 
to differences in how each state views the international society in which those 
norms are embedded” (p. 417). My dissertation emphasizes the importance of 
social beliefs concerning the bilateral relations in which diffusion is embedded.  
My research finds that how Mexicans view both the U.S. and the bilateral 
relationship in which U.S.-Mexico migration is embedded critically shapes non-
migrants’ propensity to either resist or accept the American political beliefs and 
behavioral dispositions that migrants transmit. Mexicans’ attitudes towards both 
the U.S. and their country’s relationship with its northern neighbor principally 
consist of a highly ambivalent anti-Americanism. Mexico sees itself as “weak, 
dependent, and violated in relation to the United States” (Morris, 2000, p. 125). It 
sees the U.S. as “powerful, self-serving, often hypocritical in its treatment of a 
weak Mexico, and decidedly anti-Mexican, perhaps for racist reasons” (Morris, 
2000, p. 130). Non-migrants therefore hold Mexican migrants, who they believe 
bear the brunt of this asymmetrical bilateral political relationship and America’s 
alleged abuse of power, in high regard; U.S.-based migrants thus need and 
deserve the moral support of their co-nationals back home. Nevertheless, despite 
these negative perceptions of the U.S., most Mexicans would like to live there 
because of the opportunities and benefits they believe the country offers. And 
migrants afford to non-migrants close to them a form of indirect membership in 
the more powerful and wealthy U.S. Therefore, non-migrants openness to the 
political ideas transmitted by migrants who currently reside in the U.S. 
simultaneously reflects both Mexicans’ negative understandings of the U.S. and 
their longing to move to the U.S. 
In contrast, when returnees reenter Mexico, they are no longer the victims 
of U.S. power and Americans’ real or imagined exploitation and discrimination of 
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Mexicans. At the same time, migrants who return to Mexico no longer enable 
their non-migrant friends and family to make both concrete and symbolic claims 
on membership in the U.S. Yet migrants return home with a new identity—
including new political habits and beliefs—that is intimately tied to the U.S. 
Snubbing returnees and the political innovations they transmit thus provides non-
migrants with an ideal target for expressing the defensive nationalistic aspect of 
their anti-Americanism.  
Mexican anti-Americanism shares with many other countries in the world 
an ambivalent (McPherson, 2003; Naím, 2002), ambiguous (Rubio, 2006), or 
polyvalent (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006) aspect that French historian Pascal 
Bruckner (2006) describes brilliantly. He writes: 
America: the greatest power of attraction and the greatest of repulsion. It 
makes our hackles rise while it places us under its spell because it 
incarnates modernity in its best and worse aspects with that little bit of 
excess and incommensurability that makes it unique…So the United 
States---that rotary republic, nouveau riche, without style and whose 
manners are a paragon of vulgarity and chintz arouses a singular 
adulation, even among its detractors (2006, p.11). 
This form of anti-Americanism is akin to a social norm in many countries. Brucker 
notes that “In Europe, especially in France, anti-Americanism fundamentally 
structures political life and thought. In its most extreme forms, it embodies a 
whole way of interpreting the world” (2006, p.9).  
This way of interpreting the world is sufficiently powerful to trump rational 
decision-making not only because receptivity is guided by beliefs as opposed to 
careful cost-benefit analysis or well-founded perceptions of a social interlocutor’s 
expertise, but because it gives rise to inconsistent decisions. Chapter 4 shows 
systematically that returnees who try to introduce the forms of civic engagement 
they learned in the U.S. face a consistent lack of support from their non-migrant 
co-nationals. It provides evidence that mistrust of the dollar and innovations that 
originate in the U.S., as well as general resistance to change, underlie this lack of 
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support. In contrast, Chapter 5 shows that despite their pessimism, non-migrants 
are very interested in the information that U.S.-based migrants provide, and 
willing to try actions that reflect the narratives they hear.  
Non-migrant receptivity to migrants abroad appears to be rooted in their 
high regard for the personal sacrifice they undertake in moving to a distant and 
alien country and their admiration of their friend’s and kin’s membership in the 
U.S. This causes them to value the same piece of information more if it flows 
from a Mexican abroad than if it comes from a migrant who has returned. This 
finding fully contrasts with the expectations to which rational choice theory points. 
Mexicans’ anti-Americanism also leads individual non-migrants to 
overcome the cognitive propensity to embrace the most available and 
representative foreign models as bounded rationality would predict. Bounded 
rationality suggests that Mexicans should embrace, first and foremost, the ideas 
of their immediate and powerful northern neighbor. The U.S. has a public 
infrastructure and democracy that most Mexicans envy. The foreign country that 
most ordinary Mexicans know about is the U.S. Migrants—particularly 
returnees—should uniformly strengthen the likelihood that Mexicans emulate 
U.S.-style beliefs and behaviors by introducing them in a very personal manner 
into millions of Mexican households. Surprisingly this study finds no evidence for 
that argument. To the contrary Chapter 3 shows that of the two diffusion paths I 
examine, face-to-face communication between returnees—insiders—and non-
migrants, within non-migrants’ own homes are least likely to produce change. 
That a political practice or belief is common in the U.S. seems to instead 
trigger an affect, rather than cognitive heuristic. According to Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters and MacGregor (2007), affect becomes a significant causal force when 
“images, marked by positive and negative affective feelings, guide judgment and 
decision making” (p. 1335). Affect heuristics, they claim, involve “tagging” 
representations of objects in people’s minds with varying degrees of negative or 
positive affective feelings. “Just as imaginability, memorability, and similarity 
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serve as cues for probability judgments (e.g., the availability and 
representativeness heuristics), affect may serve as a cue for many important 
judgments” (p. 1336). Mexicans appear to “tag” the U.S. with revulsion and 
desire at the same time. Similarly, they feel empathy and respect for migrants 
who are in the U.S., while they tag returnees with disparagement. When 
individuals use affect heuristics, they employ even less thinking and critical 
analysis than they do when they use cognitive heuristics; affect heuristics are the 
shortest of shortcuts—gut reactions, so to speak.  
Constructivism and theories that stress the role of affect in decision-
making are closely related. However, affect is highly individualized, whereas for 
constructivists “the most important ideational factors are widely shared or 
“intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals” (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 2001, p. 392-393). Mexicans’ attitudes towards the U.S. are affective, 
but by and large it is not their personal experiences with the U.S. or with migrants 
who move between the two countries that drive their responses to the ideas that 
migrants transmit. The anti-Americanism that underpins their mixed receptivity is 
more of a national norm with deep historical roots than an individual feeling. I 
therefore consider a constructivism to provide a useful theoretical approach for 
understanding how migrants contribute to the international diffusion of 
democratic citizenship. 
Nonetheless, my argument differs from the dominant constructivist 
approach to international diffusion in several respects. First, the theory I propose 
does not depict international beliefs and behaviors flowing automatically and 
unidirectionally from more to less advanced democracies. That is, I break with 
the notion that “hierarchies in global networks of communication” such as global 
North versus global South, or East and West (Risse, 2007) fundamentally 
structure the flow of ideas. Actors in states that are relatively weak, poor, or less 
democratic can also shape diffusion outcomes; they are not simply at the behest 
of international ideational and normative forces that flow from “above”. 
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Furthermore, I find that state boundaries “matter”; concretely, when foreign 
political ideas or migrant transmitters cross state borders, non-migrants’ 
perceptions of their meanings and values change. This finding is particularly 
interesting because it indicates that mass publics “enforce” international borders 
by stressing their symbolic significance. A growing number of constructivist 
scholars concur that the hands of state leaders are not tied as a result of the 
pressure of international norms and policy prescriptions, even though the 
prevailing view is that the global movement of ideas, people, goods and capital is 
erasing nation-state boundaries. Still, among even among the former group of 
constructivists, the prevailing view is that state actors seek to enforce state 
sovereignty because they have at their disposal various instruments of the state 
such as policy making power and control of the use of force, while actors at the 
level of mass publics increasingly seek to transcend state boundaries. My 
research shows that citizens also reify state boundaries; popular perceptions and 
shared understandings of both foreign states and their state’s position vis-a-vis 
other states infuses the border with meanings that significantly shape the cross-
border movement of ideas. Their role in asserting state sovereignty is fully 
independent of government efforts to this end.  
For these reasons I embrace constructivism, but advance a unique version 
of the approach that downplays the unidirectional movement of policies from 
entities that are higher in the international hierarchy to those that are lower, or 
from the systemic level to the local. The constructivist argument I advance here 
stresses the power of local beliefs against the regionally dominant foreign 
practices and ideas. It also shows that the ideas about the vector of diffusion 
itself, or concerning the nation-state origins of an object of diffusion, are as 
important as intersubjective beliefs about the object of diffusion.   
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6.2 International Democratic Diffusion at the Level  of Mass Publics  
Prior research on democratic diffusion has focused on evaluating the 
proposition that democratic transitions spread like a contagious disease among 
neighboring countries. Based on national indicators of democracy, such as 
whether a country has experienced a transition to democracy, scholars have 
found support for the hypothesis that the emergence (or presence) of a 
democracy in a region of the world increases the probability that other countries 
in the region will also become (or remain) democratic. This project considers the 
theoretical implications of this finding on another aspect of democracy—
democratic civic engagement. Furthermore, it focuses on individuals at the level 
of mass publics as vectors of diffusion.  
One of the core theoretical contributions of this dissertation is therefore to 
shed light on the conditions under which individuals at the level of mass publics 
contribute to the diffusion of democracy. Given the extent to which transportation 
and technology have made trans-state social transactions accessible to an 
increasingly wide range of publics (i.e., they are no longer the exclusive realm of 
elites), exploring whether and how prosaic social transactions that span 
international borders contribute to spreading political information is empirically 
and theoretically valuable. For this purpose, migrants represent a specific kind of 
actor at the level of mass publics from which we can make wider inferences. 
Although migrants have some unique properties, I uncover some theoretical 
findings that may apply to actors other than migrants who engage in trans-state 
social transactions such as business professionals, exchange students, and 
people in different countries who interact through the Internet.  
My research suggests that individuals at the level of mass publics may 
follow a distinct pattern in determining whether or not they accept and embrace 
innovations that issue from a foreign country. The reason is that international 
borders do more than enclose geographic units; they also contain identities and 
constitute relations between states.  
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Chapter 2 explains that there is no constructivist theory of social learning, 
as such; the approach has not been employed at the level of mass publics. The 
chapter argued that structural equivalence models of social learning nonetheless 
contain many of the same ideas that constructivists advance. According to the 
structural equivalence model of social learning, people are likely to accept the 
practices they observe among individuals who belong to the same “moral 
reference group”, a group for which the adopter has deep admiration, or a group 
to which the individual thinks he ought to belong.29 In this case, the border 
structures non-migrants’ understandings of whether a migrant is a member of the 
American political community that they both admire and loathe. When migrants 
are located north of the border, they belong to a group with which non-migrants 
would like to be associated. When migrants cross the border back into south are 
no longer considered members of the U.S.; even worse, returnees are no longer 
considered part of the same “moral reference group” as their non-migrant co-
nationals, because returnees change as a result of having lived in the U.S. 
With respect to international diffusion by individuals at the level of mass 
publics in general, my research has two implications. First, it suggests that the 
borders will structure any type of political learning that occurs via trans-state 
social transactions. Actors must bridge these borders in order to engage in 
international social transactions. If a border encloses a nation-state that engages 
in actions or produces outcomes (or hold beliefs) that an individual believes 
conform to the ideals of his own community, then information flowing from across 
that border will strongly influence the individual in question. When the information 
flows from within the borders that enclose the country to which the receiver 
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already belongs (even if the source of information is itself is foreign), then 
domestic social structures, such as race and ethnicity, religion, and class will 
prevail in shaping an individuals’ receptivity to foreign ideas and information. 
It is easy to see how this theory is closely linked to my findings that long-
distance transmission facilitates localization, whereas face-to-face transmission 
in the recipient’s own territory can make localization challenging. Recipients can 
choose and implement as they see fit the ideas they receive through long-
distance cross-border communication. On the other hand, when receivers and 
transmitters are within the same country, they must work around any local norms 
that may affect relations between the transmitter and the receiver. Additionally, 
the transmitter will inevitably have in mind how the object of diffusion operates 
outside of that country or how it should operate in theory; while the receiver will 
tend to lament the transmitters’ poor understanding of local conditions as well as 
his attachment to the foreign country.   
In sum in the case of mass publics, diffusion does not simply erase 
international borders; rather, international borders fundamentally constitute and 
structure the diffusion process. 
6.3 Implications for Mexico 
The significance and implications of this dissertation for Mexico are as 
ambiguous as Mexicans’ sentiments toward the U.S. The transmission by 
migrants who live in the U.S. of information concerning American political 
behavioral dispositions contributes to strengthening civic engagement; however, 
the fact that this positive outcome requires citizens to leave their country is 
nothing to celebrate. Additionally, the finding that non-migrants fail to support 
returnees suggests that migration could potentially weaken the quality of 
democracy in some communities to which migrants return. Finally, my findings do 
not bode well for proponents of a more deeply integrated North America. My 
findings are based on a national-level analysis in contrast to studies that focus on 
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how migrants who are very active in their home country or community of origin 
are affecting change in one or a few local communities within Mexico. Possibly 
for this reason, the conclusions I draw concerning migrants’ effects on civic 
engagement in Mexico are less sanguine. 
6.3.1 Implications for Mexican Democracy 
As we saw in Chapter 3, there is a need for greater civic engagement 
within Mexico. The finding that communication between non-migrants and their 
friends and family abroad enhances civic engagement is therefore encouraging. 
This pathway for diffusion is the most widespread in Mexico. More Mexicans 
have a family member or close friend in the U.S. than have close relationships 
with returnees. Long-distance cross-border communication may thus significantly 
and positively affect democratic citizenship all over Mexico. Specifically, migrants 
abroad could contribute to strengthening individual non-electoral participation, 
voting turnout, participation in organized protest and participation in 
organizations. Though long-distance cross-border communication does not 
strongly affect attitudes, the evidence suggests that this type of link could make 
non-migrants more critical of their own democracy and increase their political 
efficacy as well. 
On the other hand, that the departure of hundreds of thousands of 
migrants from their country of origin contributes to enhancing civic engagement 
in Mexico is troubling. It is not an outcome around which coherent and 
normatively acceptable policy prescriptions can be easily developed. Policies to 
encourage Mexico-U.S. migration would not be well received in either the U.S. or 
Mexico.30 However, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental 
                                            
30Some may consider government policies that support the exportation of a country’s nationals 
normatively unacceptable. However, the idea underlies the development community recent 
emphasis on employing remittances as a development tool. Insofar as international financial 
organizations such as the World Band and the Inter-American Development Bank support a 
growing number of development programs that rely on migrant remittances, exporting migration 
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organizations (NGOs), and perhaps even U.S. government agencies could 
contribute to strengthening migrants’ democratic experiences in the U.S., while 
simultaneously providing more opportunities for migrants to share them with non-
migrants via long-distance cross-border communication. IOs, NGOs, and U.S. 
and Mexican government agencies could also help return migrants improve their 
advocacy skills so that fewer quit their new political behaviors when they confront 
the “soft” constraints that exist at home. 
 Although the findings clearly show that return migrants do not strengthen 
civic engagement, they do not unambiguously point to a decline in political 
participation as a result of migrant returns. A null finding is certainly preferable in 
this case. At the same time, however, Mexicans’ habitual rejection of the 
innovations that returnees import is disconcerting. The finding signifies that non-
migrants discriminate politically against a specific group of actors. Such 
intolerance does not contribute to strengthening democracy. My qualitative 
research pointed to the possibility that return migrants in such communities 
withdraw from public life as a result of their frustration. This is undesirable insofar 
as it signifies that the interests of a specific group may be underrepresented and 
because it points to emerging social divisions in Mexico—particularly in those 
communities to which many migrants return, but not enough to change the 
dominant social beliefs towards returnees. Above all, the prejudiced attitudes of 
Mexican non-migrants clearly prevent them from making rational choices that are 
in their best interests.  
Significantly, Mexican attitudes towards the U.S. have improved. The 
growing intensity of regional integration and the concomitant expansion in the 
range of cultural, economic, political, and educational exchanges between 
                                                                                                                                  
has implicitly become a normatively acceptable strategy for seeking domestic improvement. 
Migration policy in the Philippines has institutionalized the exportation of labor since the 1970s; 




Mexico and the U.S. has brought Mexican beliefs about the U.S. more in sync 
with reality (Beltrán, 2001; Gonzalez & Minushkin, 2006, Inglehart et al., 1996).  
But studies also demonstrate that anti-American attitudes condition Mexicans’ 
openness to further integration (Davis & Bartilow, 2007; Kocher & Minushkin, 
2007). Furthermore, some scholars claim that government discourse concerning 
the U.S., the Mexico-U.S. relationship and emigration to the U.S. has in the past 
caused variation in the level and specific focus of Mexican anti-Americanism 
(Beltrán, 2001; Krauze, 2005). During the 2000-2006 presidency of Vicente Fox, 
for example, the Mexican federal government worked to transform government 
discourse with respect to both the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico migration. The effort fell 
flat following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when Mexico lost its 
status as a priority for U.S. foreign policy. 
U.S. and Mexican governments could design programs and policies that 
further contribute to breaking down Mexican’s deeply rooted anti-Americanism, 
by fostering more cross-border exchanges and by changing their discourse. 
Additionally, both government and non-government actors could work actively to 
reintegrate return migrants into the society and economy of the country of origin.  
6.3.2 Implications for Regional Convergence 
Scholars have argued that regional economic integration and cultural 
convergence (including the convergence of political beliefs and behaviors) go 
hand in hand. One aspect of this argument that scholars rarely attempt to 
validate concerns how the movement of people across international borders 
impacts convergence. This is surprising since a rise in the cross-border 
movement of people is, of course, one consequence of regional integration. 
Moreover, if the hypothesis is that the international movement of goods, capital, 
music, and media products leads to cultural convergence, then we should expect 
this to be all the more true in the case of the international movement of living 
human beings capable of engaging in deliberative discussions.  
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In the case of the U.S. and Mexico, there is tremendous asymmetry 
between the political and economic power of the two countries. Most Mexicans 
will probably agree that they would love for Mexico to have a democracy like the 
U.S. and for the Mexican economy to produce as much wealth as its northern 
neighbor; the same cannot be said with respect to Americans’ views of Mexico. 
Additionally, the U.S. figures intensely in the thoughts and lives of most Mexican 
routinely, whereas most Americans do not think much about Mexico. We would 
therefore expect convergence to occur as a result of political changes that flow 
into Mexico from the U.S., consistent with diffusion. 
The timeframe for my study comes nearly fifteen years after the 
implementation of NAFTA and corresponds with a 50 percent increase in the rate 
of emigration from Mexico between 2000 and 2008. Nonetheless, I find that 
Mexican beliefs about the U.S. and their attitudes towards migrants represent an 
important barrier to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. This is in 
contrast to the predictions of Mexican scholars like Soledad Loaeza, who claimed 
that Mexico’s reorientation towards an open, export oriented economy would 
transform Mexican nationalism by forcing Mexican citizens to reconsider the anti-
American aspects of their nationalism (Loaeza, 1994). This projection has not 
come to pass. In fact, Mexican politicians such as 2006 presidential candidate, 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, have aptly revived anti-American discourse to 
motivate millions of Mexican voters who are disappointed by the outcomes that 
neoliberal economic restructuring have produced.  
This conclusion does not mean that some convergence is not underway. 
Indeed, although there is good reason to expect that American political ways 
would grip Mexicans, and not vice versa, the presence of about 11.5 million 
foreign-born Mexicans in the U.S. also has the potential to transform American 
political beliefs and behaviors. It is therefore possible that the ways in which 
Americans and Mexicans engage civically are becoming more similar. 
Nonetheless, the process appears to be more subtle and complex than 
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unidirectional diffusion would suggest. In sum, that the political ideas and 
behavioral dispositions of Americans do not overwhelmingly flow south into 
Mexico via migrants is surprising because it challenges the conventional wisdom 
that NAFTA would lead to cultural convergence—meaning that it would cause 
Mexican political beliefs and behaviors to become more like those of Americans.  
It means that the hands of even the weakest actors—ordinary people living in 
Mexico—are not tied by international forces; they have not lost control over their 
local environment to the forces of globalization. 
6.3.3 Methodological Contribution 
Most of the research on the political effects of migration in Mexico has 
utilized the case study method to examine exceptional political events involving 
migrants. The scholarship tends to focus on cases where migrants have 
effectively modified local politics by running for elected office; working through 
hometown associations to provide public goods that the government would 
normally provide; or working on behalf of transnational NGOs to push for 
expatriate suffrage. For example, Bakker and Smith (2003) explore the political 
candidacy of Andrés Bermúdez for mayor of Jerez, Zacatecas to explore the 
extent to which migrants are transforming Mexican politics by creating 
opportunities for migrants to vote and compete for office in their home country’s 
elections; they focus on how that specific campaign has contributed to Mexico’s 
broader democratization process. Their detailed ethnographic account 
significantly deepens our understanding of the ways in which a relatively small 
number of migrants with an interest in purposefully and actively transforming their 
community operate, including how their activities are conditioned by state policies 
and how the state has responded to their initiatives.  
Bakker and Smith form part of a large tradition of studies concerning 
transnational migration that explores what motivates migrants to be politically 
active in their home countries, how transnational migrants draw on both U.S. and 
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Mexican resources, and the extent to which they are modifying both the local 
economic landscape and political processes (Fitzgerald, 2004; Goldring, 2003; 
Rivera-Salgado, 2001; Smith, M.P. 2003; Smith, R.C., 1994 and 2006). But 
despite their significant contributions, such studies do not help us understand the 
extent to which the cases they examine are representative of migration’s effects 
throughout Mexico.31 Furthermore, they do not account for the effects of the more 
prosaic activities of “ordinary” migrants, whose political interests and involvement 
in home country politics is significantly less intense than that of active migrant 
leaders.  
My project aims to uncover the effects of the more common and 
widespread ways in which migrants engage their home country politics. It 
focuses on non-purposive social transactions between migrants and non-
migrants. By evaluating the most widespread and consistent type of social 
transactions between return migrants and migrants in the U.S., on one hand, and 
non-migrants located all over Mexico, on the other, I offer a unique, more 
nationally representative assessment of how migration is contributing the 
Mexico’s ongoing democratization process. 
6.4 Future Research 
Numerous aspects of the research question that motivates this project 
have yet to be addressed. Additionally, the results of the project raise many new 
questions. This section proposes two areas for future research. These involve 
testing various theoretical implications of my new theory of migrant-led 
international diffusion both within Mexico and internationally in order to verify its 
validity.  
To further the within-case analysis, a next step is to explore in greater 
depth the possibility that localities with a long and sustained tradition of migration 
                                            
31 For example, multiple studies focus on the state of Zacatecas, where an exceptional 72 percent 
of municipalities have a high or very high migration intensity index 
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respond to the ideas that both returnees and U.S.-based migrants transmit in a 
different manner. The reason is that anti-Americanism is probably weaker in 
traditional migrant sending regions with historic ties to the U.S. than in areas 
where emigration is a newer and more sporadic phenomenon (Bakker & Smith, 
2003). We should find that attitudes towards migrants in such localities are more 
consistently positive; that is, we should not observe same lack of support for 
return migrants as we do on average nationally. If attitudes towards the U.S., 
Mexico’s relation with the U.S., and migration’s role in that bilateral relationship 
are not so ambivalent, then non-migrants in such regions could be less likely to 
make rationally inconsistent decisions regarding whether to adopt or reject the 
American political beliefs and behaviors that migrants transmit. 
Additionally, if return migration is common enough that returnees 
constitute a critical mass of the local population, then the portion of the 
population whose views towards the U.S. have been directly impacted by an 
experience abroad would be significant. In this context we can expect returnees 
to support one another’s efforts to strengthening democratic civic engagement in 
their community. As this process effectively brings about better political 
processes and outcomes, it could contribute to changing the non-migrants beliefs 
about returnees and the political innovations they transmit. Moreover, the 
process should weaken migrant and non-migrants’ perceptions of the host 
country as a place where certain forms of democratic civic engagement are 
uniquely possible. Research within Mexico confirming these propositions would 
represent significant support for my theory, by validating one of its key theoretical 
implications.   
Another important area for future research will be to validate the theory of 
migrant-led international diffusion that this dissertation advances by determining 
whether its theoretical implications also hold in other parts of the world. 
In theory, the findings uncovered by research designs that employ the 
“critical case” selection method should help us to understand the broader 
  
206 
universe of similar cases. Chapter 1 explains that I selected the case of U.S.-
Mexico migration precisely because of it represents the most likely case for 
observing international diffusion via migrants. Skeptics may counter that Mexico-
U.S. migration and the bilateral relationship in which it is embedded is sui 
generis, and that I should circumscribe my claims concerning its external validity. 
Migration from Mexico is unique in one important respect: nearly all emigrants 
move to the United States. The concentration of Mexicans in a single country 
makes it easier to consider the aggregate impact of migrant-led international 
diffusion. In countries where migrants flow in comparable numbers to various 
countries, assessing the aggregate effect of migrant-driven diffusion on domestic 
politics may be more complicated; migration to some countries may have a 
uniformly positive effect, while the diffusion effects of migration to others may be 
more diverse. Other than this exception, the Mexican case provides useful 
insights into how migrants may contribute to diffusing political beliefs and 
behaviors from their more democratic host country to their less democratic home 
countries in cases from various regions in the world. Confirming the external 
validity of this study is nonetheless important. I propose three comparative cases 
in the following paragraphs.  
The diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors that Moroccan migrants to 
France and Spain—the two leading destination countries for migrants from 
Morocco—transmit into their country of origin should conform to the theoretical 
framework I offer in this dissertation. In both places, the foundations are in place 
for diffusion to occur, since emigrants travel from a less to more democratic 
countries where they can learn new forms of civic engagement; there is strong 
demand for greater democratization in Morocco (Jamal & Tessler, 2008); and 
both return migration and cross-border communication are prevalent. However, 
Moroccan attitudes toward France and Spain are ambivalent, particularly their 
sentiments about the migration of their co-nationals to the two countries. A 
comparative study of migrant-led democratic diffusion involving both Mexico-U.S. 
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and Moroccan-Spain/France migration would employ the most different systems 
design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970) or J.S. Mill’s (1843) method of agreement. 
This research method compares countries that differ in most respects, but are 
similar in terms of the key explanatory factors. Comparing these two sets of 
migration corridors would be valuable not only because of the similarities they 
share, but because of their differences as well (e.g., geographic region, 
immigration policy in receiving countries, culture of the home country, etc.). 
Furthermore exploring Moroccan migration across the Mediterranean has 
important policy-relevance in contemporary Europe. 
Though attitudes about France in the Muslim world have improved over 
the last decade, Moroccan attitudes towards the country remain ambiguous. On 
one hand, France is Morocco’s main trading partner; French is widely spoken 
and taught in schools; and many Moroccans consider that emulating French 
styles and habits indicates modernity. On the other, Islamists resent France’s 
unshakeable influence on their country and believe that Morocco should reorient 
itself east and south. Similarly, critics argue that their countries historical ties to 
France have kept it from having a clearly defined position within the African 
continent, particularly in the Maghreb. Ironically, older Moroccans hold favorable 
views towards that country, while the sentiments of Moroccan youth tend to be 
hostile (Furia & Lucas, 2008). Similarly, though Morocco and Spain consider 
themselves allies, they appear to be of two minds with respect to one another. 
Concretely, bilateral relations between the two countries are privileged for 
geographic and historical reasons; yet the border is a focal point for 
contemporary disagreements related both to migration and unresolved territorial 
claims.  
Moroccan attitudes towards emigrants who move to both countries are 
equivocal, and depend largely on whether migrants have returned home or 
remain abroad. When migrants are abroad, they are seen as victims of rising 
anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly following September 11, 2001 and the 2004 
  
208 
terrorist attacks in Madrid. Concern and empathy for migrants also rises in light of 
the tremendous risks that migrants undertake to arrive in Europe. According to 
Human Rights Watch, an estimated 10,000 Moroccans have died in their effort to 
cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe during the past ten years. At the same 
time, migration is seen as an opportunity. Remittances accounted for nearly 10 
percent of the country’s GDP in 2006 (Ratha & Xu, 2008), helping to keep the 
balance of payments stable and contributing significantly to the welfare millions 
of poor families (De Haas, 2005). Additionally, the vast majority of Moroccan 
youth would like to move to Europe, at least in part to experience western culture 
(Alami, 2002). 
When Moroccan migrants return, non-migrants’ perception of them 
changes. Because migrants reenter their home country after having lived in 
countries where respect for civil liberties, including freedoms of speech and 
assembly, are robust, they struggle to adapt to the social context of their country 
of origin. Moreover, even now that the Moroccan government’s respect for civil 
liberties has improved, the local population may consider associating with return 
migrants—particularly those who share their new ideas about democratic civic 
engagement—to be a liability. De Haas (2005) notes that until the 1990s, the 
Moroccan government attempted to discourage its migrants living in Europe from 
integrating into their receiving countries. He writes that: 
Through Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and state-created 
offices for migrants, Moroccan migrants were actively discouraged from 
establishing independent organizations and joining trade unions or political 
parties. The Moroccan government also prevented migrants from 
organizing themselves politically and, as such from forming an opposition 
force from abroad. During the 1970s and 1980s, it was not unusual for 
political troublemakers who lived in Europe to be harassed while visiting 
family and friends in Morocco (2005, p. 6).  
The government has since endeavored to reconcile its relationship with 
migrants by engaging in them in a more supportive manner. However, the 
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perception that return migrants are troublemakers with whom non-migrants 
should associate with caution probably prevails. 
 Attitudes towards France and Spain as well as to migration from Morocco 
to those countries are ambivalent in much the same way that attitudes about the 
U.S. and emigration to that country are in Mexico. We can therefore anticipate 
that political beliefs and behaviors that Moroccan migrants to France and Spain 
diffuse into their home country to be better received when migrants transmit them 
from abroad, while facing obstacles when they enter by returns. The process and 
outcomes should be similar to those observed in Mexico. 
Another case that would permit us to employ the most different systems 
design involves emigration from South Korea to the U.S. This migration corridor 
is also embedded in the complex love-hate type of bilateral state-to-state 
relationships that I have described.  
The U.S. is the top destination country for South Korean emigrants. 
Chung-in Moon (2005) argues that South Koreans’ attitudes toward the U.S. 
oscillate between “banmi” (anti-Americanism) and “sungmi” (worship of the 
United States). He writes that:  
many South Koreans show a very strong pro-American attitude in person, 
but in public or in a group tend to switch to an anti-American tone. An 
interview with a forty-two-year-old housewife who participated in the 
candlelight protest over the death of two middle school girls underscored 
the essence of ambivalence embedded in contemporary [Korean] anti-
Americanism, “Although I attended the candlelight protest, do not consider 
myself anti-American…My greatest concern is how to improve English 
proficiency of my son, 9th grade student, and my daughter, 6th grade. If 
possible, I wish I can send them to the U.S. for an early education” (p. 
144).  
As we can see from this case, the possibility of emigrating to the U.S. partially 
constitutes the complex attitudes that Koreans have towards the country.  
This is manifest in the Korean government’s migration policies as well.  
There is evidence that sentiments towards the U.S. are negative. For example, a 
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2002 Gallup poll found that 54 percent of Koreans either dislike the U.S. 
somewhat or dislike it very much (Watts, 2005).  And a recent survey of rising 
leaders indicates that Korean politicians mostly mistrust the U.S. (Watts, 2005). 
Sources of anti-Americanism include: excessive dependency on the U.S., U.S. 
military presence on Korean Territory; U.S. interventionism in Korea’s internal 
affairs; and differences with respect to how best to handle North Korea (Moon, 
2005; Watts, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the Korean government has implemented policies that aim to 
lure “home” ethnic Korean-Americans, meaning the U.S.-born sons and 
daughters of Koreans who emigrated to the U.S. For instance the “Act on the 
Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans”, which states the degree to 
which ethnic Koreans can return to Korea and enjoy the full benefits of citizens, 
offers to Korean Americans nearly full citizenship in their country (Seol & 
Skrentny, 2009). The paradox is striking. The government grants to Koreans in 
the country whose presence and interference in their country they resent the 
highest level of citizenship status accorded to foreigners. International borders 
structure this courtship. The presence of a co-national within the borders of 
another country may make that individual more attractive; making such 
individuals part of one’s own in-group represents a strategy for accessing the 
resources of that country or the ideals to which countries of origin aspire.  
Empirical studies concerning South Koreans’ attitudes towards return 
migrants are not available. However, the government’s courtship appears to be 
motivated by an interest in accessing the economic wealth that Korean 
Americans can generate. Put differently, such policies aim to link Korea to the 
opportunities that Korean Americans have in the U.S. But these opportunities are 
in large part bounded by U.S. borders. When people move, they bring with them 
their productive skills, but they do not bring home the institutional context that 
supported their work. Korea’s policy towards Korean-Americans may be 
strategic, but it portends frustration, if not disappointment on the part of both 
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returnees and non-migrants. The former may be surprised that home is not 
“home”; while the latter may be disappointed if their kin in the U.S. do not 
reproduce that countries wealth and progress in Korea, or if they contribute to 
importing the aspects of American culture that Koreans perceive as degenerate. 
Again the diffusion process and outcome should be similar to that observed in 
Mexico. 
There is also a need to explore other cases in which both the relationship 
between the sending and receiving country and attitudes towards emigration 
differ from the Mexican case. One case that would allow us to follow Mill’s 
method of difference involves Philippine-U.S. migration. Philippino popular 
opinion of the U.S. is among the highest in the world. Moreover, over the past 30 
years, that country’s government has institutionalized emigration, making it a 
pillar of its economy and creating a national “culture of migration” (Asis, 2006). 
The Philippino state supports the emigration of labor by placing workers in jobs 
and helping them to obtain visas; education (particularly higher education) 
throughout the country is largely oriented toward training Philippinos to fill skilled 
jobs for which empirical studies indicate there is demand; remittances are an 
explicit component of the country’s fiscal policy. Most importantly, the 
government takes responsibility for helping migrants to reintegrate into their 
country of origin once they return.  
Phillipino state institutions actively work to weaken the significance of the 
border surrounding the islands. The state thus contributes to diminishing the 
belief among both migrants and those who stay behind that their home country 
and migrants’ host countries are antagonists. Migrants are positively perceived 
regardless of where they are located. We should therefore observe that the 
political beliefs and behavioral dispositions that migrants transmit to non-migrants 
from the more democratic host countries to which they move have a positive and 
significant impact on democratic citizenship at home. 
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These are just some examples of comparative studies that can help us to 
confirm or invalidate the theory I develop based on the case of U.S.-Mexico 
migration. Other examples could include Polish migration to Germany, Pakistani 
migration to the United Kingdom, and Nicaraguan migration to the U.S.  The 
theory should hold in a large number of cases of voluntary economic migration 
from less to more democratic countries.  
The reason this generalization is possible is that one or another of two 
patterns characterize economic migration from less to more democratic 
countries. First, a great deal of this type of migration occurs between neighboring 
countries, where the border is often politically charged and a focal point for 
bilateral relations; such borders often represent a symbolic barrier separating 
hope from frustration. Alternatively, economic migrants often move to countries 
with which their own country has legacy of asymmetrical power relationships. 
Such migrant producing countries have usually been diffident before the 
countries that receive most of their migrants.  
At the same time, these comparative cases can also help us identify gaps 
in my new theory and draw out and test its implications. For example the within 
case analysis I suggest concerning high versus low migrant producing 
communities in Mexico, as well as the comparative analysis involving the 
Philippines, point to ways in which domestic views towards migrant receiving 
countries can change. Furthermore, each of the comparative cases allows us to 
explore the role of the state in helping to shape attitudes towards migrant 
receiving countries and migrants themselves. 
Researchers should be cautious not to reinterpret the shared beliefs of 
citizens in each case to fit the theory. This can be a problem with all research 
that employs an approach that, like constructivism, emphasizes the causal 
importance of intersubjective beliefs or norms. In this case scholars run a great 
risk falling into a “unfalsifiability trap”—so to speak—precisely because anti-
American (or anti-receiving country) attitudes are ambivalent and can thus be 
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interpreted in different ways. Comparative analysis demands that the sentiments 
of citizens towards migrants’ receiving countries be clearly documented through 
both popular opinion polls and a review of how that country is represented in 
literature, the news, political cartoons (see e.g., Morris 2001), and other cultural 
expressions.  
 This dissertation reveals that individuals at the level of mass publics 
contribute to a unique form of international democratic diffusion. It highlights the 
need to understand other dimensions of how political principles and practices 
spread from one country to another and suggests that the theoretical approaches 
that dominate the field are incomplete.  
Students should take seriously the fact that international diffusion, by 
definition, entails crossing state borders. This means that the study of diffusion 
should consider the meaning of borders carefully. What and who do the borders 
of two countries between which objects of diffusion move contain and exclude? 
What historical events contributed to defining the border that objects of diffusion 
must cross? To what extent is the border an important symbol for a nation’s 
citizens? Addressing these questions will inevitably lead scholars of diffusion to 
make peoples’ attitudes and sentiments towards borders, foreign countries, and 











Multilevel (Hierarchical) Models 
The sample design was three-stage.  The electoral section was the 
primary sampling unit, followed by households at the second stage and 
individuals at the third.  Sixty-five electoral sections (equivalent to a polling 
precinct in the U.S.) out of around 134,000 nationwide were selected at random.  
Within each section, ten households were selected and one individual was 
chosen in each household by the last birthday method.  Since data for the 
aggregate variables (including the Migration Intensity and Marginalization 
Indices) is only available at the municipal level, however, I matched each 
electoral section with a municipality, giving rise to a two-tiered, “nested” structure 
in which each individual (level one) belongs to one, and only one, municipality 
(level two).  The sample groups 650 Mexican citizens into 56 municipalities, 48 of 
which were represented by ten citizens drawn from a single “electoral section”. In 
seven municipalities, two electoral sections (20 citizens in all) had been selected 
into the sample and in one municipality, three electoral sections (30 citizens) 
were chosen. 
Given this data structure, I employed a multilevel (or hierarchical) 
regression model for each of the seven attitudinal and behavioral indicators that 
constitute the dependent variables.  Multilevel models correct standard errors 
sometimes understated by OLS regression. OLS assumes that each observation 
is independent and thus fails to account for the “spatial correlation” that often 
obtains when observations fall into geographical clusters.  Multilevel models also 
determine if, in addition to the variability that exists across individuals, there is 
also variability across municipalities.  These models allow us to test the 
hypothesis that unobserved, or unmodelled, aggregate-level factors contribute to 
variability in the substantive outcome I wish to explain.  The intraclass correlation 
coefficients measure variance across municipalities as a proportion of all 
variance (municipalities and individuals).  Denominated by “rho” in Table 3.5, 
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they lie between .007 and .178.  Higher coefficients are consistent with a 
“contagion” effect among inhabitants of a given municipality: merely residing in a 
place influences political attitudes and behaviors.   
Of the seven dependent variables, three (tolerance, satisfaction with 
democracy, and government respect for rights) are normally distributed and four 
(self-reports of voting in an election from 2000 to 2003, participation in organized 
protest, individual non-electoral participation, and participation in civic 
organizations) are binary.  Normally distributed dependent variables lead to the 
Hierarchical Linear Model and binary dependent variables, to the Hierarchical 
Logit Model.  I regressed each dependent variable, whether normal or binary, on 
the same independent variables.   
In the linear case the level-one equation, representing the effects of 













     (Eq. 1) 
where 
 ijy  is the value of the dependent variable for individual i in municipality j;   
j0β is the (conditional) intercept for municipality j when all individual-level 
covariates are 0;   
1β  through 7β  are population-averaged slopes (i.e., slopes averaged 
across all individuals in the sample) for the associated covariates;   
iju  is a disturbance term for individual i in municipality j; and 
the individual-level covariates are those already explained in Section 4.2, “Data 
and Methods.” (I did not use any kind of mean centering for either level-one or 
level-two variables).  
 The level-two model posits that the municipal intercept from the level-one 
model, j0β , is the sum of an overall intercept ( 00λ ), a municipality-specific 
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deviation from that intercept ( )0 jv , and the effects of aggregate-level variables.  
(Since the municipality-specific intercepts are assumed to follow a random 
distribution, usually the normal, multilevel models are sometimes called “random 















j0β is the conditional intercept for municipality j from Eq. 1;   
00γ  is the overall (conditional) intercept, when all municipal-level 
covariates are 0;   
01γ  through 04γ  are population-averaged slopes across all municipalities 
for the associated covariates;   
jv0  is a municipality-specific error term for municipality j; and  
the municipal-level covariates are those set forth above. 
 Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 yields the following combined, reduced form 



















 (Eq. 3) 
 Each of the seven models estimates only one random effect, the variance 
of the random municipal intercepts—that is, Var( jv0 ). At least 10 observations, 
and sometimes 20 or 30, are available to estimate each municipal-level intercept, 
and these intercepts’ variance is estimated across 56 municipalities.   
 For the four binary dependent variables, the combined model contains the 
same independent variables, but the dependent variables are constrained to lie 




Characteristics of Sample for In-depth Field Interv iews 
Table B-1. Return Migrants (31 respondents) 


















F 54 No 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M 31 No 0.8 1 1 0.8 0.75 0.67 
M 33 No 0.6 1 1 1 1 1 
M 27 Yes 0.4 0.25 0.25 1 0.75 0.33 
F 49 Yes 0.4 0.25 0.25 0.4 0.25 0.67 
M 42 Yes 0.6 0 0.5 0 0.25 0.33 
M 53 Yes 0.8 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.83 
M 29 Yes 0.6 0.5 0.25 0.8 0.25 0.83 
M 50 Yes 0.8 0.25 0.25 0.8 1 1 
M 41 Yes 0.8 0 0.25 0.8 0.25 1 
M 39 Yes 0.8 0.25 0.75 0.8 0.25 0.83 
M 25 Yes 0.4 0.25 0.25 1 0.75 1 
M 33 Yes 0 0 0.25 0.8 0 0.17 
M 40 Yes 0 0.25 0.5 1 0.25 0.67 
M 31 Yes 0 0.5 0.25 1 0.25 0.67 
M 35 No 0.6 0.5 1 0 0.75 0.33 
M 55 Yes 0.6 0 0.5 0.8 0.75 0.83 
M 59 No 1 1 1 1 1 0.83 
F 56 No 1 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.67 
F 39 No 0.8 1 1 1 1 0.67 
M 59 No 0.8 0.75 1 1 1 0.83 
M 43 Yes 0 0.25 0.75 1 0.5 0.83 
M 55 Yes 0 0 0.25 1 0.25 0.5 
M 39 Yes 0 0.25 0.25 0.8 0.25 0.67 
M 45 No 0 0.75 1 0.8 1 0.33 
M 32 No 0.8 0.75 1 1 1 0.33 
F 35 No 1 0.75 1 1 1 0.33 
M 32 Yes 0 0.25 0.75 0 0.75 0.67 
M 29 No 1 1 1 1 1 0.33 
M 39 Yes 0 .5 0.75 1 0.75 0 
M 31 Yes 0 0.5 0.75 0.4 0.25 0.67 
*Indicates that the individuals emigrated because of economic necessity. **These categories 
represent the fuzzy sets and scores described in Appendix C. 
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Table B-2. Characteristics of Interview Respondents :  








20 from urban municipalities 
(pop. >35,000 
 
27 from small, rural municipalities 
(pop. < 10,000) 
11 Female 9 Male 14 Female 13 Male 
Parent  3  3  4 3 
Spouse  3  0 7 1 
Friend  4  5  2 7 
Sibling  1  1  1 2 
 
 
Table B-3. Characteristics of Interview Respondents :  


































Among the top 












Among the top 






















Table C-1. Specification of Fuzzy Sets Drawn from Re turn Migrant Interviews 
 Criteria for Evaluating Membership  
Embraced U.S. 
Political Behaviors and 
Beliefs 
(7 value set) 
 
Full Membership, Score 1:   Reported adopting at least one of the following beliefs and one of the following behaviors and importing 
these into Mexico (in the case of behavior respondents should indicate that they engaged in new forms of action). 
 
Score .83:  Reported adopting and importing at least one political belief and one behavior other than those listed above. 
 
Score .67:  Reported embracing and importing either one new political belief or one new behavior. 
 
Score .5: Reported embracing new political beliefs and behaviors, but did not import either into Mexico. 
 
Score .33 : Reported adopting and importing new, more democratic beliefs or behaviors while simultaneously expressing strong anti-
democratic beliefs or claiming to engage in unequivocally undemocratic forms of political participation (respondent contradicts 
him or herself), or reports observing beliefs and behaviors that make politics and governance effective in U.S., but did not report 
embracing or adopting these. 
 
Score .17:  Claimed to embrace U.S. political beliefs and behaviors, but mostly stressed admiration for U.S. wealth and physical 
organization/cleanliness. 
 
Score 0:  Did not report learning, adopting, or importing any new political beliefs or behaviors 
Fluent English Speaker 
(5 value set) 
 
Full Membership, Score 1:  Speaks, reads, writes and understands both spoken and written English at a high school level. 
 
Score .75:  Understands spoken and written English at high school level, but communicates verbally or in writing with grammatical 
errors not typical of a U.S. educated person.   
 
Score .5: Speaks and understands enough spoken and written English to engage in day-to-day transactions with locals and to carry 
out job. 
 
Score .25:  Understands what Americans say to him in English at work and in necessary social transactions (e.g., on the bus, at a 
bank, at a health clinic). 
 
Score 0:  Does not speak or understand any English. 
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 Criteria for Evaluating Membership  
Regularly Interacted 
with Americans 
(5 value set) 
Full Membership, Score1: Interacted extensively, everyday, in English with American citizens for both work and social purposes, as 
well as to complete routine social and administrative transactions. 
 
Score .75:  Interacted extensively, every business day, in English with American citizens principally in the context of work and to 
conduct routine transactions.  
 
Score .5: Interacted extensively with Spanish speaking American citizens at work, but interacted with English-only speaking no more 
than necessary both at work and to complete administrative transactions. Most social transactions at work and at home were 
with fellow immigrants. 
 
Score .25:  Received orders from English-only speaking American citizens, and interacted with Americans as necessary to complete 
transactions. Nearly all social transactions both at work, socially, and to complete transactions conducted with fellow migrants, 
including more established legal permanent residents. 
 
Score 0:  No interaction with Americans at all. 
Documented Immigrant 
(6 value set) 
Full Membership, Score 1:  Entered the U.S. with legal documents and became citizen 
 
Score .8:  Entered the U.S. with legal documents to visit for tourism, study, or work (i.e., as a legal non-immigrant) and became a 
Legal Permanent Resident (LPR), or entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant and returned prior to expiration of permit. 
 
Score .6:  Entered the U.S. without legal documents, but then became citizen or LPR. 
 
Score .4:  Entered the U.S. with work permit and overstayed illegally to work; or, entered U.S. with tourist visa, but worked in U.S. 
during the duration of entry permit. Or entered U.S. on various occasions, most of the time with documents, but sometimes 
without. 
 
Score .2:  Entered the U.S. tourist visa, worked and stayed beyond the duration of the entry permit. 
 
Score 0:  Entered the U.S. without documents and left without adjusting status (while still illegal) 
Stayed Two Years or 
More 
(4 value set) 
Full Membership, Score 1: Stayed in the U.S. two continuous years of more. 
 
Score .8: Stayed in the U.S. a total of two years over several trips. 
 
Score .4: Stayed in the U.S. over a year. 
 
Score 0: Stayed in the U.S. less than a year. 
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 Criteria for Evaluating Membership  
Educated 
(5 value set) 
Full Membership, Score 1:  Some formal university education or more; or performs job that requires that college level of training; or 
can read and write and use a computer to find, organize and convey information, strong general knowledge and well- informed 
on current events. 
 
Score .75:  Some to all of high school, high school level technical training; or performs job that requires high school level education; 
or, reads and writes at high school level and actively uses either a computer, books, or newspapers and magazines to find 
information and has civic knowledge beyond that obtained locally through basic public education and day to day social and 
administrative transactions. 
 
Score.5:  Finished middle school, works in a semi-skilled trade (seamstress, cobbler, etc) in job that requires that level of training; or 
can capable of reading newspaper and can write as necessary to achieve personal and administrative needs, not computer 
literate, has basic civic knowledge and knowledge (and understanding) of local current events. 
 
Score .25:  Some primary or middle school; or can read basic materials and write to communicate basic personal messages to family 
and friends. Very little civic knowledge, knows about current events, but does not fully understanding them. 
 




Regressions Containing Dummy Variable “Lived in U.S.  2 Years or More”  
  
Table D-1. Multi-Level Logistic Regressions: Partic ipation  














Stayed 2 Years and Returned -0.578 -.743 -.223 -1.609 
  .817 .626 .805 0.64 
  (.480) (.235) (.775) 0.012 
Communicates with  .836 .465 .934 0.431 
Migrant Friends or Family .303 .290 .378 0.215 
  (.006) (.109) (.013) 0.045 
Municipal Migration .283 .031 .289 0.554 
 Intensity Index .301 .234 .273 0.241 
  (.348) (.895) (.290) 0.021 
Total Annual Remittances .009 -.011 .010 0.034 
(in thousands of pesos) .123 .011 .023 0.033 
 (.466) (.292) (.967) 0.144 
Media Access .824 .807 1.1 0.661 
  .325 .244 .414 0.208 
  (.011) (.001) (.008) 0.001 
Sex -.085 .004 .658 -0.221 
(Male = 1) 0.301 .280 .357 0.214 
  (.778) (.988) (.065) 0.303 
Age .012 .027 .022 .026 
  0.011 .01 .013 .008 
  (.274) (.005) (.076) (.001) 
Education -.003 .091 .045 .009 
(in years of schooling) .044 .040 .051 .031 
  (.951) (.023) (.381) (.779) 
Income .774 -.084 .000 .073 
(in thousands of pesos) .374 .126 .000 .101 
  (.038) (.506) (.806) (.465) 
Population of Municipality .007 -.004 -.002 -.002 
(in 10,000 inhabitants) .004 .003 .005 .003 
  (.053) (.182) (.743) (.527) 
Municipal marginalization  .261 .126 .410 .221 
  .245 .174 .217 0.183 
  (.287) (.471) (.060) (.227) 
Municipality borders U.S. .208 .544 .026 .884 
(dummy) .731 .527 .847 .587 
  (.776) (.302) (.976) (.132) 
Constant -3.71 .524 -4.57 -1.305 
  .766 .618 .916 .543 
  (.000) (.396) (.000) (.016) 
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N 616 566 614 559 
Log likelihood -191.39 -202.56 -129.46 -341 
Wald(12) 26.98 37.61 23.99 39.43 
Pr(X2) .008 .000 .024 .000 
Rho .186 .000 .057 .168 
**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; statistically significant at p<.10 level. Dark shaded square represents result that 





Table D-2. Multi-Level Linear Regressions: Beliefs 
(Cells contain parameters, SEs, and p-values) 
  
 Tolerance Satisfaction with Democracy 
Evaluation of Govt. 
Respect for Rights 
Stayed Two Years and Returned .141 -.220 -.758** 
 .130 .274 .234 
  (.279) (.423) (.001) 
Communicates with Migrant  .027 -.308** -.103 
Friends or Family .051 .108 .092 
  (.604) (.004) (.266) 
Municipal Migration Intensity Index .051 .075 .017 
  .059 .092 .077 
 (.386) (.414) (.822) 
Total Annual Remittances  .003 .000 -.006 
(in thousands of pesos) .003 .006 .005 
  (.218) (.970) (.233) 
Media Access .126** .164* -.053 
  .048 .101 .086 
  (.009) (.103) (.537) 
Sex -.077 .179* .133 
(Male = 1) .051 .107 .092 
  (.128) (.096) (.149) 
Age -.002 -.005 .002 
  .002 .004 .003 
  (.337) (.218) (.615) 
Education .023** -.002 -.018 
(in years of schooling) .007 .015 .013 
  (.002) (.906) (.183) 
Income .030 -.075 -.037 
(in thousands of pesos) .024 .049 .041 
  (.224) (.125) (.369) 
Population of Municipality .000 -.001 -.002** 
(in 10,000 inhabitants) .000 .001 .001 
  (.929) (.482) (.018) 
Municipal marginalization index -.052 -.138** -.063 
  .045 .071 .060 
  (.248) (.053) (.293) 
Municipality borders U.S.  -.085 .148 .108 
  .146 .217 .179 
  (.557) (.495) (.548) 
Constant 3.34 3.25 3.02 
  .126 .249 .211 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) 
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Table D-2. Multi-Level Linear Regressions: Beliefs 
(continued) 
   Tolerance Satisfaction with Democracy 
Evaluation of Govt. 
Respect for Rights 
N 566 566 566 
R2 .131 .038 .055 
Wald(12) 63.31 22.33 31.31 
Pr(X2) .000 .034 .002 
Rho .127 .016 .009 
**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; *statistically significant at p<.10 level. Dark shaded square represents 





Table E-1. Reasons Returnees did not Engage in  
New Forms of Political Behaviors 
 
Male, Medium city, 
High School, Age>40 
 
“People here don't respect the changes migrants sug gest, other 
migrants have money so they withdraw easily from th e community” 
 
Male, Small town, high 
school 
Age>40 (Two individuals) 
 
Office holder, behavior well established (weak evidence of learning). 
 
Male, Large city, Secondary 
School, Age>40 
 
Already very active (weak evidence of learning). 
Male, Large city, High 
School, Age<40 
 
“I don’t like to get involved…People get suspicious of your intentions. 
They say “now your back, now you think you have power” just because 
you were up there.”  
 
 
Female, Medium city, High 
School, Age>40 
 
“I haven’t been back very long. And I’m not from here. I don’t yet feel that 
I have a sense of what I can do in this community.” 
 
Male (4), Female (1), Large 
city, College, Age<40  
(Five individuals) 
 
No time/not interested in politics (weak evidence of learning in 2 of 5). 
 
Male, Small town/rural, 
College, Age>40 years 
 
Not interested (weak evidence of learning). 
 
Female, Small town/rural 
Grade School, Age>40  
 
“I would like to do something to help my community, but I wouldn’t know 






Characteristics of Interview Respondents: Migrants Living in the United 
States and Non-Migrants who Communicate with Migran ts in the U.S.  
  
Table F-1. Characteristics of Interview Respondents : Migrants in the U.S. 
(20 Respondents) 









M 28 4 years of 
university of more  
2 years Colorado Twice a year 2-3 times per 
week 
M 33 4 years of 
university of more 
9 years Colorado Once a year Weekly 
F 49 Grade School 20 years Colorado Not since 1992 Weekly 
M 29 4 years of 
university of more 
4 years Indiana Twice a year Weekly 
F 34 Grade School 14 years Colorado 3 times in 14 
years 
Never 
F 37 Secondary School 13 years Colorado Never 3 times per 
week 
F 30 4 years of 
university of more 
6 years Indiana Twice a year Every other 
day 
F 31 4 years of 
university of more 
8 months California 4 times year Daily 
F 24 Middle School 9 years Colorado Never Every two 
weeks 
F 34 4 years of 
university of more 
8 years Virginia Twice a year 3 or more 
times per 
week 
M 34 4 years of 
university of more 
9 years Rhode 
Island 
Twice a year 3 times per 
week 
M 45 4 years of 
university of more 
20 years Colorado Twice a year Weekly 
F 38 Technical High 
School 
11 years Colorado Not in 9 years Everyday 
F 34 Middle School 7 years Colorado Never Weekly 
F 47 4 years of 
university of more 
9 years Michigan Once a year Weekly 
M 50 Middle School 14 years Colorado Once a year Every month 
M 48 Grade School 18 years Colorado Once a year  Weekly 
M 26 Middle School 2 years New York Never Weekly 
M 60 Grade School 15 years New York Never Once a month 







Table F-2. Characteristics of Interview Respondents : Friends and Family 








6 from urban municipalities 
(pop. >35,000 
 
  4 from small, rural municipalities 
(pop. < 10,000) 
 Female Male Female Male 
Parent  2 1 2  
Spouse  1  1  
Friend   1 1  







Interview Protocols for In-depth Field Interviews 
 





1.  Sex:   1b. Age: 
2.  Occupation:                            
Does he/she currently hold a political/government position?  YES   NO.   
If YES, what position? 
 
3a. Education:  
4. Marital Status:  
5. What is your relationship with a migrant or migrants living in the U.S. or 
migrants who have returned from the U.S.? 
 
6. Where in the U.S. does/did the migrant you know reside? 
 
7.  When and why did that individual emigrate?   
 
 8.  Did the migrant cross with documents? YES NO 
 
9.  Is the migrant currently legally present in the U.S. (was the migrant legally 
present prior to returning?)? 
 
10.  How often do/did you speak with the migrant over the phone? 
 




12.  Have/did you visited the migrant in the U.S.? 
 
13. Do/did you engage in other forms of regular communication with a migrant or 
migrants living in the U.S.? 
 
14. What do you mainly talk about with your friends and family? Please write either the 
number one, two, three, four, or five next to the topics of conversation that you discuss 
with your family in order of importance. For example, if when you speak with your 
friends or family living in the U.S. you talk with them more than anything about the 
people’s health and wellbeing, then write a one (1) next to that response below. You 
should mark only five responses, each with a different number.  
 




MEXICAN ECONOMY  
 
 






YOUR JOB IN THE U.S. 
 
 
YOUR DAILY LIFE IN THE U.S. 
 
 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE MEXICO (for example, elections, local candidates, 
political parties, corruption and crime, public works, political conflicts, civic activities 
in which you or your interlocutor engage, labor union activities, etc.) 
 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES  
EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERLOCUTOR IN U.S.  
OTHER: DISCUSS  
  
15.  Do you feel mostly satisfied or mostly disappointed that your friend or family 




16. Has emigrating to the U.S. mostly benefitted or mostly harmed your friend or 
family member? Discuss. 
17. Has their decision to migrate mostly benefitted or mostly harmed you and/or 
your family? Discuss. 
 
18. What about the decision to return, did you feel mostly satisfied or mostly 
disappointed about your friend or family member’s decision to return? 
(Discuss beyond immediate response) 
 
19. Does the decision to return mostly benefit or mostly harm migrants in 
general? HARM   BENEFIT 
 Explain. 
 
19b. What about the migrant you know in particular? HARM   BENEFIT 
 Explain. 
 
20. Does the decision to return mostly harm or mostly benefit the families of 
migrants in general? HARM   BENEFIT 
 Explain. 
 
20b. What about in the case of your family? HARM BENEFIT 
 Explain. 
 
21.  How frequently do you interact with people who have returned permanently 
from the U.S.? Are they people close to you? 
 




23.  In what contexts do you engage migrants who have returned to Mexico? 
 
24.  Do migrants have difficulty adapting to life here when they return to Mexico? 
Or is it easy for them to adapt to life here when they return? DIFFICULT 
EASY Explain. 
 
25. Is it very difficult for people who do not leave Mexico to adapt to migrants 





26. What could return migrants do to adapt better in their hometowns when they 
return from the U.S.? 
 
27. Do you follow politics at all? If so what issues concern you? YES   NO  
Explain. 
 
28. Do you discuss these issues with migrants abroad?  YES   NO  
Explain. 
 
29.  Do you regularly participate in the life of your community or do you not 
participate much at all? YES   NO  
Explain. 
 
30.  Has the level and/or the specific ways in which you participate changed 
since your friend or family member emigrated? YES   NO  
Explain. 
 
31.  Has your role in your household and/or community changed since your 






32.  Do you participate more or less politically (civically) you were before your 
friend or family member left for the U.S./returned?  MORE LESS 
 How so?  Why? 
 AFTER OPEN ANSWER, THEN ASK ABOUT: 
 -voting 
 -protest 
 -membership in collective organizations 
 -signing petitions 
 -support for an electoral campaign 
 -running for office 
 -other 
  
33. Do you follow the news and local affairs more or less than you did before 
your family member left for the U.S./returned? MORE  LESS 
 Why? 
 
33b. Has the type of news that interests you remained the same or changed 
since your friend or family member emigrated to the U.S./returned?  
CHANGED   STAYED THE SAME 
 
34.  Do you have more or fewer responsibilities in your community than you did 
before your friend or family member left/returned?  MORE  LESS 
How so? Why? 
 
35.  What about other migrants who have returned.  Do they participate more or 
less than they did before they emigrated?  MORE  LESS 








37.  Are you more or less optimistic about the future of your community since 
your family member emigrated/returned? MORE   LESS 
Why? 
 
38. Would the community be better or worse off if more migrants returned from 




39. Would the community be better or worse off if more people emigrated to the 
U.S.? BETTER  WORSE 
 Why? 
 
40.  Are you more or less optimistic about the future of Mexico since your family 
member emigrated/returned?  MORE  LESS 
Why? 
41.  Do you consider migration beneficial or harmful to Mexico? Explain. 
BENEFICIAL   HARMFUL     
 Why? 
 
42. Do you think the government should create policies that help people migrate 
safely or policies that help prevent emigration? Explain. 
 
43.  Have you learned from migrants about life in the U.S.? YES NO 




44. Do you wish anything about Mexico were like the U.S.?  YES NO 
What and why? 
 
45.  Do you think it is possible or impossible for Mexico to be like the U.S. in 
these ways?  Explain. 
 
46. Have you discussed these beliefs (answers 37 and 38) with your friends and 
family here in the U.S./return migrants? YES NO 
 
47.  Have you taken action to make that possible? YES NO 
Why or why not? 
 
48. Do migrants living in the U.S. that you know take action to make this 
possible? YES NO 
Why or why not? 
49. What about returnees? Do they ake actions to make this type of change 
possible? YES NO 









1.  Sex:   1b. Age: 
2.  Occupation:                            
Does he/she currently hold a political/government position?  YES   NO.   
If YES, what position? 
 
3a. Education:  
3b. English language skills: 
4. Marital Status:  
5. How many times have you emigrated? 
 
6. Where did you go each time and how long did you stay? IF NOT U.S., then 
terminate interview. If YES U.S. then: 
DATES:_______________STATE:_______________ 
 
7.  Why did you emigrate?   
7b. If you emigrated more than one time, did you migrate for the same reason 
both times?  YES   NO.   
 
IF NO, then WHY? 
8.  Did you have work here in Mexico prior to emigrating?  YES   NO 
 
9.  What type of work did you have prior to emigrating? 
 
10.  Did you already know someone in the U.S. when you arrived?  YES  NO 
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 Please discuss. 
 
11.  Did you find employment in the U.S.?   YES     NO 
 
12.  What type(s) of employment? 
 
13.  When you were in the U.S., did you interact with non-Mexicans or Mexicans 
who have been there for a long time?    
 
YES Non Mexicans    
YES Mexicans who have been there a long time 
 
In what situations did you interact with these people?  
Was this interaction positive or negative? 
  
14.  Did you have documents or did you emigrate without documents?    
YES, what documents?________________________________ 
NO.  
 
15.  When you were in the U.S., in what contexts did you interact with American 




 -migrant club 
 -others? 
 
16. Did you regularly access any of the following types of institutions while you 




 -Public libraries 
 -Health care facilities 
 -Church 
 
17. Did you participate politically in the U.S.? YES NO 
 How so? Why? 
 
18. Did you participate in any of the following? 
 -voting 
 -marches 
 -signing a petition 
 -labor strike 
 -political campaign 
 -attend political meeting 
 -other 
 
19.  When you returned to Mexico, did you come straight home to this community 
or did you return to another locality within in Mexico? 
 
RETURNED TO THIS COMMUNITY 
RETURNED TO ANOTHER LOCATION IN MEXICO.  WHERE? 
 
 
20.  Why did you return? 
 Voluntarily 
  -savings 
  -couldn’t adapt 
  -didn’t find a job 
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  -didn’t like it 
  -family obligations 
 Deported involuntarily 
 
21.  Do you have children?  If your son or daughter decides to emigrate, will you 
encourage him/her or discourage him her.   
 ENCOURAGE   DISCOURAGE 
 
Why?  (If they say for the experience, then PROBE). 
 
 
22.  How were you received by your family when you returned to your 
hometown? Why? 
 
23.  How were you received by your friends when you returned to your 
community? Why? 
 
24.  How were you received by your community? Why? 
 
28. What was most difficult thing to adapt to when they returned? Why? 
 
29. Do you discuss your experience as a migrant with family members and 
people in your community?   YES  NO 
 
If YES, what do you talk to them about? 
 
27. What was your impression of your community when you returned?  
 
 





29.  Do you believe that your values or beliefs changed when you were in the 
U.S. or did you remain the same? How? 
 
30.  Did you adopt any new customs, habits, practices, in the U.S. or did you not 
adopt any customs? 
 
IF YES, Have you maintained these customs, habits, practices, since you 
returned or have you gone back to your old ways? 
 
 
31.  Are you more or less interested in the issues affecting your community since 
you returned from the U.S.?  Why? 
 
 
32.  Do you participate more or less in your community than you were before you 
left? 
 How so?  Why? 
 
 
33.  Do you have more or fewer responsibilities in your community than you did 
before you left? How so? Why? 
 
 
34.  What about other migrants who have returned.  Do they participate more or 
less than they did before they emigrated?   
 









36.  Are you more or less optimistic about the future of your community since you 




37. How would you characterize your experiences with U.S. authorities 
(government and/or employers)? 
 
Do you consider them more respectful, less respectful or equally respectful of 
you than Mexican authorities? 
 
38.  Are you more or less optimistic about the future of Mexico since you 
returned?  MORE  LESS 
Why? 




40. Do you think the government should create policies that help people migrate 






41.  Do you wish anything about Mexico were like the U.S.?  YES NO 
 
What and why? 
 
42.  Do you think it is possible for Mexico to be like the U.S. in these ways?  




43. Have you shared (answers 37 and 38) this with your friends and family here 
in Mexico? YES NO 
 
Why or why not? 
 
44.  Have you taken action to make that possible? YES NO 
Why or why not? 
 
45. Would you like to migrate again?  YES  NO 




Interview Protocol for Migrants Living in the Unite d States 







4.  English language proficiency (zero is no English language, 10 is perfect):   
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9            10 
 
 
5. Do you work outside the home? 
 
NO Part Time Full Time 
6. What type of employment do you have? 
 
7. In what year did you arrive in the U.S.? 
 
8. Since you entered the U.S. for the first time, how many times have you returned to 
Mexico for one year or more?  
 
9. How often do you travel to Mexico? 
 

























11. What do you mainly talk about with your friends and family? Please write either the 
number one, two, three, four, or five next to the topics of conversation that you discuss 
with your family in order of importance. For example, if when you speak with your family 
in Mexico you talk with them more than anything about the  their health and wellbeing, 
then write a one (1) next to that response below. You should mark only five responses, 
each with a different number.  
 






MEXICAN ECONOMY  
 
 






YOUR JOB IN THE U.S. 
 
 
YOUR DAILY LIFE IN THE U.S. 
 
 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE MEXICO (for example, elections, local candidates, 
political parties, corruption and crime, public works, political conflicts, civic activities 
in which you or your interlocutor engage, labor union activities, etc.) 
 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES  
EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERLOCUTOR IN U.S.  
 
 
12. Has your interest in the well being of Mexico and/or your community DECREASED or 
INCREASED since you moved to the United States? 
Explain. 
 
13. Have your ideas concerning the privatization ofenergy changed since you moved to the 
United States? Or are your ideas the same? 
Explain. 
 
14. Since you moved to the United States have your ideas concerning the rights of minorities, 
such as blacks, indigenous people, homosexuals, women, and people with disabilities 
changed? Or have they remained the same?  
Explain. 
 
15. Have your ideas about government corruption changed since you moved to the U.S. or 
are they pretty much the same?  
Explain. 
 
16.  Have your ideas concerning the governments’ responsibility to citizens changed or 
stayed the same since you moved to the U.S. (with respect to transportation, education, 





17. And your ideas concerning your own responsibilities vis-a-vis the government? Have they 
changed or remained pretty much the same since you moved to the U.S.?  
Explain. 
 
18. What about your ideas about politics and democracy? Are your ideas the same as before 
you left Mexico or different? 
Explain. 
 
19. What about the actions you take or believe people should take to bring about political 
change? Do you support the same actions as before or different ones? 
Explain. 
 
20. Do you speak with your family and friends who remain in Mexico about the responses to 
questions 12-17 above?  
Explain. 
 
21. How do your family and friends respond when you share your new ideas or observations 
with them?   
a. They are interested and ask many questions 
b. I am not sure, but they listen 
c. They are not interested 
d. They say Mexico could never be that way, it’s good that I left 
e. Other? 
 
22. Do you think your family and friends could do more to improve political life and outcomes 
in Mexico—to make their country better?  Or do you think there is nothing they can do? 
Explain. 
 
23. What could they do? 
 
24. Have you shared this view (Q. 22 and 23) with your friends and family in Mexico?  
Explain. Why or why not? 
25. Before you moved to the U.S., did you believe that your family could or should make 
more of an effort to help improve political life and outcomes in Mexico?  
Yes, nothing has changed  Yes, but now my beliefs are stronger  





Desencanto Ciudadano en México Survey 
 
Desencanto Ciudadano en México  
Junio de 2006 
 
FOLIO |_______________________________________| 
DATOS DE IDENTIFICACION 
 
ESTADO _______________________|___|___|    MUNICIPIO_______________________________________|___|___|___|___| 
LOCALIDAD ________________________________________________________________________|____|____|____|____| 
DISTRITO ELECTORAL  FEDERAL   |___|___|___|       SECCION ELECTORAL    |___|___|___|___|        
MANZANA  |___|___|                                                  VIVIENDA   |___|___|   
Domicilio de la vivienda ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
(Calle, Avenida, Callejón) 
______________   ________________    _____________________________________________________________________ 
  Número exterior             Número interior                                              (Colonia, fraccionamiento, barrio, unidad habitacional) 
        






FECHA |___|___| -|___|___| - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 
Día        Mes                Año 




FECHA  |___|___| -|___|___| - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 





FECHA |___|___|-|___|___| -| 2 | 0 | 0 | 6| 
Día      Mes          Año 
"Buenos días (tardes / noches), mi nombre es __________________ y trabajo para Berumen (MUESTRE SU CREDENCIAL), una empresa que 
se dedica a conocer las opiniones de los mexicanos, y para la Universidad de Texas en Austin.  Estamos realizando una encuesta sobre la 
democracia en México.  ¿Me permitiría hacerle unas preguntas?  Su participación es voluntaria y la información que nos proporcione es 
estrictamente confidencial y únicamente para fines de investigación académica.  (DAR HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN SI EL ENTREVISTADO PIDE 




FILTRO A : ¿Quién es el miembro del hogar mayor de 18 años más próximo a cumplir años?  (ANOTE NOMBRE) 
 
FILTRO B:  ¿Me permite hablar con (MENCIONE PERSONA DE FILTRO A)  ? 
                        1.SI…… PASE A FILTRO C             
                          2. NO…… MARQUE EL INTENTO Y PIDA CITA PARA CONTACTAR AL IN FORMANTE 
 
FILTRO C:  ¿Es usted mexicano/a? 
                        1.SI…… CONTINÚE Y MARQUE EL INTENTO                       
                          2. NO……. MARQUE EL INTENTO Y SEGUIR A PROXIMO HOGAR  
VISITAS DEL ENTREVISTADOR 1 2 3 
FECHA |___|___|-|___|___|-| 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 
Día      Mes             
Año 
|___|___|-|___|___|-| 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 
Día      Mes             Año 
|___|___|-|___|___|-| 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 
Día      Mes             Año 
NOMBRE DEL ENTREVISTADOR    
CÓDIGO DEL ENTREVISTADOR |___|___| |___|___| |___|___| 
HORA DE INICIO |___|___| : |___|___| 
    Horas          Minutos 
|___|___| : |___|___| 
     Horas          Minutos 
|___|___| : |___|___| 
     Horas          Minutos 
HORA DE TÉRMINO |___|___| : |___|___| 
   Horas          Minutos 
|___|___| : |___|___| 
     Horas          Minutos 
|___|___| : |___|___| 
     Horas          Minutos 
 
RESULTADO * |___| |___| |___| 
* CODIGO DE RESULTADO 1. ENTREVISTA COMPLETA 4. AUSENTE EN EL MOMENTO 
DE LA VISITA 
7. CITA/APLAZADA (Anote en 
observaciones) 
 2. ENTREVISTA INCOMPLETA 
(Anote en observaciones) 
5. SE NEGÓ A PARTICIPAR 8.OTRO (Anote en 
observaciones) 




I. PARTICIPACIÓN Y PREFERENCIAS POLÍTICAS 
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1.1  Independientemente de cómo haya votado en las elecciones pasadas, ¿regularmente Ud. se identifica con algún partido 
político? 
         1. SI  ¿Con cuál?                       2.NO PASE A 1.3                
1. PAN 5. PVEM 9. OTRO ___________________________ 
2. PRI 6. CONVERGENCIA 77. NINGUNO PASE A 1.3                
3. PRD 7. NUEVA ALIANZA 88. NO SABE  PASE A 1.3  
4. PT 8. ALTERNATIVA SOCIALDEMOCRÁTICA  Y CAMPESINA 99. NR  PASE A 1.3   
1.2  ¿Y diría que Ud. es “muy” o “algo” (panista/perredista/priísta/verde/petista)? 
        1. MUY  PASE A 1.4               2. ALGO  PASE A 1.4              8. NS   PASE A 1.4                         9. NR PASE A 1.4               
1.3  Aunque no se identifique plenamente con ningún partido, ¿hay uno que se acerca más a su forma de pensar que otros? 
         1. SI  ¿Cuál?                       2.NO PASE A 1.4                
1. PAN 5. PVEM 9. OTRO ___________________________ 
2. PRI 6. CONVERGENCIA 77. NINGUNO              
3. PRD 7. NUEVA ALIANZA 88. NO SABE  
4. PT 8. ALTERNATIVA SOCIALDEMOCRÁTICA Y CAMPESINA 99. NR  
1.4  En las elecciones presidenciales de 2000, muchas personas no pudieron votar porque tuvieron que trabajar o por otra razón.  
¿Votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2000? 
        1. SI      2. NO  PASE A 1.7    3. NO, NO  ERA MAYOR DE EDAD PASE A 1.7     8. NS   PASE A 1.7    9. NR PASE A 1.7              
1.5  ¿Se puede saber por quién votó?   Le recordamos que la información que usted proporcione es estrictamente confidencial. 
 
     1. VICENTE FOX (PAN/PVEM – ALIANZA POR EL 
CAMBIO)  
5. PORFIRIO MUÑÓZ LEDO (PARM – PARTIDO 
AUTÉNTICO DE LA REVOLUCIÓN MEXICANA) 
77.  NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO 
     2.  FRANCISCO LABASTIDA (PRI) 6. GILBERTO RINCÓN GALLARDO (PDS – 
PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA SOCIAL) 
88.NS 
     3. CUAUTÉMOC CÁRDENAS 
(PRD/PT/PAS/PNS/CONVERGENCIA – ALIANZA 
POR MÉXICO) 
7. OTRO   
                ______________________________ 
99.NR 
     4.  MANUEL CAMACHO SOLÍS (PCD – PARTIDO 
DEL CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO) 
8. EL VOTO ES SECRETO  
1.6  ¿Y por qué partido votó en la Cámara de Diputados en las elecciones de 2000?   
 




     2.  PRI 6.  PDS – (PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA SOCIAL) 88.NS 
     3. PRD/PT/PAS/PNS/CONVERGENCIA – (ALIANZA 
POR MÉXICO) 
7. OTRO   _______________________________ 99.NR 
     4.  PCD – (PARTIDO DEL CENTRO 
DEMOCRÁTICO) 
8. EL VOTO ES SECRETO  
1.7  ¿Votó en las elecciones federales de 2003? 
        1. SI      2. NO  PASE A 1.9     3. NO, NO ERA MAYOR DE EDAD PASE A 1.9     8. NS   PASE A 1.9     9. NR PASE A 1.9         
1.8  ¿Se puede saber por qué partido votó  en la Cámara de Diputados en 2003? 
 
        1. PAN 8. PAS 77.  NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO 
        2. PRI 9. MÉXICO POSIBLE 88.NS 
        3. PRD 10. PARTIDO LIBERAL MEXICANO 99.NR 
        4. PT 11.FUERZA CIUDADANA  
        5. PVEM 12. PRI/PVEM  
        6. CONVERGENCIA 13. OTRO  ___________________________  
        7. PSN 14. EL VOTO ES SECRETO  
1.9  Finalmente, ¿votó en las últimas elecciones de gobernador del estado? 
  1. SI      2. NO  PASE A 1.11     3. NO, NO ERA MAYOR DE EDAD PASE A 1.11     8. NS   PASE A 1.9     9. NR PASE A 1.11  
1.10  ¿Y por qué partido o candidato votó para gobernador? 
 
        1. PAN 8. PAS 14. EL VOTO ES SECRETO 
        2. PRI 9. MÉXICO POSIBLE 77.  NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO 
        3. PRD 10. PARTIDO LIBERAL MEXICANO 88.NS 
        4. PT 11.FUERZA CIUDADANA 99.NR 
        5. PVEM 12. PRI/PVEM  
        6. CONVERGENCIA 13. OTRO_______________________________  
        7. PSN 14. CANDIDATO _________________________  
1.11  ¿Cuenta usted actualmente con credencial de elector con fotografía? 
       1. SI                2.NO  PASE A 1.15                            9.NR PASE A 1.15                             
1.12 ¿Nos la permite ver? 
 
     1.  SI, TIENE CREDENCIAL VÁLIDA                                                              3. NO, SE NEGÓ A MOSTRARLA 
     2.  NO, PORQUE ESTÁ EXTRAVIADA O NO LA TIENE A LA MANO           4. OTRO (ESPECIFIQUE)____________________ 
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1.13 ¿Qué tan probable es que usted vote en estas elecciones presidenciales?   (LEER OPCIONES) 
       1. Definitivamente     2. Muy probable        3. Algo probable        4. Poco probable         5. Nada probable        8. NS       9. NR 
1.14  Si el día de hoy fueran las elecciones,  ¿por quién votaría para Presidente de la República?      DAR TARJETA 1 A 
ENTREVISTADO, PIDA QUE TACHE SU OPCIÓN DE VOTO, DOB LE LA TARJETA Y GUÁRDELA EN SU MOCHILA  
 
     1. FELIPE CALDERÓN DEL PAN 5. ROBERTO CAMPA CIFRIAN  DE PARTIDO 
ALIANZA SOCIAL 
77.  NINGUNO 
     2.  ROBERTO MADRAZO DE LA ALIANZA 
PRI/PVEM 
6.  VÍCTOR GONZÁLEZ TORRES / DR. SIMI 
 
88.NS 
     3. ANDRÉS  MANUEL LÓPEZ OBRADOR DE LA 
ALIANZA PRD/CONVERGENCIA/PT 
7. OTRO ________________________________ 
8. EL VOTO ES SECRETO 
99.NR 
     4.  PATRICIA MERCADO DE ALTERNATIVA 
SOCIALDEMOCRÁTICA  Y CAMPESINA 




1.15  Le voy a leer una serie de acciones. Dígame por favor ¿cuáles ha realizado usted en los últimos tres años?  (LEER OPCIONES) 
 SI NO NS NR  SI NO NS NR 
1. ¿Firmó una queja en contra del 
gobierno? 
1 2 8 9 7. ¿Participó en una marcha? 1 2 8 9 
2. ¿Mandó una carta al periódico? 1 2 8 9 8. ¿Participó en un plantón? 1 2 8 9 
3. ¿Llamó a un programa de radio o 
televisión? 
1 2 8 9 9.  ¿Participó en una toma de oficinas 
de gobierno?  
1 2 8 9 
4. ¿Escribió al presidente o a las 
autoridades? 
1 2 8 9 10.  ¿Participó en una invasión de 
tierra o predios? 
1 2 8 9 
5. ¿Repartió circulares o manifiestos? 1 2 8 9 
11.  ¿Participó en un bloqueo de vías 
públicas? 
1 2 8 9 
6. ¿Colocó una manta o cartel? 1 2 8 9      
1.16  ¿Actualmente con qué frecuencia participa en las siguientes organizaciones?  (LEER OPCIONES Y MUESTRE TARJETA 2) 
 Muy frecuentemente  Frecuentemente Ocasionalmente Nunca NS NR 
1. Partidos políticos 1 2 3 4 8 9 
2. Asociación política no partidaria 1 2 3 4 8 9 
3. Sindicatos 1 2 3 4 8 9 
4. Campesinas 1 2 3 4 8 9 
5. Indígenas 1 2 3 4 8 9 
6. Religiosas (además de ir a misa) 1 2 3 4 8 9 
7. Profesionales 1 2 3 4 8 9 
8. Vecinales 1 2 3 4 8 9 
10. Cooperativas 1 2 3 4 8 9 
11. Derechos humanos 1 2 3 4 8 9 
12. De mujeres 1 2 3 4 8 9 
13. Ecologistas 1 2 3 4 8 9 
14  Organizaciones cívicas 1 2 3 4 8 9 
1.17 ¿Participa usted en alguna otra organización? 
      1. SI  ¿Cuál? ______________________________                 2. NO  CONTINÚE                         9. NR  CONTINÚE                         
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II. INTERÉS POLÍTICO 
2.1 Generalmente, ¿por qué medio de comunicación más se entera usted de lo que pasa en la política?  (ANOTE PRIMERA 
RESPUESTA) 
1. PERIÓDICO                            4. REVISTAS                                                 7. OTRO ________________________ 
2. RADIO                                     5. OTRAS PERSONAS                                 8. NS 
3. TELEVISIÓN                           6. INTERNET                                     9. NR 
2.2 ¿Con qué frecuencia acostumbra usted ver noticias en la televisión?   
1. DIARIO                                             4. CADA 15 DÍAS                             7. OTRA________________________ 
               
2. VARIAS VECES POR SEMANA      5. UNA VEZ AL MES  8. NS                              
3. UNA VEZ POR SEMANA              6. NUNCA                                          9. NR 
2.3 ¿Con qué frecuencia acostumbra escuchar noticias en la radio?   
1. DIARIO                                             4. CADA 15 DÍAS                             7. OTRA________________________ 
               
2. VARIAS VECES POR SEMANA      5. UNA VEZ AL MES  8. NS                              




2.4 ¿Con qué frecuencia acostumbra leer noticias en el periódico?   
1. DIARIO                                             4. CADA 15 DÍAS                             7. OTRA________________________ 
               
2. VARIAS VECES POR SEMANA      5. UNA VEZ AL MES  8. NS                              
       3. UNA VEZ POR SEMANA              6. NUNCA                                          9. NR 
2.5  En general, ¿qué tan interesado está usted en la política?  (LEER OPCIONES) 
   1. Muy interesado    2. Algo interesado     3.  Poco interesado   4.  Nada interesado            8.NS            9.NR 
III. MIGRACIÓN Y REMESAS 
3.1  ¿Usted ha vivido fuera de México alguna vez? 
       1. SI            2. NO   PASE A 3.10                  8. NS  PASE A 3.10             9. NR  PASE A 3.10                           
3.2  ¿En qué país vivió? 
         1. ESTADOS UNIDOS      ¿En qué estado?  11. CALIFORNIA       12.TEXAS      13. ARIZONA       14. NUEVO MÉXICO 
                                                                                     
                                                         15. OREGON      16. WASHINGTON   17. ILLINOIS     18. CAROLINA DEL NORTE 
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                                                         19. FLORIDA          20.OTRO  _________________________ (ESPECIFIQUE) 
         2. CANADA            3.  OTRO PAÍS  ____________________________  (ESPECIFIQUE)                   8. NS                   9. NR 
3.3  ¿En cuántas ocasiones distintas vivió fuera de México? 
             |___|___|___|  VECES      888. NS          999.  NR 
3.4 ¿Cuándo fue la última vez que vivió fuera del país?  
1. DENTRO DE LOS ÚLTIMOS CINCO AÑOS    8. NS 
2. HACE ENTRE CINCO Y DIEZ AÑOS                                    9. NR 
3. HACE MÁS DE DIEZ AÑOS                   
3.5  Y en total, ¿cuántos años vivió fuera  del país? 
|___|___| AÑOS     |___|___| MESES         88. NS          999.  NR 
3.6  Y cuando vivió fuera del país, ¿con qué frecuencia participaba en las siguientes organizaciones? (LEER OPCIONES Y 
MUESTRE TARJETA 2) 
 Muy frecuentemente  Frecuentemente Ocasionalmente Nunca NS NR 
1. Organizaciones de la iglesia 1 2 3 4 8 9 
2. Sindicatos 1 2 3 4 8 9 
3. Padres de familia 1 2 3 4 8 9 
4. Profesionales 1 2 3 4 8 9 
5. Clubes de migrantes 1 2 3 4 8 9 
6. Vecinales 1 2 3 4 8 9 
7. Política o ciudadana 1 2 3 4 8 9 
3.7  Y cuando vivió fuera, ¿con qué frecuencia utilizó los siguientes servicios públicos?  (LEER OPCIONES Y MUESTRE TARJETA 2)  
 Muy frecuentemente  Frecuentemente Ocasionalmente Nunca NS NR 
1. Bibliotecas 1 2 3 4 8 9 
2. Servicios médicos 1 2 3 4 8 9 
3. Parques 1 2 3 4 8 9 
4. Transporte público 1 2 3 4 8 9 
5. Apoyos sociales del gobierno 1 2 3 4 8 9 
3.8  Cuando vivió fuera del país, ¿asistió a la escuela pública o algún pariente que viviera con Ud.? 
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       1.  SI           2. NO                          8.  NS        9.  NR 
3.9 ¿Piensa Ud. regresar a (MENCIONE PAÍS DE P3.2) en algún momento? 
       1. SI            2. NO         3. PROBABLEMENTE      5.  OTRO ______________________________         8. NS              9. NR              
3.10  ¿Tiene otros familiares o amigos que actualmente viven fuera de México? 
       1. SI                                 2. NO  PASE A 4.1                        8. NS  PASE A 4.1                 9. NR  PASE A 4.1  
3.11  ¿Qué tan seguido se comunica con ellos? 
1. MÁS DE UNA VEZ POR SEMANA  7. ENTRE 3 Y 5 VECES AL AÑO                
2. CADA SEMANA    8. DOS VECES AL AÑO   
3. VARIAS VECES POR MES   9. UNA VEZ AL AÑO 
4. CADA QUINCENA     10. OTRO__________________________________  
5. CADA MES                                                        88. NS 
6. ENTRE 6 Y 11 VECES AL AÑO  99.NR 
3.12 Cuando se comunican, ¿qué tanto hablan de política? (LEER OPCIONES) 
1. Siempre      2. Mucho    3. A veces    4. Casi nunca    5.  Nunca      8. NS      9. NR   
3.13  ¿Algún familiar o amigo que vive fuera de México le manda dinero? 
       1. SI            2.NO   PASE A 4.1                 8. NS  PASE A 4.1             9. NR  PASE A 4.1                           
3.14  ¿Qué tan seguido le manda dinero? 
1. MÁS DE UNA VEZ POR SEMANA  7. ENTRE 3 Y 5 VECES AL AÑO                
2. CADA SEMANA    8. DOS VECES AL AÑO 
3. VARIAS VECES POR MES   9. CADA AÑO 
4. CADA QUINCENA     10. OTRO__________________________________  
5. CADA MES                                                        88. NS 
6. ENTRE 6 Y 11 VECES AL AÑO  99.NR 
3.15  Y en promedio, ¿cuánto le mandan cada vez?  
1. MENOS DE 500 PESOS   5. MAS DE 3000 PESOS                
2. ENTRE 500 Y 1000 PESOS   6. OTRO__________________________________    
3. ENTRE 1000 Y 2000 PESOS  8.NS 
4. ENTRE 2000 Y 3000 PESOS   9.NR 
IV. CONCEPTOS GENERALES DE DEMOCRACIA 
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4.1  Mucha gente está de acuerdo en que la democracia significa igualdad ante la ley.  Sin embargo, algunas personas piensan que 
la democracia también significa mayor igualdad económica entre las personas.  ¿Qué tan importante es la igualdad económica 
para que un país sea democrático?  (LEER OPCIONES) 
            1)  Muy necesaria        2)  Algo necesaria     3)  Poco necesaria      4)  Nada necesaria.       8.  NS       9.  NR 
 
Ahora le voy a leer una frase acerca de la democracia y quisiera que Ud. me diga si está muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, ni de acuerdo 
ni en desacuerdo, en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con la frase.   (MOSTRAR TARJETA 3) 














4.2 Más que cualquier otra cosa, la democracia significa 
seleccionar los líderes políticos en elecciones libres y 
justas.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.3 Un país con grandes diferencias entre los ricos y los 
pobres no puede ser considerado una democracia.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.4 Un gobierno democrático debe garantizar que todos 
los grupos sociales tengan el derecho de protestar por 
medios pacíficos.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.5 En una democracia real, no habría hambre ni pobreza.   1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.6 Elecciones libres por sí solas no hacen que un país 
sea democrático.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.7 La democracia y el capitalismo van juntos. 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.8 Las políticas públicas de un gobierno democrático 
deben reflejar los valores religiosos de la mayoría.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.9 En una democracia, los y las homosexuales tienen el 
derecho de organizar marchas públicas.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.10 Más que nada, la democracia es que los partidos 
compiten por el apoyo de la mayoría.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.11  Además de igualdad ante la ley, la democracia 
también es mayor igualdad económica entre las 
personas.   
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
4.12  Los mexicanos no están preparados para la 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
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democracia.   
4.13  Es mejor que exista nada más un partido político en 
México.     
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
V. EVALUACIÓN DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN MÉXICO 










Muy en  
desacuerdo 
NS NR 
5.1  El gobierno federal respeta los derechos de la 
gente. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.2 El Gobierno estatal (ó el Distrito Federal) 
respeta los derechos de la gente. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.3 Las elecciones federales pasadas en 2003 
fueron limpias. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.4 Las elecciones estatales pasadas fueron 
limpias. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.5 Los diputados federales toman en cuenta a la 
gente cuando hacen leyes. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.6 Las decisiones económicas del gobierno han 
sido buenas para el país  en los últimos 5 años. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.7 La decisiones económicas del gobierno han 
sido buenas para mí en los últimos 5 años. 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
5.8 En general, ¿qué tan satisfecho está usted con la democracia en México?  (LEER OPCIONES) 
1. Muy satisfecho                                                  5. Nada Satisfecho 
2. Algo satisfecho                            8. NS                                                         
3. NI SATISFECHO / NI INSATISFECHO                  9. NR         
4. Poco satisfecho    
Ahora quisiera que usted  califique las siguientes personas e  instituciones y en una escala de 1 a 7, donde “1” quiere decir “nada  
satisfecho” , 4  “ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho“ y 7 es “muy satisfecho”.  (MUESTRE TARJETA 4) 
 CALIFICACIÓN NS NR 
5.10 ¿Qué tan satisfecho está con el  desempeño del presidente 
Fox? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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5.11 ¿Y del Congreso de la Unión en general?   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.12 ¿Qué tan satisfecho/a está del desempeño del gobernador del 
Estado?  (ó en el Distrito Federal del Jefe de Gobierno) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.13 ¿Y del presidente municipal?  (ó en el Distrito Federal del 
Delegado) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.14 En general, ¿qué tan satisfecho está usted del suministro de 
agua? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.15 ¿Y del suministro de luz? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.16 ¿Qué tan satisfecho está de la educación pública? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.17 ¿Y del desempeño de la policía? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5.18  En su opinión, ¿qué tan democrático es México?  (LEER OPCIONES) 
                1)  Muy democrático     2)  Algo democrático  3)  Poco democrático  4) Nada democrático             8.  NS     9.  NR 
VI. APOYO POR LA DEMOCRACIA  
 Ahora le voy a leer dos frases.  Quisiera que usted me diga si está muy de acuerdo con la primera, más de acuerdo con la 
primera que con la segunda, en el medio entre las dos frases, más de acuerdo con la segunda que con la primera o muy de 


























NS NR FRASE 2 
6.1  1)  Todos tenemos que 
aceptar el resultado de una 
elección libre, gane quien 
gane. Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
  2)  El gobierno debe anular un 
resultado electoral si el ganador 
provoca inestabilidad.    
6.2   1)  Todos tienen el derecho 
de libertad de expresión 
aunque pueda amenazar  
la unidad nacional. Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
 2)   Nadie tiene el derecho de 
expresar un punto de vista que 
amenaza la unidad nacional, aunque 
haya menos libertad de expresión.   
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6.3  1) El gobierno debe poner 
primero el orden público, 
aun a costa de algunas 
libertades Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
 
2)  Es mejor que haya mucha libertad 
aun a costa del desorden público.   
6.4  1)  El gobierno debe 
garantizar un juicio penal 
justo para todos los 
acusados aunque no se 
castigue a algunos 
delincuentes Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
2)  El gobierno debe castigar a los 
delincuentes aunque se acuse 
falsamente a algunas personas 
inocentes.    
6.5  1)   El país debe tener un 
líder  que toma decisiones 
rápidas, aun si sus 
acciones no cumplen con a 
ley Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
2)  El país debe tener un líder que 
cumpla con la ley a costa de tomar 
decisiones rápidas.    
6.6  1)   Es mejor que el partido 
del Presidente tenga 
mayoría en el Congreso 
para que no se atoren las 
leyes Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
2)  Es mejor que haya muchos 
partidos en el Congreso para que 
haya más debate.   
6.7 1)  Es mejor un gobierno 
autoritario que resuelve los 
problemas sociales que una 
democracia que no los 
resuelve los problemas Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
      2)   Es mejor una democracia que 
permite mucha participación aunque 
no siempre resuelve los problemas 
sociales.   
6.8  Ponga por caso que el gobierno quiere construir un centro de ayuda social.  El único lugar factible se ubica en un terreno privado, pero el dueño 
se opone.  Un gobierno democrático debe inclinarse  por... 
1) Respetar la propiedad 
privada Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
     2) Anteponer el interés público y 
tomar la tierra.   
6.9  Si a la gente no le parece bien alguna decisión del gobierno, entre las diversas cosas que puede hacer la gente, la acción más eficaz de cambiar 
la decisión es ... 
1) Votar por otro partido en las 
próximas elecciones Ó 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 
2) Protestar y presionar al gobierno 
por otros medios que no sean el 
voto.   
VII. CONOCIMIENTOS POLÍTICOS   
Ahora voy a hacer unas preguntas para saber qué tan buena es la información que hay sobre la política.  Muchas personas no van a 
saber las respuestas.  Si Ud. no sabe alguna, puede decir sencillamente, “No sé” 
7.1    ¿Se acuerda de la fecha de estas próximas elecciones federales? 
         1. 2 DE JULIO DE 2006                        8.  NS 
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         2. OTRA FECHA EN JULIO                  9.  NR 
         3. OTRA FECHA 
7.2  ¿Sabe usted cuánto tiempo duran los diputados federales en su puesto?    
       1. SI, TRES AÑOS         2.SI, OTRA RESPUESTA__________________________               3.NO                       9. NR  
7.3  ¿Sabe usted cómo se llama el gobernador de (ESTADO, o Jefe de Gobierno en el D.F.)? (ENTREVISTADOR: CONSULTE 
TARJETA DE APOYO) 
  1. NOMBRE Y APELLIDO PATERNO CORRECTOS                         2. PARCIALMENTE (NOMBRE O APELLIDO) CORRECTO 
  3. INCORRECTO                                         8.  NS                              9.  NR                 
7.4  ¿Y sabe a qué partido político pertenece?  (ENTREVISTADOR:  CONSULTE TARJETA DE APOYO)  
         1. PARTIDO CORRECTO (EN CASO DE COALICIÓN, CUALQUIER PARTIDO INTEGRANTE SE DA POR BUENO)                                     
         2. PARTIDO INCORRECTO       8.  NS                             9.  NR 
(MUESTRE TARJETA 6) 
7.5 Dígame, por favor, el número abajo de la foto del personaje que fue sometido a desafuero político en 2005.  Recuerde que no 
importa si Ud. no sabe la respuesta correcta.   
      1. VICENTE FOX                                                                 7. MARTA SAHAGÚN 
      2. BEATRIZ PAREDES                                                8. DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ DE CEVALLOS 
      3. FELIPE CALDERON          9. MARIO MARIN 
      4. ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO       
      5. ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR  88. NS 
      6. ROBERTO MADRAZO                               99.NR 
7.6 ¿A cuál de estos personajes se le vincula con un cuñado incómodo?  (SIGA MOSTRANDO TARJETA 6)  
      1. VICENTE FOX                                                                 7. MARTA SAHAGÚN 
      2. BEATRIZ PAREDES                                                8. DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ DE CEVALLOS 
      3. FELIPE CALDERON          9. MARIO MARIN 
      4. ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO       
      5. ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR  88. NS 
      6. ROBERTO MADRAZO                               99.NR 
7.7 ¿Cuál es líder sindical de los maestros y priísta inconforme?  (SIGA MOSTRANDO TARJETA 6)  
 1. VICENTE FOX                                                                 7. MARTA SAHAGÚN 
      2. BEATRIZ PAREDES                                                8. DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ DE CEVALLOS 
      3. FELIPE CALDERON          9. MARIO MARIN 
      4. ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO       
      5. ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR  88. NS 
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      6. ROBERTO MADRAZO                               99.NR 
7.8 ¿Qué es “Oportunidades”?  (LEER OPCIONES INCLUYENDO “NO SABE” PERO NO “NR”)  
      1. Una dependencia del gobierno.                                                     4. Un fondo para drogadictos que quieren dejar el vicio   
  
      2. Un programa del gobierno de ayuda escolar.                                8. No sabe.   
      3. Un programa del gobierno de ayuda al campo.                             9. NR 
 
VIII. DATOS DEL INFORMANTE 
8.1 EL ENTREVISTADO ES ....  
(REGISTRE SEXO Y ANOTE SIN PREGUNTAR)   
HOMBRE ............... 1        MUJER ................... 2 
8.2 ¿Cuántos años cumplidos tiene Usted?  
 AÑOS .......................... |___|___|                 
99. NR 
8.3 ¿Cuál fue el último año que aprobó en la escuela?   
01. NO ESTUDIÓ 06. CARRERA COMERCIAL 11. LICENCIATURA COMPLETA 
02. PRIMARIA INCOMPLETA 07. CARRERA TÉCNICA 12. MAESTRÍA / DIPLOMADO 
03. PRIMARIA COMPLETA 08. PREPARATORIA INCOMPLETA 13. DOCTORADO 
04. SECUNDARIA INCOMPLETA 09. PREPARATORIA COMPLETA 99. NR 
05. SECUNDARIA COMPLETA 10. LICENCIATURA INCOMPLETA  
8.4 ¿Cuál es su ocupación? 1. TRABAJADOR EN EL GOBIERNO 6. AMA DE CASA   
 2. TRABAJADOR EN SECTOR PRIVADO               7. DESEMPLEADO   
 3. PROFESIONISTA INDEPENDIENTE 8. JUBILADO O PENSIONADO 
 4. TRABAJADOR POR CUENTA PROPIA              9. CAMPESINO O JORNALERO 
 5. ESTUDIANTE                                                 
10. OTRO (Especifique): 
_____________________________ 
8.5 Considerando a todos los miembros que trabajan en su hogar. Aproximadamente, ¿en cuál de los siguientes rangos se 
encuentra su ingreso mensual familiar?                         (MUESTRE TARJETA 7)  
        1. Hasta 1,430 Pesos (HASTA 1 VSM) 4. De 4,292 A 7,152 Pesos  (3 A 5 VSM) 
        2. De 1,431 a 2,861 Pesos (1 A 2 VSM) 5. De 7,153 pesos y más  (5 Y MÁS VSM) 
        3. De 2,862 a 4,291 Pesos (2 A 3 VSM) 9. NR         
8.6 ¿Algún miembro del hogar habla una lengua o dialecto indígena? 
1. SI       2. NO   AGRADEZCA Y PASE A P 8.10                   9. NR   AGRADEZCA Y PASE A P 8.10 
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8.7¿Qué parentesco o relación tiene Ud. con la persona que habla la lengua indígena? 
1. PADRE    8. TIA 
2. MADRE  9. PRIMO 
3. ABUELO 10. PRIMA 
4. ABUELA  11. OTRO PARIENTE _______________________ (ESPECIFIQUE) 
5. HERMANO 12. AMIGO/AMIGA 
6. HERMANA 13. OTRO__________________________ 
       7. TIO  88. NS      
 99. NR 
8.8 ¿Qué lengua o dialecto habla?________________________________________________ (ANOTE RESPUESTA)  
8.9 ¿Y (MENCIONE RESPUESTA DE P 8.7), también habla español? 
           1. SI         2.NO 
   9.NR 
8.10 ANOTE SIN PREGUNTAR NIVEL SOCIOECONÓMICO    
APRECIATIVO, DE ACUERDO A LAS 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LA VIVIENDA 
        1.    BAJO                       4.    MEDIO ALTO               
        2.    MEDIO BAJO           5.    ALTO                
        3.    MEDIO                     9.     NR 
8.11  ANOTE SIN PREGUNTAR COLOR DE PIEL DEL ENTREVIST ADO 
        1.    BLANCO/GÜERO                         
        2.    MORENO CLARO                           
3. MORENO OSCURO 
4. NEGRO (ASCENDENCIA AFRICANA, CABELLO RISADO)                 
5. ASIÁTICO (PIEL “AMARILLA”, OJOS RASGADOS) 
6. OTRO________________________ 
       9.    NR 
AGRADEZCA Y TERMINE 
Yo entrevistador _______________________________, número _______________ declaro que seguí todas las indicaciones metodológicas para la 
selección de la muestra y que toda la información contenida en este cuestionario es verídica. Acepto que si existe algún dato falso en él, la empresa 
Berumen  tome las medidas legales pertinentes. 
FIRMA DEL ENTREVISTADOR _________________________________ FECHA DE ENTREVISTA  |___|___|-|___|___|-| 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 
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